SUBCOURSE
MP 2006

EDITION
C

AREA SECURITY OPERATION

MP



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AREA SECURITY OPERATIONS

Subcourse Number MP 2006

EDITION C

United States Army Military Police School
Fort McClellan, Alabama 36205-5030

5 Credit Hours

Edition Date: September 1996

SUBCOURSE OVERVIEW

The Area Security Operations subcourse is designed to present the students with the knowledge and skills required to provide security for:

- A command post (CP).
- Designated persons.
- A convoy.
- Lines of communication (LOC).

Students will also be able to perform a cordon and search mission, analyze terrain according to METT-T, and prepare and brief missions in the operation order format.

There are no prerequisite for this subcourse.

This subcourse reflects the doctrine which was current at the time it was prepared. In your own work situation, always refer to the latest official publications.

Unless otherwise stated, the masculine gender of singular pronouns is used to refer to both men and women.

TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE

ACTION: Direct area security operations.

CONDITION: You will have this subcourse, paper and pencil.

STANDARD: To demonstrate competency of this task you must achieve a minimum score of 70 percent on the subcourse examination.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

Use the above publication extracts to take this subcourse. At the time we wrote this subcourse, these were the current publications. In your own work situation; always refer to the latest publications.

LESSON 1

COMMAND POST AND DESIGNATED PERSONS
SECURITY OPERATIONS

CRITICAL TASK: 01-3761.00-1103

OVERVIEW

Lesson Description:

In this lesson you will learn to perform security operations for command posts and designated persons.

Terminal Learning Objective:

ACTION: Plan and configure security of a command post and designated persons.

CONDITION: You will have this subcourse, pencil and paper.

STANDARD: To demonstrate competency of this task you must achieve a minimum score of 70 percent on the subcourse examination.

REFERENCES: The material contained in this lesson was derived from the following publications: FM 19-1, FM 19-4, FM 19-30, FM 71-100, FM 71-101, TAC-CP 101-5.

INTRODUCTION

Future battles will be intense, fast-moving and deadly. They will stress air ground operations across the entire battlefield. The battle lines will be ones of constant movement. Traditional battle lines will be obsolete. Battles will extend from friendly rear areas to the enemy's rear areas. The enemy will coordinate attacks in rear areas as an extension of battles being fought in the main battle area. In a battle of the future, the Army can be decisively defeated by the enemy in the rear area even while it is winning elsewhere.

Because of this great threat, the rear areas will be battle areas in which battlefield commanders do not have enough reserves to fight the enemy. They will need to depend on a mobile fighting force that is prepared to fight the rear area battle.: This fighting force is the Military Police.

The MP Role in Combat

Military police (MP) play an important role on the battlefield. They help tactical commanders meet the battle. They provide a wide range of support to commands, and ongoing close operations. MP have four battlefield missions:

- o Battlefield Circulation Control (BCC).
- o Area Security.
- o Enemy Prisoners of War Operations.
- o Law and Order.

Each of these four missions consists of a number of operations. These operations may be done alone or with others to accomplish the MP's mission. Each MP operation is determined by the maneuver commander's need and available MP resources. The tactical commander, through the provost marshal (PM), sets the priorities for MP operations. The MP, by performing these operations, provide a full range of battlefield support.

PART A - SECURITY OPERATIONS PLANNING

1. Introduction.

a. The command post is the focal point for directing combat operations. Commanders and their staff plan, execute, and control operations from command posts. Each type of command post has its primary operational function. As a result, the command post is a prime enemy target. MP are charged with the protection of these centers-of-command. As an MP officer, you may have to plan for the security of the command post (CP) and designated individuals.

b. Preparation is the key for success in any security operations. Planning security for known factors-the number of personnel, amount and types of equipment, command post configurations and mission requirements is vital. Planning defensive security measures to address the threat of the enemy is crucial on the battlefield.

c. Planning security operations requires knowing which types of command posts and what and how many personnel require security. We will first look at the three types of command posts: Tactical command post (TAC-CP), main command post (main CP), and rear command post (rear CP). Also discussed will be the six measures the MP may use to perform area security: access control points, guard posts, dismount points, observation posts, security patrols and defensive techniques.

2. Tactical Command Post.

a. The tactical command post (TAC-CP) is usually small and highly mobile. It requires only those soldiers and equipment needed to handle on going day-to-day events (current operations) on the battlefield. Since the commander

controls the battle through the TAC-CP, it is located well forward in the main battle area (see Figure 1-1).

b. Primary functions of the TAC-CP include:

- o Combat intelligence of immediate interest to the commander.
- o Control of maneuver forces.
- o Control and coordination of all ready fire support means. This includes tactical air and attack helicopters.
- o Coordination of air space and forward air defense operations.
- o Setting up requirements for sustaining the effort at the main CP.

c. A TAC-CP provides only the minimum needed staff support. But, it consists of soldiers from several units. This includes:

- o Intelligence (G2).
- o Operations and plans (G3).
- o Field artillery fire support.
- o Tactical air support.
- o Combat service support liaison.

d. A TAC-CP must be located in an area which offers protection and concealment. It can be set up in an open, wooded, or urban terrain. An example of a TAC-CP configuration is shown in Figure 1-1. To keep pace with the movement of the battle, maintain effective control, and protect itself, the TAC-CP relocates often. A small number of soldiers and the minimum equipment is needed to man the TAC-CP. Therefore, it can easily be moved day or night.

3. Main Command Post.

The main command post (main CP) conducts activities that sustain the division. The main CP is larger than a TAC-CP. It is located farther to the rear than the TAC-CP. The main CP can handle current operations (close, deep, and rear). Coordinates requirements for protection of rear areas, plans for future operations, and exercise command and control of current operations in cases where the TAC CP is not employed or is displacing. Main CPs houses staff activities that sustain the force. To increase its chance of surviving enemy attack, and mobility, only full-time staff elements are housed in a main CP. Functions which are handled part-time or can be performed some place else are not done at the main CP.



Figure 1-1. Tactical CP Configuration.

Soldiers from the following elements operate from a main CP:

- o Personnel (G1).
- o Operations and plans (G3).
- o Logistics (G4).
- o Air defense artillery.
- o Aviation.
- o Fire support.
- o Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC).

- o Signal support.
- o Combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI).
- o Communications-electronics operations (SOT).
- o Chief of staff section.
- o Tactical operations centers (TOC).

4. Rear Command Post.

The rear command post (rear CP) is set up for Army elements that provide combat service support and administrative support. They are set up even further to the rear in the division support area. Administrative support activities are located in a "division rear" either in the division support area or in a corps support area.

Elements of the division headquarters and division staff have been removed from the main CP and are gathered in the rear CP. These include:

- o Combat support functions that work closely with Division Support Command (DISCOM).
- o Counterintelligence and interrogation of prisoners of war.
- o Military police and provost marshal activities.
- o Airlift support.

5. MP's Role in Area Security Operations.

a. Military police perform area security operations such as: Area Recon and Surveillance, Designated Critical Assets, Special Ammunition, Base Response Force Opns, Counterincursion Opns, Air Base Ground Defense, Terrorist Counteraction, Area Damage Control Opns, and NBC Detecting and Reporting. This helps relieve the tactical commander of the burden of providing protection and security to battle units in the rear area. They provide a key response force for conducting rear operations. MP protect units from enemy threats which may disrupt rear operations. This is provided through three forms of security:

- o Internal security.
- o Perimeter security.
- o Screen.

b. Internal Security. Internal measures ensure close-in security of persons, specific tents, rooms, vehicles, and information (such as documents and materials). To provide this security, MP control movement around a secure

site and control access to the site. To perform this vital function, MP operate dismount posts (DPs), access control points (ACPs), and guard posts (GP).

c. Perimeter Security. Perimeter security provides all-round security for unit facilities. MP can provide this defense for a chosen facility. As part of a base defense, they can protect only a section of a larger perimeter. Defensive perimeter operations include using mines, placing obstacles, placing automatic and anti-armor weapons, manning observation posts (OP), and securing patrol routes.

d. Screen. Screening keeps a unit from being surprised by an enemy. To prevent this surprise, MP operate patrols and man OPs. These actions give an early warning of enemy activity in the area being secured. These screen operations also help identify, intercept, and destroy small enemy forces before they can cause damage to the objective.

6. Area Security Measures

There are six measures the MP may use in any combination to perform area security: access control point, guard posts, dismount points, observation posts, security patrols and defensive techniques. The type of security MP provide may depend on the presence or absence of augmentation by the division band or by a corps MP company.

a. Access Control Point (ACP). Access control points protect CP elements within a CP's perimeter. Military police at ACPs watch all persons entering and leaving a facility. Figure 1-2 shows an example of MP positioning when securing a division main CP. Access points are shown in the figure as the entrance of the division tactical operations center (DTOC)(seen in the center of Figure 1-2) and telecommunications center (seen in the upper left corner of the figure). Access control points are normally manned by an MP team located near or at the entrance to a facility. This prevents a person from entering a facility without first going through the ACP. Also, the ACP is placed in a position to allow an MP to see any approaching person as soon as possible.

b. Guard Posts. Guard posts, like access points, prevent unauthorized persons from entering a facility. Guard posts may be used in place of ACPs, or used with these points to maximize protection. Guard posts are placed close to a facility, but not at an entry door. Guard post locations can easily be seen in Figure 1-2.

c. Dismount Point. -The control of military movement is the primary purpose of a dismount point. Passengers in vehicles must dismount and the vehicles are parked in a designated area. MP provide information and directions to those authorized to enter CP area. As the officer in charge, you are responsible for identifying the general site of the dismount point. The MP team leader will usually designate the exact location. One MP team is normally all that is needed to operate a dismount point. Mission, enemy, terrain, troops available and time (METT-T) will have an impact as to whether the team organization changes.

d. Observation Posts. The OP team will observe and report enemy activity. The team has the responsibility to look and listen and provide warning of enemy approach. One person will observe while the next person records and reports information. The third person is for relief and back-up security.

e. Security Patrol. MP security patrol is a combat patrol conducted on foot or mounted as dictated by METT-T. MP security patrols can be used to deter, detect, and disrupt enemy actions against CPs, bases, base clusters, and key personnel. Security patrols prevent infiltration and surprise attacks at stationary units or critical points along the main supply routes (MSR).

f. Defensive Techniques. MP platoon deploys in a circle around the area being protected. Squads and teams defend a portion of the platoon's circle.

7. Critical Elements in a Command Post and Security Measures Used for Protection.

a. Tactical Operations Center (TOC). The TOC is the heart of the CP. It controls and coordinates those activities that are not provided by the TAC-CP. A TOC configuration is shown in Figure 1-3. You can see the different staff and specialized elements of the TOC. Each element is important to the overall success of the battle. For example, the telecommunications center is used to transmit information, distribute intelligence, control fire, and move troops by using an integrated system of secure and non-secure equipment consisting of:

- o AM/FM voice.
- o Multi-channel systems.
- o Messengers.
- o Radio wire integration (RWI).

b. Another unit in the TOC, the tactical air control party (TACP), plans and coordinates air reconnaissance operations. A third unit, the fire support element (FSE), performs fire support functions. This consists of:

- o Planning and coordinating the use of nuclear and chemical fire.
- o Ensuring that organic and nuclear-capable artillery units are in the correct position.
- o Coordinating requests for more fire support.
- o Advising the commander on fire support operations.



Figure 1-2. Platoon Securing a Division Main CP.



Figure 1-3. TOC Configuration.

c. The TOC is a crucial element of the CP. Special internal security measures are taken to protect it. This includes:

- o Perimeter patrols of the TOC.
- o TOC access control points.
- o Guard posts within the TOC.

d. All-Source Production Section (ASPS). An ASPS is where intelligence information is received, processed, and distributed. Its placement within a roc is shown in Figure 1-4. It analyzes and disseminates intelligence data from data counterintelligence, human intelligence, or photo-intelligence.

e. Telecommunications Center. As the communications center for a main CP is so vital to the success of battle, the loss of communication could result in defeat on the battlefield, therefore, special security measures are taken. The type of security measure used depends on whether the center is located in a massed CP or a dispersed CP. Its access is restricted by perimeter and access control points when located within a massed CP. It is protected by local security around its cell if within a dispersed CP.



Figure 1-4. ASPS within TOC.

f. Commander's Quarters. An attack on the commander's quarters can cause considerable disruption to battlefield operations. The commander's quarters are protected by MP through the use of limited perimeter defense positions, foot and mobile patrols, and ACPs.

g. Service Roads. Vulnerable areas and service roads are patrolled on a 24-hour basis. A massed CP will have at least one service road. MP security positions can be seen in Figure 1-2.

8. Command Post Security.

a. CPs are important to the success of a battle. They are prime targets for the enemy. Survival of the CP is increased by using the following methods:

- o Separating the command into three elements.
- o Reducing the size of the CP and changing its electronic signature.
- o Locating the main CP out of artillery range.
- o Using armored command post vehicles in TAC-CPs.
- o Providing tactical and main CPs with the ability to move frequently.

b. CP security is vital to the commander. The MP mobility, radio communications, and MK19 firepower make them well-suited for CP security operations.

c. The location of the main CP is important. It will become a principal enemy target. It should not be set up closer than 30 kilometers from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). A main CP may be set up in open terrain, in a wooded area, or in urban terrain. Main CPs can be set up as a "massed CP" or "dispersed CP." A massed CP has a definite perimeter and usually requires a dismount point. When a massed CP is used, elements within the CP set up their operations fairly close to each other. An example of a massed CP is shown in Figure 1-5.

d. A dispersed CP, on the other hand, has its elements spread out in cells. This makes finding the CP more difficult for the enemy. Dispersion also makes a single attack against the CP less likely to destroy all elements. A dispersed CP is shown in Figure 1-6.

e. The full-time operational status of the TAC-CP allows the relocation of the main CP at any time. If the TAC-CP is destroyed, the main CP can become an interim source of replacements or an emergency battle command post unit until another TAC-CP can be set up.

f. The CP set up and how it is set up, determines the type of security measures that will be used by the MP. When a division massed CP (Figure 1-5) is used, internal security measures are needed.

g. Security Measures for a Massed CP. Basing security operations on mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, and time (METT-T)(Figure 1-7), an MP platoon's security responsibilities are divided in securing the massed CP. The type of security MP provide may depend on the presence or absence of augmentation by the division band or by a corps MP company. In Figure 1-2, you can see an example of MP emplacement securing a division main CP.

(1) First, one squad operates a CP and controls movement around the CP. A massed CP has a definite perimeter. It requires that the MP set up a DP (Figure 1-2). DPs are set up wherever access to an area must be controlled. The DP is set up on or outside a perimeter. Selection of a DP requires a level area where a vehicle can stop, dismount passengers, and park. It must be easily accessible from a road, and easy for a driver to find. Although a DP must be within walking distance of the CP, it should not be so close that enemy fire could be brought to bear on the CP. A DP must also offer some cover and concealment. This ensures its protection and prevents the enemy from knowing the CP's location. As you learned earlier in the lesson, the main purpose of the DP is to control military movement. MP control military movement by stopping military vehicles, allowing passengers to dismount, and directing drivers to parking areas. Civilian traffic is prevented from entering a secured site or restricted area by directing them to other routes. Refugees are stopped from entering a secure site. MP control stragglers by:

- Giving them directions.
- Providing medical care.

o Detaining them for future disposition.



Figure 1-5. Massed Main Command Post Configuration.

(2) A second squad operates the ACP and guard posts. The MP must set up an ACP (Figure 1-2) at the division tactical operations center (DTOC). MP at access points monitor persons entering and exiting a facility. An ACP is placed near an entrance so that no one can enter the facility without first going through the control point. In securing the CP, the MP may also decide

to set up guard posts within the DTOC (Figure 1-2). MP at guard posts, as at ACPs, prevent unauthorized entry to a CP. MP at guard posts detect people who may have slipped by other access control measures. Guard posts may be used either with or in place of ACPs. A guard post is placed close to a facility, but not necessarily at its entrance. Placement is based on the guard's field of vision. If wire is used around a facility as shown in Figure 1-2, the guard post is set up inside the wire.

(3) Third, an All-Source Production Section (ASPS) may be located in the DTOC. Internal security measures at the ASPS may be combined with measures for the main CP. A separate squad attached to the MP platoon from company HQ would secure the all-source analysis center at the main CP.

(4) Finally, the remaining MP squad performs the following functions:

- o Man perimeter positions.
- o Secure the division commander's quarters.
- o Help other MP squads.
- o Perform other assigned missions.



Figure 1-6. Dispersed CP.

MISSION	What is the company's, the platoon's, or the squad's MISSION?
ENEMY	What ENEMY troops oppose MP units? What size are the units, and where are they? Will they be mounted, dismounted, or both?
TERRAIN	How can MP use TERRAIN and WEATHER to their advantage? To answer this question, MP review OCOKA: Observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach. See Appendix V for more information on OCOKA.
TROOPS	What TROOPS are available? How will this affect choosing positions, routes, formations, and fire plans?
TIME	How much TIME is available for planning? For execution? Over what area or SPACE will the operation take place?

Figure 1-7. Mission, Enemy Terrain, Troops Available, and Time.

h. Security Measures for Dispersed Command Post. When a CP is dispersed, different security measures are required. An example of an MP platoon securing a dispersed CP is shown in Figure 1-6. Because the distance between cells is greater than in massed CP, there is no definite perimeter to secure. Therefore, no DPs are necessary.

(1) Access control is performed by soldiers assigned to a specific cell. MP set up security patrols and observation posts (OPs) to find the enemy and to give the CP early warning of enemy movement.

(2) MP platoons provide CP security by using security patrols and OP. These OPs look and listen for enemy activity within a particular sector. They watch suspicious enemy avenues of approach and report enemy activity. Although a combat element, they only fight in self-defense or to cover their withdrawal. By filling in the gaps between the OPs with security patrols, the MP form a screen line around the dispersed CP. This "creates" a perimeter which can be defined..

i. Security Measures for Tactical Command Post. Security for a TAC-CP (Figure 1-1) requires setting up an ACP. MP may also set up guard posts within the TAC-CP area. Through the use of OPs and security patrols, an early warning system is established to warn the TAC-CP of enemy activity.

(1) MP squads also provide security when TAC-CPs move to new sites. One method is depicted in the mobile TAC-CP configuration shown in Figure 1-9. In this example, two CP carriers (G2/G3 operations (OPS) and fire support elements (FSE)), one Air Force communications vehicle (USAF), one Air Defense Artillery (ADA) vehicle, a command vehicle (COMMANDER), and two security vehicles (SECURITY) comprise the TAC-CP. This group is smaller than the average TAC-CP, but allows the commander to: (1) communicate with forward brigades; (2) provide Air Force communication with tactical air support; (3)

keep abreast of any current air battles; and (4) manage air defense in the forward area.

(2) To provide the most protection during the move, the security vehicles are placed at the front and rear of the TAC-CP.

9. Command Post Personnel Elements.

a. In this learning event, we have described the three different types of CP: TAC-CP; main CP; and rear CP. Each has its own function to perform in meeting the challenges of the battlefield. To perform its function, each OP needs principal and specialized staff elements. The following principal staff sections are housed in a CP:

- o The G1 Section.
- o The G2 Section.
- o The G3 Section.
- o The G4 Section.
- o The G5 Section.

b. Principal staff sections play a crucial role in the overall battle plan. It is the MP's job to ensure their safety while they perform their jobs. The G2 section has personnel at three locations. The G3 section is divided between the TAC-CP and main CP. The G1 and G4 sections are at the main CP and rear CP, while G5 section is located in the division support area (DSA).

c. The G1 Section. The G1 section provides support to the combat service support (CSS) liaison element in the TAC-CP. The G1 section keeps the commander informed of the personnel and administrative situation. They also appraise the commander on any changes in battle priority.

d. The G2 Section. The G2 section has small elements located at the TAC-OP and in the DSA. Most of the people are housed at the main CP. G2 processes all intelligence information. Its main function is to provide the commander and G3 the intelligence on which to base current tactical decisions.

(1) The G2 intelligence functions have grown to include ground recon and surveillance, in addition to air recon. Because of this, G2 is now known as G2 R & S.

(2) The counterintelligence and interrogation element is located at the rear CP. Its physical presence is not needed at the main CP.



Figure 1-8. Platoon Securing a Dispersed CP.



Figure 1-9. Mobile TAC-CP Configuration.

e. The G3 Section. The G3's functions have been divided between controlling immediate combat operations and sustaining the battle. The immediate combat operation functions are carried out at the TAC-CP. Sustainment functions are performed at the rear CP. The section at the main CP monitors combat operations and coordinates available combat support.

f. The G4 Section. The G4 section is divided between the main CP and the rear CP. This section also provides a representative to the CSS liaison element in the TAC-CP. It keeps the commander current on the logistic situation. The section at the main CP mainly coordinates the logistics with the tactical aspects of the battle.

g. The G5 Section. The G5 section is located in the division support area. It coordinates the functions of civil-military operations. This includes two aspects of current or proposed operations: civil affairs and psychological.

10. Specialized Staff Sections.

The principal staff sections are assisted by a number of specialized staff elements. Some of the elements are located at the main CP. Others perform their missions from their parent unit locations.

Specialized staff elements include:

- o Combat Intelligence Company Augmentation.
- o ASA Tactical Support Element.
- o Special Security Office.
- o Fire Support Elements.
- o Air Defense Artillery Section.
- o Division Aviation Section.
- o Chemical Section.

PART B - SECURITY OF DESIGNATED PERSONS

1. Introduction.

a. MP may be called on to provide protective services to keep agents or terrorists from killing key personnel. The degree of security given the person is determined by the importance of that person's mission and/or responsibility. Security for the following will be described in this section.

- o Quartering party.
- o Commanding general.

o VIPs.

(1) Quartering Party. A quartering party is organized and employed to prepare a new CP site. The MP company commander provides quartering party security and integrates all MP operations at the new CP. MP accompany the quartering party to the new site and perform a number of functions. This includes:

o Reconnoitering the route to the site.

o Securing the area around the site.

o Setting up obstacles.

o Providing internal security.

o Executing circulation control measures.

o Setting up communications.

o Receiving the main body.

(a) After checking she route to the new site, the MP secure the site area. When the quartering party reaches the site, MP secure the area. They search for mines, booby traps, items of intelligence value, and other signs of enemy presence. If the CP is to be in an urban area, MP clear the buildings that are to be used and others that are within the perimeter. Once the site is secured, the MP provide security by setting up OPs and defensive positions around the perimeter.

(b) The quartering party sets up the new site for the unit's arrival. They choose a location for the company CP and set up the wire net. They center the CP inside the perimeter. They decide where other unit elements will be positioned. The party places the maintenance section where it can easily use the entry and exit routes.

(c) Other functions of the quartering party include:

o Locating the tactical communications section.

o Selecting a troop area.

o Picking roads and trails that permit one-way traffic.

o Briefing main body leaders on the current operation status.

(2) Commanding General. When directed by the commander to provide security for the commander's quarters, MP operate limited perimeter defense positions. They operate foot and mobile patrols in and about the CP area. The commanding general is also given special security as he moves around

within the CP. This includes providing him a radio-equipped HUMMV. His tent is guarded 24 hours a day, and MP control entry into the area through ACPs.

(3) Very Important Person (VIP). The degree of security for a VIP (principal) is dependent on the importance of the person or his mission. MP provide the principal with protection whether he is in a building, within the confines of a CP, or traveling. Security operations at a CP or building are done by an MP team. If possible, the principal is briefed on the procedures being used by the team.

(a) When traveling, the principal is provided security while he moves about. A principal may travel by rail, boat, air, motor vehicle, or foot. Two of the most common methods of travel on the battlefield are motor vehicle and aircraft.

(b) Special security measures which are taken by the MP include:

- o Security at the pickup point.
- o MP action to pick up the VIP.
- o Security during movement.
- o Release point coordination and control.
- o Release point security.

(c) When the principal travels by fixed-wing aircraft, MP ride in the same aircraft. When the principal travels by helicopter, MP ride in the same aircraft if possible. When the principal travels by motor vehicle, MP ride in lead and trail vehicles. Many of the same procedures used to protect the principal during vehicle movement are the same employed when protecting a convoy.

b. CP Security Planning Requirements

(1) The command post and Tactical Operations Center are the centers for directing combat operations on today's battlefield. As a result, the CP is vulnerable to enemy operations, both covert and overt. The protection of these areas is crucial. An MP company may be employed in a number of ways to secure a CP. How it is used depends on the situation and METT-T. The MP commander plans how to provide the most security. He plans the internal security perimeter defense and local security measures.

(2) As an MP, you may be responsible for the security of a CP or TOC. You will need to plan for and conduct the security of the CP and TOC from a set plan to stop any breaches of security.

(3) Your area security plan will need to be flexible. It will need to meet the security requirements for any mission or battle-determined priority. The plan must consider the following:

- o Personnel.
- o Equipment and weapons.
- o Communications.
- o Contingency plans.

(4) The MP company commander is responsible for BCC in and around the main CP. You may be required to set up and operate traffic control posts (TCPs), roadblocks, checkpoints, or other control measures to control movement.

(5) The company commander may employ his security forces as follows: Two squads secure the TAC-CP. One squad provides internal security for the TOC. One squad provides access control and guard posts within the TOC. Two squads operate fixed and/or mobile guard posts within the main CP. Two squads man DPs. One squad operates as part of the perimeter defense. Finally, three squads operate OPs and security patrols.

(6) When planning for the security of a CP or TOC, make sure that the following positions are manned on a 24-hour basis.

- o TCPs at the intersection of the main supply route.
- o ACPs at the access road to the CP.
- o DP near the entrance to the CP.
- o Entrance to the TOC.
- o All-Source Production Section (ASPS).
- o Personal security of the division commander.
- o Telecommunications center.

(7) Traffic Control Posts. The number of MP needed and the types of weapons needed to man a TCP are based on METT-T. A TCP is usually manned by one MP team of three people. The leader provides leadership and maintains communications. A second MP watches the flow of traffic and directs the flow of vehicles and personnel. The third MP provides security and relieves the second MP. The TCP is an easy target for terrorists and enemy agents. Each team member must be alert for enemy activity.

(a) The team leader selects the positions for the team members. He decides where to place the MK19 in position for fighting. The team vehicle

is parked in a covered area, in a concealed position near the fighting position. The unit standing operation procedures (SOPs) determine the team's combat load.

(b) In addition to the combat load, the following items are needed at a TCP:

- o Flashlights.
- o White cuffs with light reflecting stripes (enemy situation may require the cuffs to be removed to prevent enemy detection of the MP).
- o First aid kit.
- o Signal Operation Instruction (SOI).
- o Maps.
- o Signs.
- o NBC monitoring equipment.

(c) This equipment is valuable to the enemy. The SOI reveals friendly frequencies. MP must be ready to destroy their equipment if they are attacked and it seems that this information could fall into enemy hands.

(8) Access Control Points. You have learned earlier in this subcourse that ACPs monitor all persons entering and leaving a facility. Two MP usually operate an ACP. One MP checks identification; the second MP provides security. Identification is checked against the access roster. Anyone who is not named on the access roster is detained. The MP notify facility personnel on the field telephone when someone is detained. They are instructed what to do with the person.

(a) When setting up an ACP, MP choose a place to set up a MK19. When friendly troops are within range of the MK19, rifles and pistols are used for close-in fighting.

(b) Operating an ACP requires special supplies. The MP unit must have an access roster (or badge board) stating who can enter the facility. Also, the MP must have the following equipment:

- o Personal weapons.
- o Flashlights.
- o Night-vision devices.
- o TA-312 field phone or man-portable radio.

(9) Dismount Points. The officer in charge of setting up the CP usually picks the general site for the DP. The MP team leader picks the exact location.

(a) One team, of three members, normally operates a DP. The team leader provides control, maintains communications, and sets up security. One team member controls movement at the DP. The remaining member provides extra security and relieves the MP operating the DP.

(b) Team organization changes with the terrain and the size of the DP. A large operation may need several MP to control movement in and around the DP.

(c) The equipment used at a DP is important. Each man must have his weapon and a basic load of ammunition. The team should have an automatic weapon. Also, the following should be on hand:

- Night-vision devices.
- TA-312 telephone.
- Alternate communication systems including visual devices and messengers.

(10) Entrance to the TOC. Three MP provide 24-hour security to the TOC. An MP team controls the access point in front of the TOC to control entry into the area. This control point is operated in the same manner as the ACP, controlling movement to the CP. The third member of the team patrols the perimeter. One or more guard posts are set up with the TOC.

(11) All-Source Production Section (ASPS). The ASPS is provided with a 24-hour protection with at least an MP team controlling access to the ASPS and patrolling its perimeter. An ASPS is shown in Figure 1-10. The MP are equipped with personal weapons and access rosters.

(12) Personal Security of the Division Commander. The commander is provided with a special protective team. His tent is guarded by one MP on a 24-hour basis. A minimum of four (4) MP are assigned on-call. He also is provided with an armed HUMMV equipped with an on-board radio for his own use.

(13) Telecommunications Center. This facility requires one MP on around-the-clock duty. One MP secures an ACP. He is provided with an access roster.

(14) Service Roads. One major factor deciding security measures for service roads is the number of roads to be patrolled. Also, the number and type of security depends on whether the CP security is performed by personnel assigned to that cell. Since there is no perimeter, no DP is used. Military police set up security patrols and OPs to give early warning to the CP. Figure 1-2 shows how MP could be deployed along service roads within a massed CP.

(15) Personnel Responsible for Security Operations. There must be a team effort to set up a CP and provide for adequate CP security. Personnel required include:

- o Headquarters commandant.
- o G3 Section.
- o Communication-electronics officers.
- o Military police commander.
- o Individual military police.
- o Band augmentation (division main CP).



Figure 1-10. All-Source Production Section.

The general location of a main CP is selected by the commanding general and G3. But, the specific location is determined by both the HQ commandant and communications-electronics officer. The HQ commandant directs security functions. MP commanders are responsible for securing the military forces. Individual MP must make the plan work.

c. Contingency Plans.

(1) Contingency plans must be developed to cope with unforeseen or emergency operations. Periodic review and revision of these plans increase their effectiveness.

(2) You should have a contingency plan developed for operation orders. Operation orders coordinate actions to carry out the commander's operation plan. These orders explain how leaders at different levels want the operation conducted. They may be written, oral, graphic (traces/overlays), or a combination of these forms. Operation orders may be primary or secondary.

(a) Primary plans/operation orders are used to conduct security operations dealing with the following:

- o Counter terror.
- o Hostage threat.
- o Bomb threats.
- o Confrontation management.
- o Security alert.

(b) Secondary plans/operations orders are concerned with air movement, operations, ground convoys, field storage movements and emergency escorts.

(3) There are three things about a contingency plan/order concept that commanders like, it's flexible, it's quick, and it works.

PART C - SECURITY OPERATIONS EMPLOYMENT

1. Introduction.

MP provide security for CPs and designated personnel by using: (1) security procedures: and (2) security operations. This section will describe each of these in detail. As an MP platoon leader you must know security procedures in order to plan security operations, establish secure CP elements, and provide sound CP and personnel protection. You will also learn how security operations are performed at each CP element and how security procedures are set and followed to restrict movement and/or access into specific CP areas. Methods of restricting movement and entry include the use of:

- Access rosters.
- Challenges and passwords.
- Badge board systems.
- Communication checks.

a. Access Rosters. Prepared by G2 and G3, access rosters list personnel who can enter restricted areas. People not named on this roster are prevented from entering the area by MP. Until the installation commander approves their entry, they are detained by MP. Security procedures require that they be escorted throughout the restricted area by the MP.

b. Challenge/Password. A guard may detect a person trying to enter a restricted area. He identifies that person by using a challenge and password system. This system is effective in screening personnel. It is set by the local command. A person wanting to enter a restricted area must know it to enter. The guard cautiously states the challenge, taking precautions not to "call out" the phrase. Only the person being challenged should hear it.

People knowing the password or phrase are admitted. A person may act suspiciously or not know the password. Security procedures require the MP to call their supervisor.

c. Badge Board System. A security ID badge is established to admit and control the movement of all persons admitted to a restricted area. There are different badge systems. The three most common are:

- The single badge system.
- The badge exchange system.
- The multiple badge system.

The multiple badge system is the most security-efficient. This is an exchange at the entrance to each security area within the CP. Exchange badges are kept at each designated area only for people who have a correct badge. Controlling badge exchanges prevents alteration and duplication of restricted area badges. Because the exchange is at a designated place, and the badge exchange is controlled, this is the most secure of the three systems.

d. Communication Checks. Wire and radio communications allow dispersed MP units to coordinate actions to accomplish their missions. Periodic checks ensure that MP are at their post and each CP element is secured. These radio telephone checks are used by the commander to receive current intelligence and activity reports. The telephone is the most effective and secure method of conducting such checks.

2. Security Operations: CP Interior.

a. Access Control Points. Security procedures require MP to check traffic entering and leaving CP. As described earlier in this lesson, MP posted at ACPs will stop, identify, and admit only those persons authorized to enter the CP. MP will use security methods including:

- o Access rosters.
- o Badge boards.
- o Combinations of rosters and badge boards.

b. Guard Posts. Unauthorized entrance to a CP is also prevented by MP at guard posts. Guard posts can be used with, or in place of, ACPs. MP perform guard duty either at fixed posts, or on walking patrols. Guard posts use the challenge-password system. Without authorization from his supervisor, the MP is not to allow anyone who does not know the password into the CP.

c. Tactical Operations Center. MP posted at the TOC use interior and exterior defense measures. They man guard posts inside the TOC. A guard post location is seen in Figure 1-2. The MP at these interior guard posts also use the challenge/password system.

d. MP patrol and man ACPs on the TOC's perimeter. TOC security uses access rosters, badge boards, and 24-hour perimeter patrol. Also, the MP enforces light and noise disciplines within the TOC. MP posted at the TOC conduct telephone checks with the officer-in-charge and security HQ.

e. All-Source Production Section (ASPS). Security measures used at ACPs, guard posts, TOC, and ASPS are the same. MP patrol its perimeter. They enforce light and noise restrictions and use access rosters.

f. Commander's Quarters. Protection is provided on a 24-hour basis. His quarters are protected with a fixed guard post. Foot patrols are conducted. Access to the area is restricted.

g. Service Roads. Service roads are checked by mobile patrols, foot patrols, and watched by MP around-the-clock. The number of MP assigned service roads is determined by three major factors:

- o CP organization.
- o Location.
- o Number of service roads.

3. Security Operations: CP Exterior.

a. TCP on Main Supply Route. Security operations at the TCP include both active and passive security measures. MP direct traffic, provide main supply route (MSR) signs, and observe area activity.

One crucial security operation MP perform at the TCP is protecting its equipment. Electronic operation instructions and copies of maps can be invaluable to the enemy. If it appears that TCP equipment may be taken by the enemy, MP must destroy it.

b. Dismount Point. MP make sure that only authorized personnel and vehicles enter the CP area. Vehicles and cargos are checked. People are challenged with passwords. Their identification is checked. They are given directions and instructions, and if needed, redirected. Also, valuable information about enemy activity is obtained from drivers, passengers, stragglers, and refugees at DPs.

A DP is an effective method of securing a CP. MP posted at DPs perform four functions:

- Control traffic and vehicles.
- Enforce light and noise discipline.
- Supervise parking outside the CP.
- Provide perimeter security.

MP conduct communication and telephone checks with the security platoon HQ to ensure a DP's security.

c. Perimeter. A perimeter defense is crucial to CP security. An effective perimeter defense depends on strategic placement of MP, defensive weapons, antipersonnel/antitank mines, obstacles, and perimeter barriers. MP use defensive techniques to defend a perimeter. This includes deploying platoons in a circle around the CP area. MP squads and teams defend specific perimeter areas.

The perimeter security platoon leader maintains communication with perimeter defense units and HQ. Perimeter units use security measures such as:

- Camouflage.
- Movement control.
- Noise and light discipline.
- Radio traffic limits.
- Observation posts.

An MP platoon leader may be tasked for defending a perimeter. He considers the type of defense based on METT-T (Figure 1-7). He decides where to place his squads, automatic weapons, and anti-armor weapons. He decides if obstacles, mines, range cards, and indirect fire should be used. He determines who will operate the CP-OP and use equipment. He develops fire plans and sectors of fire.

4. Security Operations: Designated Personnel.

a. Commanding General (CG). Protection for the CG is provided around-the-clock. For security when traveling, he uses a radio-equipped jeep. Four qualified marksmen, who must be diplomatic, tactful, and neat, are on-call to protect him.

b. Quartering Party. Quartering party MP assist in preparing a site for a Main CP, in addition to providing security. MP are responsible for reconnoitering the road. They report any route changes from previous recon missions.

1. When the party arrives at the new CP site, security teams sweep and secure the area. MP provide internal security by setting up ACPs and a DP. They look for mines, contamination, and enemy activity. A platoon early warning system is put into effect. Obstacles are placed. Additional circulation control measures are executed. This includes the setting up of internal road nets.

2. Communications nets are set up within the CP.

3. Finally, when the main body arrives at the new CP, their vehicles are directed to parking and vehicle areas by the MP security team.

c. Designated Personnel (VIPs). The degree of protection for VIPs (principals) is determined by three major factors:

- His mission.
- His responsibilities.
- Both his mission and responsibilities.

His protection may call for stationary security measures (such as those used at a CP or tactical site), or intransit security (used when traveling by land, air, or water). Because of the special requirements of the security service mission, SOPs may differ when protecting a VIP.

5. Initial Planning.

a. Protective service mission plans are prepared by the MP operations section. The MP company commander gives the initial plan to a platoon leader in the form of a working (warning) order. This order gives enough information

to the leader to begin troop-leading steps. The order in which the following troop-leading steps are taken can be changed to fit the situation.

b. Some steps must be done in sequence; some done at the same time. Others, once started, continue throughout the process. The troop-leading steps are:

Step 1. Receive the mission.

Step 2. Issue a warning order.

Step 3. Make a tentative plan.

Step 4. Start necessary movement.

Step 5. Reconnoiter.

Step 6. Complete the plan.

Step 7. Issue the complete order.

Step 8. Supervise.

c. Once the plan is completed (step 6), the MP company commander issues the complete mission order (step 7). The platoon leader reviews the mission plan. He then finalizes his mission plans. Note that preparing for a security operation does not stop after completing the troop-leading steps; rehearsals and inspections are done. The rehearsals are only done if time permits; inspections must be the last action of the leader before an operation.

d. The number of MP selected for a security service mission is determined by the following factors:

- o METT-T.
- o Principal's itinerary.
- o Principal's mission.

Normally during a security service mission for principals, a squad is the largest number of MP used. However, the leader must be flexible and make any changes in the number of MP when required.

6. Prior-To-Mission.

a. This first planning period is crucial to the success of a mission.

b. Itinerary. It is important when planning security for VIPs that the principal's itinerary (event schedule) be studied closely. Special care must

also be taken to identify potential problem areas and attitudes of the local population.

c. Personnel. The escort who is selected for the security mission must be carefully reviewed. Status, habits, and customs are factors in choosing the escort. Also, escort MP should meet the following qualifications:

- o Mature.
- o Experienced.
- o Physically fit.
- o Poised.
- o Weapons-qualified.

d. Equipment. Along with weapons and ammo, escort personnel are issued flak vests and other protective clothing, communications gear, and night-vision devices. Keep the principal from standing out from the escort. He is issued the same gear as the escort personnel excluding a weapon.

e. Weapons. Small arms such as a 9-mm pistol and rifles (M16) are issued to the escort team when the mission is in a small or urban area. Automatic and semiautomatic weapons are used in large, open areas.

f. Liaisons. The security advance party coordinates mission objectives with local military authorities and civilian agencies. Dates and times of arrival and departure are coordinated. Specific people, who are responsible for each phase of the mission, are identified and named.

g. Communications. Maintain a current security status. Each escort MP is issued communications gear. Changes in plans must be communicated promptly and clearly. The mission leader must keep in contact with escorts.

h. Route Security. A route is best secured by: (1) reviewing route recons, including any map, ground, air, or air-ground data; (2) coordinating points along the route, and (3) setting up check points.

i. Convoy Sequences. Reduce the enemy's chances of locating a principal in a convoy. An MP leader can use any of the following security measures:

- o Vary the principal's position in a vehicle.
- o Vary the principal's vehicle position in the convoy.
- o Vary the principal's clothing.
- o Disguise an MP to look like the principal.
- o Keep the principal out of sight.

j. Support Units. Security operations may need assistance from support units. This includes artillery, air, transportation, and medical.

k. Other Contingency Plans. Operational plans must be flexible. This is in order to meet variable mission conditions, such as changing weather and mechanical failures. Contingency mission plans must also be concerned with the following:

- o Enemy ambush.
- o Enemy attack.
- o Enemy raids.

7. Mission Execution Planning

a. After "prior-to-mission planning," plans for conducting the actual mission are developed. METT-T factors are considered. Communication systems are planned and coordinated.

b. Operation Order. After mission planning is completed, operation orders are issued to key personnel. This allows all mission personnel to know the whole operation.

c. Security at a CP. As described in this lesson, MP perform security operations for a CP. The MP team leader must brief his security team on the following:

- o MP duties and responsibilities.
- o Security measures to be taken for protecting the principal.
- o Actions to be taken if the principal ignores security measures.
- o Access point security measures.
- o Security measures at guard posts.
- o Restrictions on personnel traffic.

l. Along with briefing his MP team, the team leader explains to the principal the security procedures which will be used to protect him. Also, a weapon may be issued to the principal. When a principal understands the duties of the MP and helps to protect himself, he is the most secure. MP are on a 24-hour watch, but perform security without interfering in the principal's activities. For example, when the principal is in his tent, MP stand guard outside. When in a building, MP are stationed outside the room which the principal occupies. They perform guard post and access point duties.

2. Protective services for a VIP in a CP or building may be set up like a cordon. For example, the outermost area would have a guard serving as a perimeter defense; entrances serving as access points, and the innermost areas manned by MP at guard posts.

3. Team members are on watch for suspicious actions and people. MP must react to all threats. The safety of the principal is the MP's foremost duty.

d. Security During Travel. Principals normally travel on the battlefield in motor vehicles or aircraft. Planning takes in security measures; (1) at the pickup site; (2) at pickup points; (3) during movement; and (4) at release points. Coordination and control measures taken at release points must be considered. Special attention must be given to security measures during principal transfers.

8. After-Action Review Planning.

a. The third and final phase of planning, the after-action review planning phase, evaluates the completed mission. It consists of two parts: discussions and after-action review reports.

b. Discussion. Open discussions are held after the mission. Security personnel are debriefed. They are asked questions such as "What went right with the mission?"; and "What went wrong?" To make discussions more valuable, MP are encouraged to take part. Discussions are used as learning experiences. MP are criticized in private and praised in public.

c. There is not a specific SOP on how to handle discussions. But, the following items MUST be included:

- o A restatement of the mission goal.
- o A review of procedures and techniques used.
- o An evaluation of performance.
- o A controlled group discussion.
- o A summary of all comments from the discussion.

d. After-Action Review Report. This report sums up highlights of the completed mission. It is written in a narrative style. It includes notes taken during the mission by supervisors. These notes form the primary basis of the report. It includes:

- o Difficulties met during the mission.
- o List of possible solutions.
- o Recommendations for future missions.

- o Improvements in planning, coordination, personnel, and equipment.

e. Copies of this report are made available to other security units as needed.

9. Summary Example

a. Let's review security in combat operations for a massed CP. MP responsibilities are diverse in securing a CP. Again, see yourself as the commander of the 709th MP Co. You are tasked to detail your personnel for security of the 30th ORD Division Main CP. You must determine the security needs based on METT-T. The mission is top secret; the CP is in a wooded terrain with two approach routes. G2 learns that an armed element has plans to attack. How will you task your personnel for the mission? If you answered, "this task requires one platoon to provide perimeter defense, internal security, and DPs", you are on the right track.

b. Next, you assign the 1st Platoon to provide proper security for the 30th ORD Div. Squad A will have perimeter defense. Squad B is detailed for DP. Internal security is the task of Squad C.

c. An ASPS is located in the DTOC. Therefore, a separate squad from company headquarters will be used to secure the center.

d. Perimeter defense is the task of Squad A. You are to ensure the squad maintains all-around security of the CP by deploying in a circle around the CP. The squad sets up the perimeter to a service road which has two approach routes (one from the east and one from the south). Perimeter defense monitors the service road. Squad A is to control the movement of personnel and vehicles along this perimeter through the use of TCPs. They must be on the lookout for enemy elements. They must be prepared to assist in the defense of the perimeter. This squad is further tasked to provide security for the 30th ORD Division Commander's quarters. They also help other MP squads on other assigned missions, if needed.

e. Perimeter security will include the use of TCPs to control vehicle movement, and be a communication link along the MSR. Make sure your squad knows identities of the soldiers requesting tactical data, and the MP are strictly following operational security (OPSEC) procedures. Remember, this prevents the enemy from gathering important data.

f. Squad B is preparing for DP duty. What information can you give the squad leader for the security of the mission? Two DPs are needed for the security of the CP based on METT-T and the size of the CP. The DP locations are determined essential; close to the CP at the two approach routes. They are on level ground, on a dust-free surface, on or outside the perimeter. The approach to the DP must be easy for drivers to find, yet with natural cover and concealment from enemy elements.

g. A visitor vehicle dispersal area is needed. This will prevent military movement and civilian traffic from entering the secured site by

directing them to other routes. The location of the dispersal area must be close enough for pedestrian traffic. It should not be so close as to give away the location of the CP.

h. Refugees and stragglers are stopped at the DP. To control stragglers, MP give directions. They provide medical care, or detain the stragglers for future disposition. MP are to enforce regulations at the TCPs and DPs. They stop an offender and make the appropriate corrections.

i. A 2-1/2 ton vehicle carrying two people with briefcases and three large boxes is in sight of the DP on the east approach route. The MP stop the vehicle. They request passengers and driver to dismount. Their ID is verified and access is authorized. The vehicle is then directed to the parking area, where briefcases and vehicle load is inspected. The passenger is CPT Davis. The driver is SSG Traylor of the 30th ORD Div. with information for the DTOC. CPT Davis is directed to the location in the CP, after the security inspection is completed. SSG Traylor is informed at the DP that intell has information on recent enemy activity.

j. What tasks will you define in internal security? Remember, guard posts and ACPs must monitor all persons entering and exiting a facility. The location of the ACP is near an entrance. No one enters without going through a security check. Vital to internal security is guard post location. MP must be placed in view of the ACP to detect persons who have slipped through access control measures. The guard post is close to the facility under observation. The distance is based on the guard's field of vision (if wire is used around the DTOC, the guard post is set inside the wire).

k. Once inside the CP, CPT Davis reports to the DTOC ACP, where squad C is in charge of the internal security. At the ACP, MP Johnston stops CPT Davis. He requests to see his ID. Military Policeman Johnston checks the access roster to verify authorized personnel in the restricted area. CPT Davis is on the roster. He is admitted to the DTOC after being informed to observe light and noise discipline. SSG Traylor is not on the roster. Military Policeman Johnston contacts the installation commander for approval by field phone.

l. Inside the DTOC, surrounded by a wire fence, are two fixed guard posts and one walking patrol around the DTOC perimeter. Military Policeman Walker sees CPT Davis. He requires the password by citing the challenge. CPT Davis answers with the correct password. CPT Davis is directed to enter the facility, but the MP stay cautious due to the sensitive nature of the mission.

m. Remember, it is the HQ commandant who directs all security functions. You, as the MP commander, are responsible for training and securing the forces. The individual MP make the plans work.

LESSON 1

PRACTICE EXERCISE

INTRODUCTION

This practice exercise is designed to test your knowledge of the presented material prior to taking the posttest. This lesson covered the required material to direct CP, or designated personnel security operations, and security operation employment. To check your comprehension of the lesson, complete the practice exercise below. All of the questions are multiple choice with one correct answer or best choice. Try to answer all the questions without referring to the lesson material.

When you have answered all the questions, turn the page and check your answers against the answer key. Review any questions you missed, or don't understand, by referring to the corresponding reference page. When you have completed your review, continue to the next lesson.

SITUATION:

You are the commander of the 709th MP company (this scenario will be repeated and expanded as the subcourse proceeds). As the CO of the 709th MP Co, you are tasked to detail your personnel for security of the 30th ORD Division main CP. You must determine the security needs. The mission is top secret; the CP is in the wooded terrain with two approach routes. G2 has information that an armed element has plans to attack.

1. How can MP control stragglers and refugees?

   A. Detain them for future disposition.
   B. Provide medical care.
   C. Give directions.
   D. All of the above.

2. How will you provide security at the ASPS?

   A. Perimeter defense and TCPs.
   B. Mobile and foot patrols.
   C. Guard posts and ACPs.
   D. DPs and ACPs.

3. You know that security needs are based on the acronym METT-T. What does this stand for?

   A. Method of Enemy Tactics, Terrain, and Space.
   B. Monitor Enemy Targets and Tactics in Terrain.
   C. Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops Available, and Time.
   D. Mission of Enemy Troops, Tendencies, and Transport.

4. Dismount point duty requires a variety of tasks. Which is one task you must ensure the DP performs to support security of the CP?

A. Direct civilian vehicles to other routes.
B. Set up watch inside the wire perimeter.
C. Provide security for the commander's quarters.
D. Ensure the DP is in view of the DTOC.

5. Which MP security team will you task to perform monitoring of the MSR?

A. Dismount point.
B. Guard post.
C. Traffic control point.
D. Access control point.

6. You are placing personnel on guard post duty. What determines the distance from the facility a guard post is located?

A. METT-T.
B. Type of material under guard.
C. Every fifty yards.
D. The guard's field of vision.

7. Your personnel are required for security of a VIP who will arrive at 0800 hours from the FEBA. What directions can you give to the team leader tasked to provide protection?

A. Two guards are required 24 hours a day.
B. Brief the VIP on the security procedures being used.
C. MP are to ride in the vehicle with the VIP.
D. Security while VIP is in a building will not come under MP jurisdiction.

GENERAL

A division CP is relocating; the site has been selected. You have been tasked to direct security operations. This main CP has a highly sensitive mission in an urban terrain. Inspections and visitations by the CG are slated to begin upon set up. The questions below are based on this scenario.

8. Upon receiving your task for protective services, you issue a warning order to the platoon leader. What is a warning order?

A. An initial working order.
B. An order stressing timeliness and caution.
C. An admonishment to the MP of consequence for any miscalculations on recon.
D. A precautionary measure of possible risks in the mission.

9. Prior to the arrival of the CP personnel to the new site, what security task must be performed?

A. Establish intel-operations center.
B. Search for signs of enemy presence.
C. Obtain access roster.
D. Task DP team.

10. What is the duty of the MP upon arrival at the selected site?

A. Sweep and secure the area around the site.
B. Direct and reroute traffic.
C. Provide manpower assignments.
D. Prepare contingency plans.

11. You are tasked to study the CG's itinerary, identify potential problem areas in the plan, and select escort personnel. What standards should be met in making the selections?

A. Escort MP should speak the language of the local population.
B. Escort MP must be weapons and martial arts qualified.
C. Escort MP should be young, attentive, and physically fit.
D. Escort MP should be experienced and have favorable qualifications.

12. Planning the escort of the CG includes reducing the enemy's chances of locating the general in the convoy. What security measure(s) can be taken?

A. Disguise an MP to look like the CG.
B. Keep the CG out of sight.
C. Change where the CG sits in the vehicle.
D. All of the above.

13. The complete mission order has been issued. A challenge/password system is in effect in restricted areas of the CP. How do you maintain security with this system?

A. Make sure everyone in the CP is aware of the password.
B. Ensure the MP on duty calls out to each person entering the restricted area using the challenge.
C. Stress that the guard use caution in stating the challenge to an individual being screened.
D. Require every other person (or random testing) requesting entrance to state the password.

14. The multiple badge system is the most security-efficient of the badge exchange systems. What procedures do you use in this system?

A. As the person moves from area to area a badge is required. The number of badges in his possession indicates the area (building) entered. This is a record of where that person has been.
B. As the person moves from area to area a new badge is exchanged for the one in his possession. To exchange a badge, one must have the correct badge at each designated area.
C. An individual requiring entrance to restricted areas prepares a written request for badges through the PM. If authorized, the person receives a specified number of badges (based on unit SOP).

15. How will you provide feedback to security mission team members about their performance?

A. Conduct a debriefing.
B. Prepare and distribute after-action reports.
C. Facilitate a group discussion.
D. Give pertinent information to team leaders.

LESSON 1

PRACTICE EXERCISE

ANSWER KEY AND FEEDBACK

ITEM		CORRECT ANSWER AND FEEDBACK
1.	D.	All of the above MP: Control stragglers by:... (page 1-11, para 8g(1)).
2.	C.	Guard posts and ACPs A second squad operates the... (page 1-12, para 8g(2)(3)).
3.	C.	Mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time Figure 7. (page 1-14, figure 1-7).
4.	A.	Direct civilian vehicles to other routes. Civilian traffic is prevented from... (page 1-11, para 8(1)).
5.	C.	Traffic control point. TCP on main supply route... (page 1-28, para 3a).
6.	D.	The guard's field of vision Placement is based on the guards... (page 1-13, para 8g(2)).
7.	B.	Brief the VIP on the security procedures... Along with briefing his MP team... (page 1-32, para 7c1).
8.	A.	An initial working order The MP company commander gives... (page 1-29, para 5a).
9.	B.	Search for signs of... They search for... (page 1-19, para 1a(1)(a)).
10.	A.	Sweep and secure the area around the site When quartering party reaches... (page 1-19, para 1a(1)(a)).
11.	D.	Escort MP should be experienced... The escort who is selected... (page 1-31, para 6c).
12.	D.	All of the above Convoy sequences... (page 1-31, para 6i).
13.	C.	Stress that the guard use caution... The guard cautiously states... (page 1-26, para 1b).
14.	B.	As the person moves from area to area... This is an exchange at the entrance... (page 1-26, para 1c).

15. C. Facilitate a group discussion.
To make discussions more valuable... (page 1-33, para 8b).

LESSON 2

CONVOY SECURITY OPERATIONS

CRITICAL TASK: 01-3761.00-1104

OVERVIEW

LESSON DESCRIPTION:

In this lesson you will learn to plan and organize a convoy security operation.

TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

ACTION: Plan a convoy security operation.

CONDITION: You will have this subcourse, pencil, and paper.

STANDARD: To demonstrate competency of this task you must achieve a minimum score of 70 percent on the subcourse examination.

REFERENCES: The material contained in this lesson was derived from the following publications: FM 5-36, FM 5-7-9, FM 7-7, FM 7-8, FM 19-1, FM 19-4, FM 19-30, and FM 55-30.

INTRODUCTION

Convoy escort and security are operations where MP are detailed to provide security for top-priority units transporting critical supplies to tactical forces. They may protect:

- Resupply operations.
- Special ammunition or sensitive material movements.
- Escort of designated commanders or other VIPs.
- Units moving through rear areas.

As an MP platoon leader, you may be charged with the responsibility to protect a convoy. You should know what a convoy commander does, how he organizes a convoy, and how the Highway Traffic Division (HTD) influences convoy movements. Area control of convoys is planned by the HTD to maintain highway regulations. This control is carried out through the use of TCPs and mobile patrols for traffic control. The area commander allocates MP resources to a convoy security mission. A primary concern is whether the convoy is able

to protect itself. Another consideration is the specific tactical situation. This is especially true when rear protection is a factor.

PART A - CONVOY SECURITY PLANNING

1. Responsibilities.

a. The convoy commander does the overall planning and execution of the convoy operation. He:

- o Receives a mission.
- o Conducts a recon.
- o Plans the operation.
- o Issues the orders.
- o Inspects personnel and vehicles.
- o Coordinates security.

b. Security is coordinated with intelligence, air cover and fire support. Communications are planned between convoy elements, between the convoy and HQ, and between the convoy and support units. Policies are developed for finding out the road conditions, enemy activity and guerrilla action from local civilians.

c. Depending on the convoy's size, the convoy commander may be a company commander, a platoon leader, or the NCO from the escorted unit. The convoy commander has operational control (OPCON) of the convoy. It is his job to make sure that drivers obey rules of the road. This includes:

- o Traffic laws.
- o Speed limits.
- o Time and distance gaps.
- o Routing plans.
- o Schedules.
- o March discipline.

d. He may organize a large convoy into a march column, serials or march units. A march column consists of all vehicles involved in a single move over the same route. A serial is a small division of the march column. A march unit is a small division of a serial. A small convoy may travel as a single unit.

e. Convoy movements are usually controlled by two methods: organizational and area control.

(1) Organizational Control. This is when authority is assigned a unit to control its movement during the time it uses a given route as authorized by a unit commander.

(2) Area Control. Measures taken by HTD and enforced by MP over a road network in an assigned area.

2. Planning Convoy Security Operations.

The MP operations section starts the planning. Using METT-T to plan the operation, they identify the convoys mission. They coordinate with intelligence units. They find out what enemy activity has been directed against convoys in the area. This information is used to plan for convoy security. Also, the MP operations section considers the following items to help them decide which platoon will be assigned to the convoy, what supplies the convoy will need, and how long the mission will last:

- The terrain which the convoy will travel.

- The route and destination of the convoy.

The MP operations section decides how security will be provided to the convoy. For example, will the MP be committed to area-oriented support, or functional-oriented support.

a. Area-Oriented Support. The MP unit provides the convoy protection within a geographical area. A convoy would be escorted by this unit from the time it enters an area until it leaves. This job is passed from one platoon to the next at prearranged points.

b. Functional-Oriented Support. In this type of support, the MP is committed to a specific task. A convoy would be escorted by this unit from start to finish, regardless of the areas passed through.

3. Convoy Security Standing Operation Procedures (SOPs).

The success of a convoy depends on planning. A complete SOP makes planning easier. It gives guidance when MP must act without orders. An effective SOP considers:

- Administrative procedures.

- Operational plans.

- Tactical plans.

- Contingency plans.

a. Administrative Procedures. This covers the tasks employed when preparing and inspecting vehicles, weapons and ammo, and personnel. Security vehicles must be ready for the mission. Vehicles are inspected and checked for road-readiness. Each escort vehicle is to be equipped with the following:

- o MK19 grenade machine gun.
- o SINCGARS.
- o Signaling devices.
- o Night-vision devices.

Each escort MP is inspected to insure that he has his personal weapon and ammo load. Escort MP must be fully trained for convoy security missions. They must know how to read maps, call for fire and air support, find and deactivate mines and booby traps, and call for medivac assistance. They must understand small unit tactics and convoy discipline.

b. Operational Plans. Escort vehicle placement, convoy routes, communications, and operational plans depend on a number of factors. These include:

- o Convoy size.
- o Number of vehicles available.
- o Terrain and route conditions.
- o Enemy activity.
- o Availability of support units.
- o Counterattack plans.

c. Tactical Plans. These plans address convoy escort and contingencies. Consideration is given to the terrain which the convoy will pass, to the purpose of the convoy mission, enemy action and what support units are available. The escort commander will choose the proper escort method. Each method is described in "Escort Methods" in the following section.

d. Contingency Plans. Most situations may be planned for. Emergencies do arise. Plans need to be amended according to the situation. These emergency plans detail individual actions, alert force actions and security force actions.

4. Convoy Security Planning

The company commander gives the convoy security mission to a platoon leader. The MP commander receives the mission to provide convoy security. The following items are considered when planning for the mission:

- o Coordination.

- o Reconnaissance.
- o Method of escort.
- o Tactical actions.

a. Coordination. The MP leader and convoy commander must meet and coordinate their actions. Each must know his capabilities. They should set up convoy organization. They must also set up primary and backup communications. They must determine times and locations where the convoy will need MP support. Finally, any anticipated changes in route need to be reviewed.

b. Reconnaissance. The MP should look at the route that the convoy is to use. As a minimum, a map recon is needed. All sources of information should be reviewed, especially aerial photographs. The route should be classified as:

- o Free from enemy activity.
- o Risk of enemy activity.
- o Located in the combat zone.

Recon missions identify TCP locations, checkpoint sites and vehicle holding areas. Also, a recon of convoy routes provides data on locations of villages and towns, bridges and tunnels, and sites where vehicles may need to ford or ferry rivers. In addition to information gathered from recon missions, intelligence information on ambush and sabotage, enemy troops, and friendly forces is vital to the convoy security team.

c. Escort Methods. The best method of escort must be determined. Some of the items to consider before making the decision as to which escort method to use would include:

- o Terrain.
- o Persons or cargo.
- o Volume.
- o Convoy length.
- o Enemy activity.
- o Number of MP.

The methods of escort include: (1) leading and following; (2) empty truck; (3) leapfrog and, (4) perimeter.

(1) Leading and Following Method. At least two escort vehicles are used in this method. One leads the convoy, the other follows. MP in the lead vehicle stop and dismount at TCPs. The following escort keeps the convoy moving and closed up.

(2) Empty Truck Method. In this method, a truck loaded with MP travels ahead of the convoy. MP dismount and man TCPs along the route. An empty truck follows the convoy and picks up the MP.

(3) Leapfrog Method. This method is like the children's game, but it is done with vehicles. Extra MP in one escort vehicle go ahead of the convoy. MP are posted at designated sites along the route. After the convoy passes, the MP are picked up and go ahead of the convoy again. This is repeated until the convoy reaches its destination. This method is not effective on narrow, congested, and mountainous roads.

(4) Perimeter Method. Escort vehicles are positioned around convoy elements. All four sides of a vehicle are protected. This method can be enhanced by employing extra perimeter rings.

(5) Tactical Actions. Tactical actions will be taken when a convoy halts or has mechanical breakdowns. Weapons resources must be coordinated. Locations of armored vehicles and automatic weapons must be organized for maximum effectiveness. Prior coordination should be made with mortar, artillery and air support. The soldiers in the convoy must know what action to take if the enemy attacks. Generally, convoy personnel protect their vehicles. MP will take offensive actions against the enemy attacks., The type of enemy attacks determines specific protective actions. If the convoy is under air attack, the vehicles disperse and attempt to find cover. Weapons are fired in an antiaircraft effort. If under an artillery attack, vehicles must not stop. They should continue forward quickly to clear the area under attack.

5. Security Element Forces.

a. The platoon leader reviews the situation and task-organizes a security force. He then assigns a security element leader and forms security teams. The security element for a convoy may be one team or several teams. The security element leader may be a squad leader or a team leader. This depends on the size of the convoy. He assigns jobs for each security team. He ensures that an alternate leader is designated and that each team understands its job. A security element consists of three teams: the scout team, lead team, and trail team.

(1) Scout Team. The scout team leads the convoy by three to five minutes. Their primary job is to assess the routes and report any threats. It maintains its distance from the convoy's main body.

(2) Lead Team. The lead team stays with the convoy. It maintains the rate of march set by the convoy commander. One primary function is to protect critical convoy elements. It watches for mines, ambush, sniper attack

and booby traps. If under sniper attack, they return fire and keep the convoy moving.

(3) Trail Team. The trail team protects the rear of the convoy. Its primary job is to provide fire support.

b. All three teams must maintain radio contact with each other and the MP platoon leader. They move at the same march speed as the convoy. It is important that they maintain contact with the convoy. Each team is given a direction of fire. The SOP requires that team members keep their weapons pointed in the direction of fire at all times. During halts, members of the security team take up overwatch positions in their sectors of fire. They may remain mounted or they may dismount and form fighting positions. This depends on how long the convoy halts.

c. The same SOPs are used whether the convoy is large or small. For example, when more teams are used to protect a large convoy, security vehicles have similar placement in the convoy:

o One vehicle leads the convoy.

o One or more vehicles are placed in the rear.

o The rest of the escort vehicles are placed within the body of the convoy to protect key elements.

PART B - CONVOY SECURITY PROCEDURES

1. Personnel Briefings. The security element leader briefs the convoy personnel and his MP team. A sample convoy briefing is shown in Figure 2-1. This figure shows specific items, including briefs on the mission, the enemy situation, and specific individual duties and tactical actions. He also tells them:

o What defensive measures to take when under attack.

o What convoy and catchup speeds will be maintained.

o What vehicle distances will be.

o What emergency measures will be followed,

2. Defensive Measures. The convoy uses passive and active defensive measures. Passive defense is used to prevent trouble. The MP watch for signs of trouble. For example, drivers avoid driving over foreign objects, grass, and fresh dirt. Drivers watch to see if civilians are avoiding certain areas. The convoy uses camouflage, night vision devices, and communication checks. These actions are passive.

a. Active defense, on the other hand, is used to counterattack an enemy. It is used when mines or booby traps are located or the convoy is under any of the following:

- o Sniper fire.
- o Being ambushed.
- o Air attack.
- o Artillery attack.

b. Mines and Booby Traps. When mines or booby traps are found, the MP leader sends a security team to mark and report the exact position. If possible, the convoy goes around the obstacle. If not, the security element leader tells the MP team and convoy personnel what tactical actions to take if attacked. Mines may be planted along the road or roadside or hung from trees, or detonated as the convoy passes. Booby traps, including grenades, may be suspended in trees and activated by vehicle antennas or by trip wires on bridges or tunnels.

c. Sniper Fire. If the convoy receives sniper fire, convoy personnel should act with extreme caution. Sniper fire is often used to slow down a convoy and set it up for an ambush. The key rule is to keep the convoy moving and to avoid indirect response fire. Convoy troops should fire on specific targets. The convoy commander is notified of the sniper fire. The fire direction is shown using a prearranged signal, usually a red smoke canister. MP may be tasked to neutralize the sniper. They may be authorized to use long-range fire in a free-fire zone. A convoy commander can call in support fire or request support forces. However, the convoy's movement and security cannot be risked. Military police protect convoys against ambush and air attack through the use of security measures, movement techniques, and fire control. The SOP should tell what actions will be taken when the convoy is moving, stopping and under enemy attack.

d. Ambush. The convoy may be ambushed and the road is not blocked. The part of the convoy under fire and in the kill zone drives out of the ambush to the front. Vehicles disabled by the attack are left behind. If these vehicles block the road, they are pushed out of the way by the following vehicles. The following vehicles then pick up stranded personnel. Those vehicles that are not in the kill zone stop. They do not drive through the kill zone. The convoy personnel dismount. They set up defensive positions.

Note: The MP may not contain the enemy attack. Fire support is then requested.

If the road is blocked, personnel from the convoy in the kill zone dismount. They take cover and place a maximum volume of fire on the ambush position. Troops in vehicles that have passed through the kill zone dismount and provide a coordinated base of fire. Soldiers in vehicles that have not entered the kill zone dismount and fire on the ambush position. Only the escort MP move

against the enemy position. When contact is broken, the convoy consolidates, reorganizes, treats and evacuates the wounded. They continue on to their destination.

e. Air Attack. If the convoy comes under air attack, each vehicle turns away from the angle of attack (the direction that the plane is attacking from) and seeks cover. Troops not manning vehicle-mounted weapons dismount and fire at the attacking aircraft. The best protection from air attack is concealment. Camouflage helps to hide the convoy. Also, MP correct noise, light and movement violations. In deciding how to protect the convoy from air attack the convoy commander considers a number of factors. This includes:

- o Convoy column formation.
- o Open column formation.
- o Closed column formation.
- o Camouflage.
- o Natural cover from above.

f. Convoy Column Formation. When deciding a convoy's column formation, the convoy commander considers the type of mission, the terrain, cover and concealment, and the length of the road march. Also, other factors that are considered include:

- o Type of road.
- o Type of vehicle.
- o Cargo.
- o Enemy threat.
- o Support unit available.
- o Small arms potential.

Each of these factors determines the distance between vehicles and whether the formation will be an open or closed column.

APPENDIX M

SAMPLE CONVOY BRIEFING

SITUATION:

Friendly forces.
Support units.
Enemy situation.

MISSION:

Type of cargo.
Origin.
Destination.

EXECUTION:

General organization of convoy.
Time schedule.
Route.
Convoy speed.
Catchup speed.
Vehicle distance.
Emergency measures.

Accidents.
Breakdowns.
Separation from convoy.
Ambush.

Action of convoy personnel in the event of an ambush.
Action of the security forces during ambush. Medical support.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

Control of personnel.
Billeting arrangements.
Messing arrangements.
Refueling of vehicles.
Servicing of vehicles.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

Location of convoy commander.
Designation of assistant convoy commander.

FIGURE 2-1. SAMPLE CONVOY BRIEFING

g. Open Column Formation. Open column convoys have 75-100 meters between each vehicle. The main advantage of the open column is that fewer vehicles are damaged by an air attack. However, an open column has three main disadvantages:

- o The convoy commander has less control because of the convoy's dispersement.
- o The convoy is exposed for a longer time. This makes it more likely to come under attack.
- o Defense is less effective. Success of small arms fire against aircraft depends on volume.

h. Closed Column Formation. Closed column convoys set and maintain a distance of 15-20 meters between each vehicle. This presents a larger target. Night travel is usually used when a closed column is chosen by the convoy commander.

i. Camouflage. This is used to hide shiny objects, disguise a convoy's cargo, and/or to conceal a vehicle and cargo.

j. Natural Cover From Above. An important consideration is the type of natural cover to hide a convoy. For example, the type and amount of trees are considered. Are there hills and overhanging cliffs along the convoy route?

k. Artillery Attack. When a convoy comes under artillery attack, it has three options:

- o The convoy halts in place if the artillery fire is directly ahead. The convoy commander seeks an alternate route. Then the convoy prepares to move out quickly.
- o The vehicles do not stop. They continue forward as quickly as possible.
- o The convoy disperses to concealed locations.

(1) The convoy can reduce its casualties during artillery attacks by increasing speed, avoiding the impact area, and increasing the distance between vehicles. Also, convoy personnel can wear protective gear and use vehicles for protection.

(2) Active defense measures against artillery fire include:

- o Returning fire when the fire source is found.
- o Destroying the enemy's forward observation posts.
- o Using air strikes.

(3) Passive defense measures are convoy formations. These formations were described earlier in the learning event (refer to paragraphs on open and closed column formations).

l. Security During Mechanical Breakdowns. When a vehicle breaks; down, troops inform the convoy commander, the MP leader, and maintenance and recovery. Vehicles should be recovered. Maintenance crews repair or arrange towing. When vehicles are too disabled to be moved, the following actions are taken:

- o The vehicles are cleared from the road.
- o They are unloaded and the cargo is transferred to another vehicle.
- o The vehicles are destroyed only to keep them from falling into enemy hands, or guarded until support units can arrive. The passengers and driver(s) guard a vehicle and/or cargo, by dismounted and taking up defensive postures.

m. After-Action Activities. The last action of a convoy security mission is to gather operation reports and data. After-action reports are prepared with this information.

n. The MP leader documents the escort mission. The main purpose of this report is to maintain a record of unusual events. Note current intelligence and record lessons learned.

o. The after-action report may be written or verbal. It normally is written when valuable lessons were learned, very unusual events occurred, or numerous events occurred. The report records information which may prove of value to future missions.

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LESSON 2

PRACTICAL EXERCISE

INSTRUCTIONS

You have just finished reading the instructional material for Lesson 2. This lesson covered the requirements and procedures for protecting a convoy. It is now time to check your comprehension of the material. This is done by completing the practical exercise below. All of the questions are multiple-choice with one correct answer or best choice. Try to answer all questions without referring to the lesson material.

When you have answered all the questions, turn the page and check your answers against the answer key. Each correct response is referenced to a specific portion of the lesson material. Review any questions you have missed or do not understand. When you have completed your review, continue to the next lesson.

SITUATION:

You are the commander of the 709th MP Company tasked to command the security escort mission for a resupply convoy. The MP unit will provide protection from the start point to release point. Recon of the area shows potential ambush sites along the route. You will be moving through a tactical environment.

1. How will you commit MP forces to this mission?

A. Area-oriented support.
B. Unit-oriented support.
C. Functional-oriented support.
D. Tactical-oriented support.

2. You are aware of the potential ambush situation. In developing operational plans, how will you provide for ambush watch?

A. Task ambush watch to the lead team.
B. Plan leap-frog convoy escort.
C. Plan MP along the route during the mission.
D. Assign watch duties to the front element.

3. What information will you give in briefing MP convoy personnel about passive defense movement used to prevent trouble?

A. Watch for areas which civilians are avoiding.
B. Tactical actions to take if attacked.
C. Mark and report exact location of mines and/or booby traps.
D. Provide a coordinate base of fire.

4. MP escort vehicle placement is vital to the security of the convoy. What task do you assign to the lead team?

A. To lead the convoy by 3 to 5 minutes.
B. To keep the convoy to the primary route.
C. To steer the convoy away from threatening conditions.
D. To stay with the main body of the convoy.

5. Contingency plans are used to plan for emergency situations. What action should be taken if no alternate routes are included in the operational plans?

A. None; alternate routes are not necessary when planning for emergencies.
B. Halt the mission until you receive alternate route plans.
C. Task more personnel to the convoy for extra security.
D. Amend plans to vary the route timing and detail individual actions in emergencies.

6. During the convoy movement, the scout team reports a landslide blocking the road and not shown on the most recent recon report. How will you regard this information?

A. The recon team erred in not reporting it.
B. It could mean an ambush is about to occur.
C. Time to perform a new route recon.
D. The recon report must not accurately show the route.

7. What security procedures will you plan to reduce the risk of an air attack?

A. Active security measures.
B. Concealment strategies.
C. Air recon activities.
D. All of the above.

8. The convoy is proceeding through a valley when it is ambushed. Enemy fire is coming from the hillsides. What order should you give?

A. Order all personnel in the convoy to dismount, take cover and fire maximum volume on the enemy.
B. Order the whole convoy to keep moving in a closed column formation through the kill zone. The MP will move against the enemy position.
C. Order fire support immediately to move against the enemy. The convoy will drive out of the ambush zone and wait for the fire support to catch up.
D. Order the part of the convoy under attack to drive out of the ambush to the front. Ensure following vehicles (those not yet in the ambush zone) do not drive on; they are to dismount and set up defensive positions.

LESSON 2

PRACTICE EXERCISE

ANSWER KEY AND FEEDBACK

Item		Correct Answer and Feedback
1.	C.	Functional oriented support Functional-oriented support... (page 2-3, para 2b).
2.	A.	Task ambush watch to lead team It watches for mines, ambushes... (page 2-6, para 5a(2)).
3.	A.	Watch for areas which civilians are avoiding Drivers watch to see if civilians... (page 2-7, para 2).
4.	D.	To stay with the main body of the convoy The lead team stays with the convoy... (page 2-6, para 5a(2)).
5.	D.	Amend plans to vary route timing... Plans need to be amended... (page 2-4, para 3d).
6.	B.	It could mean an ambush is about to occur If the road is blocked... (page 2-8, para 2d).
7.	B.	Concealment strategies The best protection from air attack... (page 2-9, para 2e).
8.	D.	Order the part of the convoy under attack The part of the convoy under fire... (page 2-8, para 2d).

LESSON 3

SECURITY PATROLLING OF ALL LINES OF COMMUNICATION

CRITICAL TASK: 01-3761.00-1105

OVERVIEW

LESSON DESCRIPTION:

In this lesson you will learn to plan and direct security patrolling of all lines of communication.

TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

ACTION: Plan the security patrolling of all lines of communication.

CONDITION: You will have this subcourse, pencil, and paper.

STANDARD: To demonstrate competency of this task you must achieve a minimum score of 70 percent on the subcourse examination.

REFERENCES: The material contained in this lesson was derived from the following publications: FM 7-7, FM 7-8, FM 19-1, FM 19-4, and FM 19-30.

INTRODUCTION

Enemy forces will attempt to penetrate rear areas to attack targets including command and control centers and communication networks. This enemy activity is expressed in three levels of intensity:

- Level I.
- Level II.
- Level III.

The levels do not mean a progression of intensity, but the level of intensity at a given time.

a. Level I. Those which can be defeated by base or base cluster self-defense measures.

b. Level II. Those which are beyond base or base cluster self-defense capability and can be defeated by response forces, normally military police with supporting fires.

c. Level III. Those which necessitate the command decision to commit a tactical combat force (TCF).

d. In communications zones, Level I and II activities will be directed at lines of communication (LOCs). These lines of communication must remain open and secure. The movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies depends on it. Protection of communication sites depends on a mobile fighting force. That fighting force is the MP.

As an MP officer, you may be tasked to direct security patrols of a LOC. You must know three major things:

- How to plan security operations.
- How to select correct security measures used at LOCs.
- How to train/direct MP in controlling the enemy threat.

PART A - PLAN SECURITY PATROLLING OF ALL LINES OF COMMUNICATION

1. Planning Security for LOC.

a. Line of Communication. Security planning begins with identifying each type of LOC within a tactical environment. Within an area of operation there are several types of LOCs. This includes:

- Main supply routes.
- Ports and waterways.
- Airfields.
- Pipelines.
- Railroads and rail yards.

(1) Each type of LOC listed above is identified and located on map and in recon reports. These reports and maps are reviewed and analyzed during the planning phase. After security plans are developed, MP are then tasked to provide protection for these vital communication links.

(2) Each LOC requires a security plan to protect it against enemy activity. In the planning phase, each LOC is examined to assess what type of threats may be used against it and where its vulnerable areas may be located.

- Threats to LOC -Possible threats to a LOC include: (1) strategic; (2) tactical; and (3) special threats. Strategic threats include nuclear, biological and chemical threats. Tactical threats include airborne, air assault, and amphibious attacks. Special threats include insurgents, harassment, and enemy recon actions.

- o Vulnerability - Each LOC must be studied to find out how open to attack it is. Consider specific weaknesses and operations which are conducted within and around it. Identify possible targets within the LOC. Determine how many troops you will need to protect it. Review security reports which previous MP operations may have prepared on the LOC. Finally, evaluate prior MP patrol missions.

b. Reconnaissance. Analyzing recon reports is crucial when planning LOC security. Recon reports should contain current information. If this is not current, you should order a new recon mission. For example, map information contained in a report may still be applicable. Route conditions or intelligence information may be obsolete. When analyzing recon information, make sure that the following is included in the report: (1) area maps; (2) route identification; and (3) area recon data.

c. Prioritize Resources. Planning security requires you to determine the resources needed to conduct the mission. This includes personnel and equipment. This is crucial for ensuring that people and equipment go where they are needed and the operation is successfully completed.

d. Support Units. Security planning means to coordinate patrol actions with support units. This includes artillery, air, transportation, and medical. As an MP officer, you need to locate each available support unit and set up SOPs for emergencies. Planning for mission support also means to establish liaisons with support units, decide rear area protection priorities, and perform the following planning tasks:

- o Plan communication between patrols, control points, and support units.
- o Plan how response elements will be used to fight off any enemy attacks.
- o Coordinate use of air support.

2. Methods of Security

Security methods for the LOC in your operation area must be determined. This should be based on your own available resources and methods which have been successful at the LOC. You should consider active or passive security measures.

a. Active Security Measures. Active security measures include security escorts, security patrols, recon, strongpoints, remotes, and combat.

(1) Security escorts are used when protecting convoys and watercraft. Foot and mobile patrols are used to protect LOC sites. Recon patrols are effective when watching critical points along routes and LOC elements. The use of motor vehicles and helicopters provides remote security.

(2) Recon patrols are used for timely and accurate information on specific mission-related objectives. These may be various types of recon patrols. For example, area recon patrols are used to obtain information about critical points along routes and areas around the LOC. A zone recon is used to obtain information on all enemy, terrain, and routes within a zone as defined by map boundaries.

(3) Strongpoint security measures are used when securing an area between two points. MP patrol the areas between each point with foot and mobile patrols. Combat security measures coordinate all support combat forces within a specific sector to protect a LOC. They are used to harass, destroy, or capture enemy troops, equipment, and installations.

b. Passive Security Measures. Like CP security, passive measures are an effective method of protecting a LOC. The following are examples of passive security measures:

o Camouflage.

o Sensors.

o Concealment.

o Dispersion.

o Barriers.

(1) Camouflage is the protective coloration to blend or change visual configurations of personnel, vehicles, equipment, and facilities. It is an effective method. Sensors can detect the presence of personnel in the immediate area.

(2) Dispersion scatters personnel and equipment. This makes it harder for the enemy to detect each LOC element. Dispersion also keeps the enemy off-guard.

(3) Obstacles and barriers such as fences and mines hinder enemy attacks, if not prevent them.

(4) Physical Security. Some LOCs are located at a single point or facility. They need a physical security plan. For example, when protecting a cargo storage area at a port, physical protection requirements call' for entry and exit controls, patrol boats, and placement of security aids and devices. This includes protective lighting and closed circuit television. Physical security at pipelines poses a very difficult security task. They need protection from end to end. Security guard posts, natural terrain, dispersion, and mobile patrols are used to protect pipelines against sabotage.

3. Types of Patrols.

Patrols generally fall into two categories: recon and combat.

a. Reconnaissance Patrol. A recon patrol's primary function is to collect, confirm, or disprove information gathered earlier. Recon patrols are organized into teams to meet mission objectives. This depends on the size and type of mission assigned. For example, a recon and security (R & S) patrol consisting of about four members is not organized into elements. It operates as a single unit providing its own security while conducting its mission. When conducting an area recon, a patrol is organized into a recon element and a security element. When conducting a zone recon, the patrol is organized into several recon elements.

b. Combat Patrol. A combat patrol's primary mission is harassing, destroying, or capturing enemy troops, equipment, and installations. It is normally organized into an assault element, a security element, and a support element. Special purpose teams may be organized to include scout dog teams, demolition teams, and prisoner teams.

c. When organizing a patrol, you should use the MP unit's organization and chain of command as much as possible: team leaders, squad leaders, and platoon sergeants. For example, a combat patrol could be organized as follows:

- The 1st and 2d squads are the assault element.
- The 3d squad is the security element.
- The machine gun teams, Dragon gunners, and platoon sergeant make up the support element.

d. Regardless of the category of a patrol, there are four key principles to successful patrolling. These are:

- Detailed planning.
- Thorough reconnaissance.
- Positive control.
- All-around security.

4. Planning for a Patrol.

a. A patrol is more or less on its own and must be self-sufficient. A recon patrol must remain undetected throughout the mission. It collects information or confirms information which has been gathered previously. A combat patrol must move unseen until close enough to the mission objective to ensure it can complete its mission. Therefore, a successful patrolling mission requires well considered plans and coordination.

b. Planning for a patrol is as important as the skills needed to carry out the mission. Nothing must be left to chance. Alternate and contingency

plans must be developed. Each soldier must know what he is to do. Finally, equipment must be checked and rechecked.

c. You can use the following procedures as a guide in planning a patrol.

5. Mission Analysis.

When assigned a patrol mission, the first thing you must do is analyze the mission. Mission goals must be understood. Mission-related intelligence data needs to be reviewed. Gather information to determine what elements and teams will be needed for the patrol. Weapons and equipment for the patrol need to be selected. Finally, time constraints for mission objectives must be understood.

6. Tentative Plans.

Once a mission is understood, develop a tentative plan to accomplish mission objectives. The plan should include coordinating the patrol's needs. This phase determines how the mission will be completed. For example, the objective may require a night patrol with two teams converging from two directions in a coordinated attack. Tentative plans will cover what has to be coordinated. This includes procedures for departing and reentry into friendly areas, actions taken in danger areas, and actions taken at the objectives. Also, plans for the following points will be needed in the tentative plan:

- How the patrol unit will move.
- The leader's recon mission.
- How the patrol will be organized.

7. Warning Orders.

These are issued to all members of the patrol team. A warning order gives team members general information which will help them prepare for the mission. The format of a warning order is shown in Figure 3-1. The following paragraphs will explain sections shown in the figure.

a. Situation. This gives team members early information. This will allow them to make preparations for the mission while the team leader continues to plan. The details are given in the patrol order.

b. Mission. This is a clear and concise statement of the mission. Included in this statement is the who, what, when, where, and why of the mission.

c. General Instructions. These provide team members with general and specific organizations. It assigns members to specific elements, teams, or lead units. It lists uniform and equipment requirements. This includes clothing, water, and rations. It instructs what personal items are not be to taken on the mission (such as wallets, letters, and personal papers).



Figure 3-1. Warning Orders.

(1) In the general instructions, the MP team leader determines types of weapons and equipment to be used on the patrol. He then assigns these items to team members.

(2) Chain of command is stated in these instructions. Each is given a place in the chain. In large patrols, team leaders are assigned leadership positions. Each team element then sets up a chain of command within the element.

(3) Time and place schedules are presented in general instructions. This includes listing the times when all patrol activities will take place. Times when operation orders will be given and when rehearsals and inspections will be held are also presented.

d. Special Instructions. These are given to element and team leaders. They provide instructions for getting, checking and distributing

mission-related gear such as weapons, ammo, equipment, rations and water. Also, team leaders are instructed on how to prepare their men for the mission and how to coordinate, inspect, rehearse, and reconnoiter. Special teams may be part of the patrol. Special instructions provide team leaders with specific data that will help them prepare for their missions. This includes preparing explosives, making maps, or checking radio equipment.

8. Coordination.

a. Battlefield situations change daily and available resources vary. Mission planning with key personnel must be continuous. A company commander may coordinate the patrol's movement to the point of departure and arrange for the patrol's return to friendly territory. But, the patrol leader needs to coordinate other items, such as changes in enemy situations. He maintains a checklist. He makes sure that he does not overlook anything; call signs, fire plans, and other items shown in Figure 3-2.

b. In addition to those items listed in Figure 3-2, the patrol leader contacts elements from:

- o S2 (intelligence).
- o S3 (operations).
- o Fire support.
- o Forward units.
- o Adjacent patrols.

c. Intelligence. S2 provides information on weather conditions, enemy status, and SOI data.

d. Operations. S3 gives the patrol leader information concerning changes in the friendly situation, route selection, resupply, linkup procedures, and transportation. Also, S3 provides data on signal plans, rehearsal areas, and information on other patrols which are in the mission area.

e. Fire Support. Fire support teams coordinate plans on the mission and objective. Times of departure and expected times of return are coordinated.

Mission targets are identified and selected. Primary and alternate communication methods, signals, and code words are worked out.



Figure 3-2. Patrol Leader's Coordination Checklist.

f. Forward Units. The patrol leader coordinates closely with forward units through which the patrol will pass. He must talk with someone in the forward unit who has the authority to commit that unit to help the patrol. This is normally the company commander. Information must be exchanged between the two units. The patrol leader provides the following:

- o Personal and unit ID.
- o Size of patrol.
- o Times of departure and return.
- o Areas of patrol's operation (if within the forward area of operation).

g. In return, the company commander of the forward unit must provide the following to the patrol leader:

- o Information on terrain.
- o Known or suspected enemy activity within patrol area.
- o Friendly unit's activities (detailed).
- o Fire plans.
- o What support the forward unit can provide.
- o Communication (signal plans, code words, and emergency signals).
- o Rally, departure, and reentry points.

h. Adjacent Patrols. The patrol leader must make contact with other patrols patrolling in the same or adjacent area. The following should be exchanged:

- o Patrol identification.
- o Missions.
- o Routes.
- o Fire plans.
- o Call signs and radio frequencies.
- o Challenge phrases and passwords.
- o Planned times and points of departure and reentry.
- o Enemy activities.

9. Reconnaissance.

The patrol leader must make either a map, ground, or air recon of the patrol area before completing the mission plan. He should make sure that he reviews a current report. The recon report can change or confirm the plan.

10. Plan Completion.

a. After the warning order has been issued, a review of reconnaissance is made. Patrol members are prepared for the mission and the patrol leader completes his plan. He finishes the plan by assigning mission tasks to patrol elements, teams, and men. A platoon-sized combat patrol may have a raid mission. One team may have the task of providing security and support fire to the teams assaulting the objective.

b. The completed plan tells HOW to perform the assigned tasks. Other tasks such as navigation, security during movements and halts, and actions when in contact with the enemy are assigned.

c. The following items are explained in the completed plan:

- Times of departure and return.
- Primary and alternate routes.
- Rehearsals and inspections.
- Personal requirements.

(1) Times of Departure and Return. Times of departure and return are based on a number of factors. These include the amount of time needed to reach the objective, accomplish essential mission tasks and return to friendly territory.

(2) Primary and Alternate Routes. A route to a mission objective must be different from the route back. In addition to a primary route, an alternate route must be selected. This is used when the patrol has made contact with the enemy on the primary route. It is also used if the patrol leader feels that the patrol has been located.

(3) Rally Points. Patrols can reassemble and reorganize when they are scattered during an operation at a rally point. Rally points can be selected by the patrol leader during the patrol or by a map study before the mission. Keep in mind that rally points selected prior to the mission are only tentative. The patrol leader must state the action to be taken at rally points. Each man must know the rally point in case the patrol becomes dispersed. Normally, instructions provide for continuing the patrol after a certain number of men arrive at the rally point or after a given period of time. The senior member at the rally point will, in the absence of the patrol leader, decide how to best accomplish the mission.

There are different types of rallying points. They include:

- o Initial rally point.
- o En route rally point.
- o Objective rally point.
- o Reentry rally point.

(a) An initial rally point is used to meet if patrol members are dispersed prior to departure. It is located within friendly lines.

(b) En route rally points are where team members meet if scattered prior to reaching the objective. The en route rally point: is located between friendly lines and an objective along their route.

(c) An objective rally point is where the patrol stops before taking actions on the objective. It is located under the mission's objective, but not so near as to cause the patrol to be detected. This rally point is also used after a mission action.

(d) A reentry rally point is where the team members meet prior to reentering friendly lines. It is located just before the friendly lines, but out of sight and sound of friendly OPs.

(4) Rehearsals and Inspections. Rehearsals and inspections should be planned and conducted even if team members are experienced. This ensures that every member knows his job. The patrol leader should rehearse every phase of the operation with his patrol. Accurate and thorough rehearsals increase the chances of a successful mission. A patrol leader contacts operations (S3) before using a rehearsal area. Inspections must be planned for patrol elements and team leaders, as well as for the patrol leader.

(5) Personal Requirements. When planning, determine personal requirements. This includes rations, weapons and ammunition, uniforms, and equipment. If rations are to be taken, the patrol leader specifies the type and amount, and tells where to get them. The warning order lists the weapons and ammunition to support the tentative plan. If there are changes, the patrol leader must tell element leaders. There may be changes in the warning order regarding what uniform and equipment is to be used on the patrol. It is the patrol leader's responsibility to inform element leaders of the change.

11. Operation Signals.

The type of signals to be used during the patrol must be planned and rehearsed. Patrol members need to know visual, sound, and manual signals, as well as radio call signs. In addition to knowing radio call signs, team members need to know primary and alternate radio frequencies, reporting times, and codes.

12. Challenges and Passwords.

The challenge and password form (SOI) should not be used outside the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). As a patrol leader, you may devise a challenge/password system beyond FEBA. For instance, one system is the "odd-number system." In this system, a patrol leader could select an "odd" number like "11." The challenge could be any number between 1 and 10. The password could be the number which, when added to the challenge equals 11. Therefore, if the challenge is "8," the correct password is "3."

13. Chain of Command.

It is important that any change in the chain of command from that listed in the warning order be given to patrol members.

14. Location of Leaders.

Where the leaders and alternate leaders will be during the mission must be planned for all phases of the operation. This includes location during the patrol's movement at danger areas and at the objective. Examples of danger areas include highways, streams, large open areas and known enemy positions.

15. Issuing Operation Orders.

Using the standard operation order (OPORD) format shown at Appendix B, an order is issued when the plan is completed. The plan is illustrated through the use of terrain models, sketches, or blackboards. Planned actions can be drawn in the sand, dirt, or snow. They are crucial to the success of the plan.

16. Final Actions.

The last phase of preparing for a patrol includes conducting inspections, rehearsing all operation phases, and supervising. Inspections and rehearsals are critical. They are conducted regardless of the patrol's experience. They determine the patrol's physical and mental state of readiness. Do not take anyone who might compromise the operation; for example, someone with a cold might cough.

a. Inspections. These are conducted before rehearsals to make sure correct uniforms and equipment are being used. Questions for each man include:

- Does he know the plan?
- Does he know his role?
- Does he know the roles of others?
- Does he know the communication plan?

Inspect after the final rehearsal and just before leaving on the mission. Ensure that all equipment is still working; that nothing is being left behind and that the men are ready.

b. Rehearsals. Practice sessions help insure that the patrol is ready for the mission. Rehearsals also allow the patrol leader to check plans and make any needed changes. It is through practice that the men become familiar with the things they will do when on patrol.

(1) Rehearsals should take place on terrain similar to the area of operation. If the operation is to be at night, practice both in the day and night. All actions should be practiced, if possible. If not, practice critical actions. Actions in the objective area are critical. They should always be rehearsed.

(2) One favorable way to practice is to hold both "dry" and "wet" runs. During "dry runs" the patrol leader walks and talks the team(s) through their actions. Men take their positions and practice their assigned roles. When each is clear on actions of the patrol, hold "wet runs."

(3) "Wet runs" are complete rehearsals at normal speed. The entire patrol participates in the wet run. Hold as many runs as time permits to gain proficiency. When possible, element and team leaders should practice their units separately, before the final rehearsal of the entire patrol.

PART B - DIRECT SECURITY PATROLS

LOCs share some security requirements while having their own security requirements. To direct security patrols, you must become familiar with these requirements. This learning event will describe security tasking for the following LOCs:

- Main supply routes (MSR).
- Pipelines.
- Railways.
- Airfields.
- Ports and waterways.

1. Securing Main Supply Routes

To keep MSRs free for resupply and convoy operations, MP support highway regulation measures. MP use active and passive security measures.

a. Passive Security Measures. Passive security measures include the use of camouflage, sensors, concealment, dispersion, and barriers to prevent and stop enemy attacks. The use of route signs is another passive measure used by MP.

(1) Route signs help make up for MP manpower shortages. Signs give drivers information on road conditions, hazards, and speeds. Also, signs provide directions and act as guides. Examples of directional signs, guide signs, and hazard signs are shown in Figure 3-3. Look at sign "A" in Figure 3-3.

(2) This is a directional sign. The sign has a 12-inch diameter disk to indicate direction. The disk is white. The directional arrow is black. The route ID number (or name) is mounted beneath the disk. The hazard sign (sign "B" in Figure 3-3) indicates traffic hazards, such as steep hills, dangerous corners, and crossroads. Hazard signs are yellow, diamond-shaped signs. The hazard sign is printed in black. Guide signs (sign "G" in Figure 3-3) are rectangular; symbols are superimposed in white on a black background. The legend is used to indicate route and has a directional arrow and a route number or symbol.

b. Active Security Measures. Although there are various active security measures available, traffic control posts (TCPs) and mobile patrols are key LOC security measures.

(1) TCPs are placed at critical intersections. Specific locations are based on METT-T and are coordinated with other security measures such as ACPs and DPs. As explained in Lesson 1, TCPs control movement of forces, stragglers, and refugees. In addition, MP are tasked to:

- Gather intelligence information.
- Provide drivers with directions, road conditions, and information on enemy activity.
- Provide route security.

(2) Mobile patrols perform their own specific functions and support TCPs when protecting LOCs. Mobile patrols provide a defense "screen" between static posts. An example of how MP would secure static posts is shown in Figure 1-8.

(3) MP maintain radio contact with TCPs and investigate events such as accidents, requests for aid and reports from other security teams. They perform special tasks. This includes manning road blocks, checkpoints, and TCPs, in addition to providing transportation for troops or stragglers.

Mobile patrols also are tasked to:

- Monitor NBC.
- Provide area surveillance.
- Conduct route and area reconnaissance.



Figure 3-3. Types of Road Signs.

- o Provide rear area security support.
- o Redirect stragglers and refugees.

Finally, mobile patrols coordinate activities between support units including:

- o Highway Traffic Division.
- o Movement control center.
- o Artillery support.
- o Engineers.
- o Military intelligence.

(4) MSR security is enhanced by development of a communications net. Once established, MP should know all signals, frequencies, codes, and procedures.

(5) The final measure in protecting MSRs is identifying and securing critical points along the route. This includes defiles. A defile is an obstruction which restricts traffic flow to one-way at a time. Narrow bridges and damaged roads are examples of defiles. Since movement at defiles is restricted, it is an ideal opportunity for the enemy to stage an ambush. The role of the MP is to:

- o Control access to the defile.
- o Ensure that traffic does not enter the defile from different directions at the same time.
- o Reroute traffic when necessary.
- o Provide security and defense at the defile.
- o Brief drivers about obstructions.

(6) The most common method of controlling movement at a defile is to post MP at each end of the defile. Have a mobile patrol circulating throughout. Other controlling methods include use of visual, flag, rider, lead and trail, and FM radio or wire communication methods.

2. Securing Pipelines.

a. Pipelines are a highly vulnerable and volatile LOC. They are widely used in active theaters of operations. They are used for economical delivery of large amounts of bulk petroleum products or other liquids. This includes diesel fuel, gasoline, and jet fuel. Their protection is critical to peacetime and war efforts. Pipeline security is difficult. They must be protected from end to end. Pipelines are generally of two system types: Logistical or tactical.

(1) A logistical system is either permanent or semipermanent. A tactical system can be either temporary or semipermanent. The tactical system can be set up quickly. It furnishes fuel to advancing units in corps or division areas rapidly.

(2) One variation of the tactical system is called an assault pipeline system. Composed of hose, collapsible fuel cells, and portable pumps, it can rapidly supply advancing troops in combat areas.

(3) Pipeline systems have a number of critical points which must be protected. These include discharging facilities at ports, water terminals, and other points of entry; inland storage facilities such as tank farms and terminals; and pump stations and pipelines. Pump stations can be used as booster stations (when used on the main line) or as a branch station (when used on a branch pipeline). Branch pipelines are lines from the main line to airfields or general support suppliers.

b. Security Hazards. Pipelines are vulnerable to theft, enemy sabotage, and attack from point of entry to point of final delivery. Lengths of pipe can be damaged by mines and artillery fire. The enemy can weaken couplings and reduce the flow of fuel to the troops.

(1) Pilferage is the most common hazard. It occurs in areas where fuel is scarce and expensive. Pipelines are tapped by loosening flange bolts that join the pipes or through holes cut into the pipes. In many cases, pilferage causes fires and explosions along the pipeline. Fuel losses due to damaged and leaking pipes can be high.

(2) Sabotage is always a security hazard. It can easily destroy large or critical sections of the pipeline.

(3) Additional security hazards exist at pumping stations which are often remote from supporting units. They are vulnerable to sabotage, with pumping machinery or entire stations subject to destruction.

c. Planning for Security. Providing security for pipeline hazards requires planning and coordination on a large scale. Security may be performed by MP or infantry units, or both. The coordination of these forces is crucial to maintaining pipeline security. An MP commander's coordination should include the following forces:

- o Engineering commands.
- o Petroleum operating group.
- o Commander of security support units.

(1) When planning security, the best protection is determined by target analysis and feasibility studies. Protection against strafing, high explosives, atomic blast, and fire must be considered. As an MP security officer, you must coordinate analysis and studies with pipeline engineers.

(2) The level of warfare in the battle area will have a great affect on the type and extent of the security. As the level of intensity increases, the hazard of sabotage increases. When the area stabilizes, incidents of sabotage normally decease. Pilferage may increase, depending on availability and price of petroleum products in the area.

d. Security Consideration. One of the first security considerations is to coordinate efforts, both tactical and nontactical. You should coordinate with forces listed above to make sure the following actions are taken:

- o Surveillance is provided.
- o Observations are reported.
- o Actions are taken to protect the system.

Protection forces must be deployed to maximize coverage with use of:

o Static posts.

o Mobile patrols.

o Air patrols.

(1) Communication nets between security forces and supporting units must be set up. Security personnel should be equipped with radio equipment. On-call air strikes, helicopter night illumination, and mobile patrol capabilities must be set up. Weapons and equipment for security forces will vary. This will be according to tactical considerations, prevailing conditions, and the type of enemy activity anticipated.

(2) A second major consideration in pipeline security is placement of terminals. Site location depends on tactical and logistical military considerations. The primary military factor is its vulnerability to enemy attack. Wherever a terminal is placed, it must be protected. Terminal placement is a compromise between two requirements:

o Military necessity.

o Technical efficiency.

(3) Pump stations are vital elements in a pipeline system. Locations of pump stations are determined by a number of factors. These include the type and properties of the fuel to be pumped. When practical, underground shelters should be provided to security forces.

(4) An important consideration for pipeline security is whether the pipeline and tanks should be buried or not. Two advantages of burial are obvious:

o Concealment from area observation.

o Reduced maintenance requirements.

(5) Finally, as a security officer you must watch for changes in types and density of local populations in areas next to pipelines. Dangers need to be pointed out to civilians and reasons for growth must be analyzed. All evidence connected with possible illegal access to the pipeline needs investigation.

3. Securing Railways.

a. Railroads are a tempting target for the enemy. By nature of their layout, railroads present a number of security problems. Long stretches of track, bridges, and tunnels are subject to sabotage. Tracks can be cut, trestles demolished, and tunnels sabotaged. Any of these actions can prevent a train from reaching its destination on schedule. Security measures depend

on specific situations and areas of operation. A number of protection steps may be used. This includes:

- o Air recon of routes.
- o Critical areas occupation during rail movement.
- o Observation cars.
- o Locomotive placement.
- o Decoy trains.
- o Special armored guard cars.
- o Maintenance trains placement along route.
- o Movement speeds.
- o Security patrols along route.

One of the first steps in railway protection is to identify and protect critical points. Switch yards and train installations must be located. These sites may be vulnerable to attack or critical to a military mission. MP will be tasked to protect them.

b. Tunnel Security. Protection of tunnels and bridges are handled as separate security problems. Tunnels are most vulnerable at the place where they pass through unstable sand or dirt. Saboteurs place explosives along the tunnel crown or upper sides. An explosion can cause the tunnel to collapse. Derailing a train in the tunnel has an equal affect on the train's movement--it stops.

Security measures for tunnels include inspecting for explosive charges in and around the tunnel. This includes ventilation shafts and checking the conditions of tracks.

c. Bridge Security. Security measures used for a bridge do not depend solely on its stability. Where a bridge is located, its closeness to other structures and routes, and its nearness to populated areas are other prime considerations.

Normally, a stationary security force is the most effective. MP or other security forces should be quartered at a safe distance from the bridge, but, close enough to respond quickly to emergencies. Forces should be placed at both ends of the bridge. Security on bridges spanning rivers is enhanced by patrol boats. Guard boats and upstream booms permit vessel inspections prior to allowing them to pass under a bridge. Finally, a bridge's entire length should be inspected periodically.

d. Train Security. The primary mission of a train crew and security force is to get the train to its destination and keep its freight intact. Normally, a train operation crew consists of four or five people:

o The engineer.

o The conductor.

o A fireman.

o The senior brakeman.

o The flagman or brakeman.

(1) This crew has control of the train. The number of MP, or other security forces, used to protect a train depends on three things:

o Length of train.

o Duration of the trip.

o Degree of enemy threat.

(2) As an MP security officer, assigned to the Transportation Railway Services (TRS), you will plan and supervise only the MP force. Planning train security will include determining communication links between MP on the train and support units. Coordinate security with: military intelligence, MP use of crew-served weapons, map recons of routes, and reactions to every kind of attack.

(3) One of the first things that is done to protect rail traffic is to clear underbrush from sides of tracks. This eliminates cover for people who are attempting to stop rail traffic. Other security measures include MP riding in a specific car that requires protection, in a train's caboose, or in security cars. If protecting a freight train, check car doors, seals, wires, and locks. MP assigned to passenger trains do not interfere with train crew duties, but, serve to help maintain discipline and order.

(4) MP guarding rail traffic must be on the alert for attacks from the ground and air.

(a) Armed MP, well placed, can counter enemy ground attacks. If attacked, it is vital to KEEP THE TRAIN MOVING. However, if the train is stopped, MP should remain on board, if possible. Fire should be directed to fight off the attack. MP must know, and are alert for, the train whistle signal for reboarding. Thus, they will not be left behind or injured trying to get on the train as it leaves.

(b) If a train is attacked by aircraft in an open or exposed area, it should continue to move if possible. During the attack, antiaircraft weapons spaced throughout the train repel the air attack. If attacked in

wooded or hilly areas, the train should use the terrain for cover. Tunnels are excellent cover for trains. Short tunnels can be used to protect locomotives or cars containing vital equipment; long tunnels may protect the entire train. In areas subject to air attack, the train should operate at night and stop in concealed areas during the day.

e. Freight Security. Because of economic conditions caused by war, supplies, and other freight are prime targets in theaters of operations. Favorite targets include food, clothing, fuel, tools, and other items that sustain life. Freight must be protected against removal by anyone not authorized to receive it. MP are tasked with providing freight security during three major periods:

- At point of origin.
- In transit.
- Destination point.

(1) Shippers are responsible to make sure that cars are properly loaded and secure at the point of origin. One of the most vulnerable places during movement of cargo is the loading point. Rail cars should be loaded as soon as possible once it is delivered to the carrier. If shipments are made in open cars and subject to damage by weather, cover them securely. This also reduces chances of theft. Rail car doors should be securely locked with seals, wires, or metal straps attached to the car door. Rail cars and cargo are documented to make sure of identification and control. Remember, an adequate documentation system is essential for rail shipment security. When loaded cars are turned over to TRS, the shipper must include this paperwork.

(2) MP are responsible to make sure that freight security is continued once the freight is turned over to the TRS. MP check cargo, locks, and seals, and report losses or tampering to their supervisor.

(3) Security problems are most severe when the freight is in transit. Loading procedures, placing cargo into carriers, and moving these carriers all pose varying degrees of security hazards. Security is enhanced when responsibilities are clearly set up. The group who has the shipment under custody should be held for its protection. The shipper is responsible until he turns it over to the TRS. The TRS is responsible when the loaded cars are attached to the train. This does not stop when the cars are delivered to a designated depot, siding, or track. The receiver (consignee) assumes the security at the time they are delivered.

(4) Sabotage is most likely to occur while freight is in transit. Looting and attack most often happen when the train is moving at slow speeds on steep grades or through tunnels. Trains are also vulnerable when traveling through villages, wooded, restricted, or congested areas. Security forces must be alert for persons trying to board or damage the train. When the train is stopped, MP dismount and check the train on both sides. They also perform the following tasks:

- o Verify that locks, seals and wires are intact.

- o Check for damage to cars. This includes overheating journal boxes which may cause damage to axles.

(5) Unloading points are highly vulnerable to theft and sabotage. Cargo should be unloaded as soon as the train gets to its destination. Security at the storage site must be maintained at a high level. It is a target for saboteurs.

f. Trip Report. At the end of a trip, the MP commander completes an after-action report. This contains the following:

- o Date and time of departure and arrival.

- o List of events.

- o Personal data of security forces and train crews.

- o Recommendations for future missions.

Keep in mind when completing the report that other items may be needed. These may be required by local or command directives or at the discretion of the NCO in charge.

4. Securing Airfields.

a. Unique security problems are presented at airfields. They must be protected, but, they also must remain accessible to our troops. Effective airfield security requires that you set up security procedures and make sure that they are understood.

b. Physical Security Plan. When developing security for airfields, prepare a physical security plan. This plan should cover all phases of security. A physical security plan may cover:

- o Area security.

- o Control measures.

- o Security aids and forces.

- o Contingency plans.

- o Use of air surveillance.

- o Coordination instructions.

A sample physical security plan can be seen at Appendix B at the end of this subcourse. Review this plan. Each section is explained briefly in the following paragraphs.

(1) Area Security. Areas, buildings and other critical structures are defined in this section of the plan. It also gives priorities for their protection.

(2) Control Measures. This section defines and establishes restrictions to access and movement into critical areas. These are classified as to persons, vehicles, and materials.

(3) Aids to Security. How protective barriers, lighting systems, intrusion devices, and communication will be used is presented here.

(4) Security Forces. This section provides instructions which apply to all security forces, including fixed and mobile personnel.

(5) Contingency Plans. These plans list required actions in response to various emergency situations. This includes detailed plans to counter terrorism, bomb threats, hostage negotiation, disaster, and fire.

(6) Use of Air Surveillance. Air surveillance is an important tool in airport security. Security is more effective at night when air surveillance is coordinated with other security systems. This includes lighting, night-vision devices, mobile patrols, and remote sensors.

(7) Coordinating Instructions. This section identifies security measures which require liaison and coordination with other military, government, and civilian agencies. MP in air base ground defense operations are responsible for defending air assets from ground threats outside the boundary of the air base while the Air Force is responsible for internal security.

5. Critical Site Security.

a. When securing critical sites, you should place your security forces at critical operation centers. Set up guard posts and OPs at critical sites along the perimeter, also, access control points at entry and exit locations. Plan and assign foot and mobile patrols. If available, plan for use of sentry dogs to augment patrols. MP assigned to ACPs, guard posts, and patrols must know radio frequencies, signals and codes.

b. Patrols. When using foot patrols, make sure MP on foot patrol do not follow set routines. They should use irregular routes to keep intruders guessing when they will be back. Mobile patrols should vary routes and times. Sentry (patrol) dogs can be used either to augment MP elements or take the place of MP. This allows the MP to do other missions. Patrol dogs can be used for local security, perimeter defense and internal security. They can be used with patrols or fixed posts. They may patrol along a portion of a perimeter which encloses security areas such as tactical aircraft parking areas or along the entire fence line. On patrol, dogs can easily detect people hidden along a perimeter. At guard posts and OPs, the dog is used primarily for early warning. At an access point, the dog can guard a person during an identification check.

c. Barriers. Critical sites are further made secure with use of barriers and protective lighting. Protective barriers are used to:

o Define the physical limits of an installation.

o Restrict, channel, or impede access.

(1) Protective physical barriers are used to protect the installation, facilities, or restricted areas. These barriers may consist of fences, walls, roadblocks, or other construction to make penetration difficult. The use of barriers provides two important benefits to physical security: (1) they create a psychological consideration; (2) they have a direct impact on the number of security posts needed and how often they will be used.

(2) Plan the use of barriers. Keep in mind the type of anticipated threat, the nature of the secured area, and the degree of security. One set of barriers may be needed to control vehicular and pedestrian traffic flow, checking IDs, or defining a buffer zone for classified areas. Additional reinforced structural barriers may be needed for protecting highly secret facilities.

d. Protective Lighting. Protective lighting should allow security forces to see activities around or inside the airfield without disclosing their presence. Adequate lighting for all approaches discourages attempted unauthorized entry. It also reveals persons within the area. Good lighting is achieved by adequate, even lights on bordering areas, glaring lights in the eyes of the intruder, and relatively little light on security patrol routes.

(1) Plan protective lighting with high brightness contrast between intruder and background. It should be one of your first considerations. If illumination is not sufficient, the intruder is harder to see. Effective, protective lighting should discourage intruder entry. It makes detection likely if entry is attempted.

(2) There are various types of protective lighting used at airfields. Generally they consist of four general types:

o Continuous.

o Standby.

o Moveable.

o Emergency.

(3) Continuous lighting is the most common protective lighting system. It consists of a series of fixed lights arranged to flood a given area with light. Continuous lighting primarily uses two methods: glare projection and controlled.

(4) Glare projection is useful when the glare of lights is directed across a large area without interfering with adjacent operations. Controlled lighting is best when it is necessary to limit the width of the lighted strip. Both systems are best used around fenced perimeters. Active entrances should have two or more lighting units with adequate lighting for recognition of person and examination of credentials. One example of controlled lighting is shown in Figure 3-4.



Figure 3-4. Example of Boundary Lighting (Controlled Lighting).

(5) Standby lighting is similar to continuous lighting. But, it is only turned on when suspicious activity is detected or suspected.

(6) Moveable lighting consists of searchlights. These may be turned on during the night or when needed.

(7) Emergency lighting may duplicate all of the above lighting systems. Its use is limited to times of power failure or other emergency conditions which prevent the other systems from being turned on. It depends on alternate power sources, such as portable generators.

(8) Lighting should not be used alone. It should be used with other measures. These include fixed security posts or patrols, fences and alarms.

e. Airfield Security Planning/Supervising Reaction Forces. Finally, airfield security is dependent on sound planning and effective supervision. Planning for all anticipated threats to security is crucial. An effective security force is vital to security.

6. Securing Ports and Waterways.

a. Similar security measures are taken at ports and waterways as used in protecting freight. Theft and pilferage of cargo are serious problems in terminal operations. The need for personnel ID and control is, if anything, greater. Ports and waterways have extensive and undefined perimeters, exposed beaches, and pier areas. This increased exposure to sabotage makes ports and harbors harder to protect. Important and valuable cargo is unloaded and stored at terminals. It is easy to understand why they are prime targets. Port, harbor, and waterway security requires identifying critical points. These points include:

- Terminals.
- Piers.
- Bridges.
- Locks.
- Dams.

b. Terminal Security. Terminal areas consist of a number of related areas such as storage areas, piers, beach and shore areas, also, entrances/exits, anchorage areas, and ships tied up at piers. It may include petroleum, oil, lubricant (POL) discharge points, pipelines, and POL storage areas. Whatever type of terminal, the guard force is the key to successful security. Security guard posts may be motorized, stationary, or walking. This depends on location and nature of posts, types of cargo and supplies on the dock, and types of ships. Specific guard positions are presented later in this learning event.

c. Pier Security. A pier can be protected on the landward side by fencing and pass control. The section which extends into the water cannot be protected this way. This part of the pier is accessible from the end, sides and underside. Security methods require the use of patrols (walking and water), protective lighting, booms, and nets.

d. Bridge Security. Bridge security measures include use of guard boats and upstream booms. These permit inspections of vessels before allowing them to pass under a bridge. Guard posts need to be located at bridge approaches and abutments. Use other bridge security measures as described earlier.

e. Navigational Locks and Dam Security. These are important elements in the waterway system. They provide an economical means of transporting by

water. They are critical to the national economy. A navigational lock and dam is shown in Figure 3-5.



Figure 3-5. Navigation Lock and Dam.

(1) Access to lock walls, locks and gates, control rooms, operating machinery, or the power supply is not allowed unless supervised. All entrances are guarded or kept locked. During tours of critical areas,, no packages, briefcases, or suitcases are permitted. Access to the lock wall is prevented by fencing.

(2) Dams have many uses, including generating electric power and providing flood control. Critical and sensitive functional areas demand security attention, such as power house, switchyards, intake/outlet structures, transformers and generators. Access to these areas is restricted. Explosive materials must not be allowed near the structures. Security measures should consist of the following:

- o Fencing/barriers.
- o Protective lighting.
- o Intrusion detectors and sensors.
- o Access control and ID systems.
- o Closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance.
- o Lock and key control.
- o Security forces.
- o Contingency forces.

(3) To provide maximum security at a dam, areas should be identified for guard forces. This includes static, mobile, and response force protection. CCTV is used effectively at remote locations such as switchyards, transformers, head and tail waters, and powerhouses facilities. Figure 3-6 shows a sample security set up for a dam, including CCTV.

(4) Protective lighting should be placed at critical areas of locks and dams, such as intake and outlet structures. Also, the following locations should be considered in developing any protective lighting plan.

- o Inside and outside chambers.
- o Upper and lower gates.
- o Dam gate spillways.
- o Transformer decks.
- o Walkways and gate hoists.
- o Exterior powerhouse doors.
- o Generators and switchyards.

f. River and Harbor Patrols. Port and harbor security requires the use of patrol boats. These boats are needed for open harbor areas as well as water sides of piers and dock areas. They perform escort operations, and patrol inland waterways and beach areas used in logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations.

(1) Patrol boats enforce port regulations and provide security for incoming and outgoing craft. They provide offshore security for communication facilities, and secure quays, piers, moorages, and anchorages in port areas.



Figure 3-6. Sample Security Set Up for Dam.

(2) In river shore areas they guide, escort, and guard small craft carrying wounded, emergency supplies, and command and staff personnel.

7. Security Aids.

a. Areas around waterways should also be safeguarded with use of sensors, barriers and lighting. In directing placement of security aids you must determine effectiveness. This is dependent upon the threat, perimeter size, surveillance capabilities, and available guard forces.

b. Sensors. Sensors are designed to detect entry of unauthorized personnel into protected areas. Certain intrusion systems are suitable only for outdoor protection. Others are suitable only for indoor use. In planning, you must be aware of the advantages and limitations of these systems so they can be used effectively. However, any detection system is useless unless it is supported by prompt security force action when the system is activated.

Selection of a sensor system depends on the type of security problem. Factors to be considered in choosing a sensor include:

- o Location and response time of security forces.
- o Value of facility, material, or sensitivity of classified materials being protected.
- o Area environment.
- o Radio and electronic interference.
- o Operational hours of the facility or installation.
- o Specific target to be protected.
- o Availability of security forces.

c. Barriers. When determining placement and selecting the type of barrier, keep in mind the type of anticipated threat, nature of the secured area, and the degree of security required. Barriers include fences, booms and cable nets. As explained earlier in "Airfield Security," fences can protect facility or installation perimeters and entrances.

(1) There are four types of fences, channeling, barbed wire, concertina, and chain link.

(2) Booms can close off the water side of a pier, deny underwater access, or prevent entry of small boats. An example of a boom is shown in Figure 3-7.

(3) A cable net is used to stop underwater entry. In Figure 3-7, a cable net is suspended from the boom.

d. Lighting. Pier and dock lighting should illuminate water approaches and the pier and dock area. It is important that areas beneath the pier floor also be lighted. Moveable lighting which can be directed should be part of lighting security. The lighting must not violate marine rules and regulations. Coordinate with the U.S. Coast Guard for approval of proposed lighting next to navigable waters.

8. Vulnerability Testing/Analysis.

a. Guard duty is sometimes boring duty. Special efforts must be made to keep personnel alert. This is done by conducting tests. Detailed planning and preparation is required for effective security testing. These tests are conducted to check security in port facilities and the harbor area.



Figure 3-7. Example of Boom and Cable Net Protection.

b. Vulnerability Tests. Conduct vulnerability tests. You will find weaknesses in the security system. These tests consist of attempts to breach security such as trying to enter restricted areas. Tests examine improper enforcement of ID and control procedures and check the responses of security personnel. Techniques for infiltrating security include entry through unguarded gates, use of altered badges and passes, and entries without presenting ID. Test objectives are:

o Estimate vulnerability for commander.

o Determine effectiveness of security force.

o Alert guard force commander to techniques that could be used to breach security.

o Provide information for corrective action.

c. Vulnerability Analysis. After conducting these tests, you must conduct such an analysis. The report is carefully reviewed to provide an evaluation of the physical security program. It serves as a basis for finding where changes should be made in the system. You should review and analyze the testing methods and procedures for guidance on future tests. Test results are given security classifications. They are rigidly controlled and access is allowed only to those persons who have the required security clearances and need to know.

d. Entry Exit Control. Control of vehicular and pedestrian traffic entering and leaving the area is vital to maintaining security. You must set up a single control point for each entrance. Have MP posted at each control point. At vehicle control points, only delivery vehicles, maintenance, and essential administrative vehicles may enter the area. Containers are inspected and documents are checked. Note that no containers can pass through a control point without a valid Transportation Control and Movement Document (TCMD). At pedestrian control points, only authorized people should enter the area. This is accomplished by establishing, maintaining, controlling and safeguarding a pass system.

e. Perimeter Security. Backed by gate security, perimeter security keeps unauthorized personnel from entering restricted areas. When planning perimeter security you may include barriers. This includes chain link fences topped with barbed wire and concertina wire, flood lighting, use of sensors and intrusion systems, use of motor patrols, dog patrols, and physical security posts. Your plan should instruct MP to inspect fences along perimeters daily to assure that there are no holes or breaks. Antisubmarine and antiunderwater demolition team control is the responsibility of the U.S. Navy.

f. Finally, hatch guards are posted at cargo hatches where workers, called long-shoremen, load and unload cargo. They report on damaged cargo and signs of pilferage and sabotage. They must be alert for attempts to change destinations of cargo. Hatch guards must coordinate with guards on deck to prevent cargo from being dropped overboard.

9. Cargo Security.

a. Cargo areas must be protected from pilferage and sabotage. As a minimum, sensitive, classified, and high value cargo should be fenced with its own guarded gate and MP patrol. An added security measure is how the cargo is stacked in the storage area. Cargo can be stacked door-to-door, or with the door against a wall. An example of how cargo is stacked to maximize its protection is shown in Figure 3-8.



Figure 3-8. Stacking Cargo for Maximum Security.

b. The break-bulk point and damaged cargo storage areas are high-risk areas. They require close supervision, perimeter barriers, and adequate lighting. Cargo security is enhanced if ships are unloaded during the day and unloading operations are watched by MP.

c. Secure holding areas need to be set up for convoys picking up cargo (access points and other circulation controls). MP establish communication nets and maintain radio contact with other security forces. Finally, convoys are escorted when they are carrying sensitive cargo.

d. Safeguarding/Controlling TCMDs and Container Seals. Although not normally accountable documents, Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMDs) can be numbered to aid control. This will prevent pilferage. Blank TCMDs should be secured in a vault to prevent their unauthorized use.

e. Container seals are used to show whether a door has been opened or tampered with. Seals are serially numbered. This helps identify who applied the seal and provides a system of control. Container seal control and accountability is easier to maintain if you:

- Maintain a record of seals by serial number.
- Store seals under lock.
- Designate one person for safekeeping, issue, and record keeping.
- Restrict who may apply seals.
- Enter seal numbers on TCMDs.
- Conduct periodic inventory audits.

f. You should establish procedures for supervising application of seals. Failure to supervise offers an opportunity for cargo to be pilfered prior to a seal being applied, or to the application of a bogus seal.

10. Water Patrol Operations.

a. Harbor and river security operations require coordination and liaison with land-based MP organizations and local military and civilian police. Water patrols provide the only practical means to protect arterial and smaller waterways against attack by boat.

b. Water patrol operations are an extension of land-base MP operations. Water patrol routes and missions are assigned in accordance with the needs for MP service. These patrols enforce port regulations, suppress criminal actions, and assist in circulation control.

c. Other duties include providing security for incoming and outgoing craft, providing offshore security for communication facilities, and securing quays, piers, moorages, and anchorages in port areas. In river shore areas they guide, escort, and guard small craft carrying wounded, emergency supplies, and command and staff personnel.

d. Finally, during prisoner of war (POW) operations, water patrols guard crafts holding POW and offshore areas of POW collection points.

e. Effective security measures require coordination between water patrols, ground patrols, and static posts along shorelines. Water patrols support beach parties in regulation, control, and direction of watercraft near or on the beach.

f. When controlling water traffic, water patrols must coordinate visual/photographic air surveillance, develop a system for identifying friendly military and civilian vessels, and establish search/seizure procedures.

11. Special Training.

a. Training for waterborne security forces must be a high-priority item. Water patrol activity includes all the dangers normally encountered by MP plus the following:

- o Encounters with waterfront criminals.
- o Encounters with enemy/insurgent forces.
- o Accidents on the water.

b. Therefore, a thorough safety and communications training program must be considered. Efficient and continuous training is the most effective means of obtaining and maintaining maximum security force proficiency. In addition to training in weapons, security forces need training in water survival, small boat operations, crossing water areas, water safety, and care of equipment.

c. Communications procedures must be developed. Personnel must be trained in their uses. They must be able to communicate with support units, patrol boats and civilian craft by using radio equipment, megaphones, blinkers, flags, and pyrotechnics.

d. This concludes the lesson on providing security for all LOCs. It has explained and described security requirements for:

- o Main Supply Routes.
- o Pipelines.
- o Railways.
- o Airfields.
- o Ports and waterways.

The information contained in this lesson can be adapted to a number of systems to be secured. Remember, physical safeguards, like tactical barriers for defense, require the backing of a trained and alert security force.

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LESSON 3

PRACTICE EXERCISE

INTRODUCTION

You have just finished reading the instructional material for Lesson 3. This lesson covered how to direct security patrolling of all lines of communication (LOC). It is now time to check your comprehension of the lesson. This is done by completing the practice exercise below. All of the questions are multiple-choice with one correct answer or best choice. Try to answer all questions without referring to the lesson material.

When you have answered all the questions, turn the page and check your answers against the answer key. Each correct response is referenced to a specific portion of the lesson material. Review any questions you have missed or don't understand. When you have completed your review, continue to the next lesson.

SITUATION

You received an assignment to secure all lines of communications in a tactical environment. You ordered an area recon mission which revealed the presence of a pipeline, port, airfield, and rail station.

1. Select another line of communication that you will have to plan for.

   A. MP communication set.
   B. Equipment for wire communications.
   C. Main supply routes.
   D. Alternate routes for military traffic.

2. Which active security measures will you plan to secure lines of communications?

   A. Camouflage.
   B. Strongpoints.
   C. Dispersion.
   D. Sensors.

3. You have tasked an MP team to conduct a recon patrol. The mission goals are understood. (In what form will the information be given to the patrol members?)

   A. Verbal orders.
   B. Operation plan.
   C. Warning order.
   D. Preparation order.

4. Under what condition will you hold an inspection before a patrol? For:

A. Actions in the objective only.
B. Intensity of the mission.
C. All patrols.
D. Patrols with new members.

5. Your combat patrol mission reached its objective. Contact with the enemy was made on the primary route. How do you direct the return to friendly territory?

A. Return by the most direct route possible.
B. Return on the primary route because you have the current recon on the area.
C. Recon on adjacent area for the next patrol.
D. Return on the alternate route.

6. During the patrol, two team members are scattered by enemy actions. What action will you take?

A. Order all members to return to departure point.
B. Order patrol to start a search party.
C. Meet at the objective rally point.
D. Meet at the en route rally point to direct how best to accomplish the mission.

SITUATION

As the commander of the 709th MP Co, you have been tasked to direct LOC security patrols. Personnel will be deployed in a tactical environment for an extensive and top secret mission. You must determine the security needs for each patrol task. Intelligence has informed you that enemy elements are in the area. You are required to provide training and personnel for the mission.

7. What active security measure will you task to team members on main supply routes?

A. Dismount points.
B. Tactical operations center.
C. Access control points.
D. Traffic control points.

8. You have a manpower shortage. There are steep hills along the MSR. How will you provide for the LOC security?

A. Spread your personnel out as thinly as possible along MSR.
B. Keep in radio contact with units using MSR.
C. Use road hazard signs along MSR.
D. Locate TCP before the hills on the MSR.

9. A mobile MP patrol has notified you that an obstruction is on the MSR. Traffic flow has been restricted to one way at a time. What direction can you give to the patrol?

A. Control movement at the obstruction and be on the lookout for enemy ambush.
B. Notify engineers to clear the obstruction.
C. Place hazard route signs at each end of the obstruction.
D. Order patrols to disperse immediately, take cover, and prepare for maximum fire.

10. Fuel pipelines are located in the area of your security operations. What information can you provide to patrols about this form of security?

A. Pipelines are highly vulnerable and difficult to secure; therefore, give pipelines a lower priority to other TOC tasks.
B. Provide for a wide-scale security plan as pilferage is the most common hazard, causing scarce supplies, fires and/or explosions along the pipeline.
C. The level of warfare has decreased, so the need for security along the pipeline will also decrease.
D. Provide TCPs along the pipeline to redirect traffic away from the pipeline and control who has access to pumping sites.

11. The task of security for railroads presents a number of problems because of their physical layout. You are required to task personnel for railway protection. What is one of the first steps you must take to implement a security plan?

A. Identify critical points and specific security situations in the area of operations.
B. Train MP and TRS personnel about security measures at vulnerable points.
C. Make shippers more aware of the vulnerabilities of shipping by rail; provide for them the means to secure the cargo.
D. Prepare a recon report of the area to determine type of terrain that can be used for camouflage and concealment.

12. Critical site security differs from other types of LOC security in that airfields have a set perimeter that can be patrolled. What is one physical security task you can use in deploying critical site security? Use of:

A. Sentry dogs on foot and mobile patrols.
B. TCP in and out of the area.
C. Fixed and mobile personnel.
D. Gate guards.

13. Your security plans will vary from one LOC to another. With which LOC will you have to emphasize stronger personnel ID and control measures?

A. Railways.
B. Airfields.
C. Ports and waterways.
D. Pipelines.

14. Which system will you employ to assist MP water patrols in controlling LOC traffic?

A. Restrict patrols in controlling LOC traffic.
B. Issue permits for waterway travel.
C. Allow movement over water during daylight hours.
D. License and identify civilian and friendly military watercraft.

LESSON 3

PRACTICE EXERCISE

ANSWER KEY AND FEEDBACK

Item		Correct Answer and Feedback
1.	C.	Main supply routes Within an area of operation there are... (page 3-2, para 1a).
2.	B.	Strong points Strong point security measures... (page 3-4, para 2a(3)).
3.	C.	Warning order A warning order gives... (page 3-6, para 7).
4.	C.	All patrols Rehearsals and inspections... (page 3-12, para 10c(4)).
5.	D.	Return on the alternate route This is used when a patrol... (page 3-11, para 10c(2)).
6.	D.	Meet at the enroute rally point... Enroute rally points are... (page 3-12, para 10c(3)(b)).
7.	D.	Traffic control points Active security measures... (page 3-15, para 1b).
8.	C.	Use road hazard signs along MSR Route signs help make up for... (page 3-15, para 1a(1)).
9.	A.	Control movement at the obstructions... The final measure is protecting... (page 3-17, para 1b(5)).
10.	B.	Provide for a wide scale security plan... Pilferage is the most common... (page 3-18, para 2b(1)).
11.	A.	Identify critical points and specific... One of the first steps... (page 3-19, para 3a).
12.	A.	Sentry dogs on foot and mobile patrols Plan and assign foot and mobile... (page 3-24, para 5a).
13.	C.	Ports and waterways The need for personnel ID... (page 3-27, para 6a).
14.	D.	License and identify civilian... When controlling water traffic... (page 3-35, para 10f).

LESSON 4

CORDON AND SEARCH MISSION

CRITICAL TASK: 01-3761.00-1106

OVERVIEW

LESSON DESCRIPTION:

In this lesson you will learn to perform a cordon and search mission.

TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

ACTION: Perform a cordon and search mission.

CONDITION: You will have this subcourse, pencil, and paper.

STANDARD: To demonstrate competency of this task you must achieve a minimum score of 70 percent on the subcourse examination.

REFERENCES: The material contained in this lesson was derived from the following publications: FM 19-1, FM 90-10, and FM 100-20.

INTRODUCTION

Military police conduct cordon and search operations in support of combat efforts. A "cordon and search" mission is defined as an operation in which the following characteristics are present:

- A small group of people are surrounded.
- The area is seized.
- A detailed search is conducted.
- A specific mission is carried out.

These missions are a part of the overall intelligence effort to gather information on the identity and location of enemy insurgents. As part of the population and resources control program, MP check family census cards, issue ID cards, and locate hidden supplies, weapons, and other-valuable materials.

MP make people aware of government intentions and try to win their cooperation as part of the psychological operations/civil affairs (PSYCOP/CA) effort.

Search missions try to keep the enemy off balance. Search operations harass insurgents and keep them on the defense. They are oriented at finding people,

material, buildings, and terrain. MP should perform cordon and search operations only within areas under military jurisdiction. Authority for these operations must be carefully used.

PART A - MISSION PLANNING

1. Planning Requirements for Search Missions.

Successful cordon and search operations are dependent on thorough planning and an understanding of the types of terrain in which it will be conducted. This requires knowing the types of urbanization where a commander will conduct his operations, also, the tactical impacts of each type. When planning search missions, analyze the terrain.

a. Urban Terrain Analysis. Terrain analysis of an urban area is important to offensive and defensive planning on today's battlefield. It forms a basis for organizing troops. It determines how support weapons and troops will be used.

(1) Tactical terrain analysis has always focused on natural terrain features. Today, analysis is more aware of effects of man-made features on the overall tactical scheme. How urban terrain impacts operations is important in determining tactical options.

(2) For commanders at battlefield level and above, the size of the built-up area, the communications support network, and the urban pattern is important. For commanders at levels from the platoon through brigade, the physical layout and building construction are important.

b. Built-up Areas. A built-up area is a concentration of structures, facilities, and population. This forms the economic and cultural focus for surrounding areas. There are four general categories of built-up areas. These are:

- o Large cities (populations over 100,000).
- o Towns and small cities (3,000 to 100,000).
- o Villages (less than 3,000).
- o Strip areas.

c. Large Cities. Large cities are normally the core of larger, densely populated areas. This consists of the city, suburban areas, and small towns. They are large in area and have vast amounts of land.

d. Town and Small Cities. These are similar to cities. These areas are found along major lines of communication and built along river valleys. They continue to grow and may merge with other towns, forming large cities,-

e. Villages. Most villages are farming areas. They are generally spread out among more open cultivated areas. In Europe, the average distance between them is 3.5 kilometers.

f. Strip Areas. These normally form connecting links between villages and towns. They are found along LOCs. The size and populations of strips vary. They assume a long linear pattern.

g. Building and Street Patterns. The way a built-up area is laid out is of tactical importance to a commander. There are five basic building and street patterns. These have an impact on fire support and troop movement. These are:

- o Dense, random construction.
- o Closed-orderly block.
- o Dispersed residential area.
- o High-rise area.
- o Industrial/transportation.

(1) Each of these will be described and explained in the following paragraphs. An analysis of offensive tactical characteristics of each built-up area will be present in "Urban Terrain Analysis/Tactical Considerations" later in this subcourse. Examples of each type are shown in Figure 4-1.

(2) Dense, Random Construction (Type A). Typical old inner city construction with narrow winding streets. The streets radiate from a central area. Buildings are close together and built along the edge of roadways. This is normally found within cities, towns and villages.

(3) Closed-Orderly Block (Type B). Found in central areas of towns and cities, Type B has wider streets. These generally form rectangular patterns. Buildings are built in a continuous front along a block. Inner courtyards are normally found.

(4) Dispersed Residential Area (Type C). Found next to Type B areas. Type C consists of rowhouses or single dwellings with yards, gardens, trees, and fences. Streets are generally curved or rectangular.

(5) High-Rise Area (Type D). Found in larger cities or towns. Type D consists of multistoried apartments, separated by parking lots and one-story buildings. You will find wide streets laid out in a rectangular pattern.

(6) Industrial/Transportation (Type E). Older Type E construction is found near the center of cities and towns. It consists of low, flat-roofed factory and warehouse buildings. Type E is normally found along major rail and highway routes. New construction is found near the edge of cities.



Figure 4-1. Examples of Urbanization.

(7) Lines of Communication (LOCs). Large networks of highways, all-weather roads, railroads, and canals connect built-up areas in Europe. These LOCs bypass congested areas. They are heavily dependent on a system of bridges, ramps, and overpasses. If destroyed or damaged, these LOCs become useless and are obstacles to rapid troop movement.

2. Urban Terrain Analysis/Tactical Implications

a. Urbanization is changing the face of the battlefield. Traditional ways of approaching an objective are being blocked and narrowed by man-made features. These are growing along lines of communications. They are expanding across large areas of terrain.

b. Conflicts in urban areas are more intense than in undeveloped areas. Search operations are more difficult as movement is restricted. Urban search operations require planning military actions around and within buildings. Also, communication networks within urban terrain are difficult to maintain. As a platoon leader, you will need to develop plans for alternate communication networks.

c. The layout of a village, town, or city follows an historical pattern. Five urban patterns were described earlier. These impact on troop movement and fire support. Patterns in the following paragraphs will be evaluated in terms of combat characteristics for offensive operations:

- o Mobility.
- o Fields of fire/observation.
- o Obstacles.
- o Cover/concealment.
- o Fire hazard.
- o Command and control.

(1) Mobility. This is the ability of units to move vehicles and troops in relation to structures, open spaces, streets, and rubble.

(2) Fields of Fire/Observation. This relates to restrictions of fields of fire and observation along streets, across spaces between buildings, and from upper floors of buildings.

(3) Obstacles. This relates to obstacle construction potential in relation to: (1) time to construct; (2) labor requirements; (3) material requirements; and (4) obstacle value.

(4) Cover/Concealment. Cover is the amount of protection in a building. Concealment is: (1) how close together the buildings are; (2) how much rubble they provide; and (3) how much hazard the structure provides.

(5) Fire Hazard. Fire potential is determined by construction type and how close the buildings are built together. Each area is evaluated by the following fire hazards:

o Isolated fires. Where a fire is restricted to one building or part of a building.

o Area fires. Where fires cover blocks.

o Fire storms. Where fires cover a large area and are out of control.

(6) Command and Control. How the built-up area affects coordination of fire and movement communication.

d. The following paragraphs will present a description of offensive tactical considerations for each basic buildup. Detailed descriptions of defensive tactical considerations can be found in the extract of FM 90-10 at Appendix B at the end of this subcourse.

(1) Dense, Random Construction (Type A). The oldest of the five basic patterns. Its buildings are close together. Troop movement is not a major problem in Type A. However, tank, truck, and other vehicle movement is very restricted, due to the narrow streets. Observation and fields of fire are greatly restricted. Tanks cannot traverse its cannon easily. Troops must rely on small arms, grenades and mortars when fighting. Type A construction is easy to make into one large obstacle. Cover/concealment is easily obtained in Type A. Thick walls offer excellent protection from direct fire. Indirect fire is poor. In a fixed defensive position, there is great danger from fire. The buildings are close together and are normally constructed of wood. Command and control is restricted to small squads and platoons. Coordination between units is difficult.

(2) Closed-Orderly Block (Type B). This consists of residential and commercial buildings. Units must move along streets, through breached walls and underground systems, and over roofs. Interiors of buildings provide excellent cover and concealment. A lot of labor and explosives are needed to breach walls and ceilings. Vehicle movement is restricted to streets. Heavy weapons can be used easily. Supporting fire can be used effectively. Observation is limited due to the number of tall buildings. Observation of indirect fire is limited. The limitations on fields of fire require fighting in narrow attack zones. Fire hazards are not a problem for attacking units. They can set fires to force the defender to leave his position. Functions of command and control are complicated and difficult to maintain.

(3) Dispersed Residential Area (Type C). Unit movement is normally unrestricted. The defender can prepare fields of fire. The attacker cannot. Buildings, hedges, bushes, and walls limit the effectiveness of small arms. Tanks are limited to short-range fighting. Overturned vehicles and mines can slow an attacker's movement, but obstacles in streets can be bypassed with ease. Units can find concealment and cover once they have entered a building.

They cannot advance until defensive fires are suppressed or obscured by smoke. Fires pose little hazard to attackers. They can go around them. Type C construction aids command and control, but observation is limited until tall structures are secured.

(4) High-Rise Area (Type D). Unit movements are not hampered, but open spaces between buildings expose an attacker. Tanks can move easily in this type of construction. Defensive fires must be suppressed before infantry units can move. Units must move RAPIDLY across open areas. NOTE: The principle of no movement without covering fire must be observed in this area. Fields of fire and observation are excellent. Mines are the primary obstacle. Cover and concealment are not available to the attacker until he secures adjacent buildings. Fires are not normally a factor. This type of construction provides excellent observation and radio communications to control forces and fires.

(5) Industrial/Transportation (Type E). Mobility is very good and available between buildings. This type of construction provides many approaches. Movement will be from building to building. Sometimes underground routes are available. This type provides excellent fields of fire for all weapons. Observation over the entire area helps provide fire support. Mines and concealed demolition charges are the most serious obstacles. Cover and concealment is the same as found in Type D areas. Fire hazards are easily bypassed. Command and control is enhanced by open spaces, excellent observation and communication, and lack of effective obstacles.

(6) After analyzing urban terrain, you will need to develop planning measures for cordon and search operations. These should be conducted with little inconvenience to local populations. A large-scale search is normally a combined civil and military operation. It must be planned in detail and practiced, if possible. The planning phase includes:

- o Conducting area reconnaissance.
- o Developing a search plan.
- o Selecting targets.
- o Coordinating with host nation.
- o Developing administrative procedures.

3. Conducting Area Reconnaissance

A physical recon may not be done just prior to a mission. An area recon can be obtained by aerial photographs. In larger cities and towns, local police agencies can provide detailed maps showing locations and size of buildings.

4. Developing Search Plan

To enhance a mission's success, a search plan must be simple. Once developed, it must be executed quickly. Search methods and techniques may be varied. The plan will consider unit organizations, command and control, and methods and techniques of searching.

a. Organization. Search units must be task-organized for each search. Search unit elements must perform five general tasks. This includes:

- o Surrounding the area to prevent escape.
- o Setting up checkpoints and roadblocks to prevent entry or exit from the search area.
- o Prevent outside attack.
- o Search houses and individuals.
- o Escort arrested people and remove confiscated material.

(1) The search element is normally organized into special teams. Each team has a special function. For example, the security element surrounds the area while the search element moves into the objective. The mobile reserve element assists the other two elements if they cannot handle any resistance. The reserve element can also replace or reinforce either of the two search units.

(2) Special teams may be set up to handle specific tasks. One team may perform reconnaissance, physical and visual search, or perform prisoner detention functions. Another team has fire support, mine detection, or tunnel recon duties. Also, special teams may be required to be capable for:

- o Scout dogs.
- o Riot control agents, flame weapons, and demolitions.
- o Interrogations.
- o Documentation.
- o PSYOP/CA operations.

(3) However, when searching small areas or a few buildings, small units can conduct the operation without support from these special teams.

b. Command and Control. A search may be a large operation being conducted by a battalion or larger force. It is best controlled by military commanders supported by local police. Small operations are done best when civil police are in control with the military in support. Remember, in search operations in an urban setting, the actual search is performed by the host

country police when they are available in adequate numbers and trained in search operations.

c. Search Methods. Methods may vary in search operations. The following methods provide guidance on how to conduct a search. Some operations allow the search unit to approach the objective mounted on vehicles. Other require search teams to enter the search area on foot. Whichever method is used, emphasis is placed on rapid and coordinated entry to the search area.

(1) Search operations should be conducted at a slow enough pace to be effective, but fast enough to prevent the enemy from reacting to the threat of search.

(2) When surrounding the area during darkness, the units should approach in as many directions as possible. By daybreak, a chain of OPs supported by patrols can be set up in the search area. Keep in mind that a large area cannot be completely surrounded for any length of time.

(3) Maintaining this containment status would require a large number of troops. Containment can be helped, however, through the use of barbed wire and dug-in units.

(4) Resistance to the search operation may develop. Actions must be taken to stop this resistance.

d. Reserve Units. There may be a chance of the enemy attacking a search operation. Measures must be taken to stop them from interfering with the operation. Observers in aircraft can help in detecting these forces and giving an early warning.

e. Search Parties. When an area is to be searched, the operation commander informs the population. A house curfew may be put into effect keeping all residents indoors. They may be told to gather in one central location. Once the people are at the central point, the units begin their search.

5. Selecting Targets

When selecting targets (objectives) for search missions, intelligence data gathered on the target must be analyzed. This can be updated with air reconnaissance. Once selections are made, these target recommendations are forwarded to the provost marshal, G3, and S3, in writing. Information from police intelligence and a target block list should be included in this report.

6. Coordinating with Host Nation

Authority for search operations must be carefully used. Prior to beginning a search operation, the military authorities and civil police must be contacted. The search activity may be continued over a long period of time. These agencies should be updated periodically.

7. Developing Administrative Procedures

a. Planning involves issues of administration and personnel. Procedures for obtaining, maintaining, and protecting charts, graphs, and maps must be developed. Search teams need to be briefed. Teams must receive detailed instructions on prohibited/controlled items. Prohibited materials include: explosives, medicines, radio transmitters, and machine tools. Means of identification must be established and distributed. Language difficulties may prevent full communication with the population. You must plan for use of interpreters and/or host country police.

b. After an initial search, you must consider and make plans for returning to the search area. This is to surprise enemy units which may have returned to the search area.

c. This concludes Part A. The following learning event will focus on performing the mission. It will describe and explain cordon and search methods and techniques.

PART B - MISSION PERFORMANCE

1. Introduction

Military commands need to continue to conduct search missions in support of Internal Defense and Development (IADA) operations. To conduct successful search-missions, you need to know how to plan, conduct, and end a search operation. Part A explained how to plan for the operation. This learning event focuses on methods and techniques used during these operations.

2. Perform a Cordon/Search Mission

a. Cordon and search operations support combat operations. They must be legal, properly recorded, and within military jurisdiction. Search forces must accomplish their mission with as little destruction as possible. To maintain the population's respect and support, forces should treat the local population respectfully. They should be informed and directed tactfully.

b. Cordon and Search Area. When moving into a search area, you may be able to approach an objective on foot, vehicle or helicopter. During approach, speed and coordination are critical. The search area is surrounded. Entry and exits are controlled. Fields of fire are established. Civilians are not allowed to leave or enter the cordoned area. Once the area is cordoned off, the population is informed that a search operation is in effect. They are told to stay in their homes or instructed to meet in a central location.

3. Search of Built-Up Area

a. Search methods and techniques in built-up areas must be perfected. These techniques are required when searching one house, a small village, or buildings in large cities.

(1) When beginning a search operation, divide the area to be searched into zones. Assign one search party to each zone. As explained in Part A, a search party consists of the following elements:

- o A search element to conduct the search.
- o A security element to surround and secure the area.
- o A reserve element to assist, if required.

(2) A sweep of the objective is begun when the signal is given by the mission commander. This sweep may draw fire from insurgents. These areas are isolated. Receiving fire during a sweep provides three valuable items of information: (1) how many insurgents are nearby; (2) what type of support they may have; and (3) what kinds of weapons they have.

b. Search Techniques. Different techniques are used when searching a house, village, or tunnel. The following paragraphs will explain some of these techniques.

c. House Search. The search party assigned to search an occupied building should consist of at least one local policeman, a military escort and, if needed, a female searcher. Occupants are gathered in one room and searched. The objective of this search is to identify suspects. Suspects are quickly removed from the area. It is important that escort and transportation arrangements have been made prior to the operation.

(1) Inhabitants may have been instructed to meet in a central location. The head of the house should go with the search party when they search his house. If he does not go with the search party, he can deny knowledge of any materials found in his home. He can say that the search party looted or stole items during the search. It is recommended that witnesses be present during a search. If practical, have him sign a statement that nothing was taken.

(2) Houses are best searched from top to bottom. Use mine detectors to find weapons and ammunition. Each building should be marked with a coded ID. Marking homes ensures that no home is missed during the search. This coding can also be used to list occupants who must be accounted for in later searches.

(3) A house may be vacant or the owner refuses entry. The search team may have to force entry. The house may be empty. It should be secured to prevent looting and arrangements made with the community to protect the home.

d. Village Search. Before beginning a search of a village, you should send out a recon patrol to find out information regarding the village and its inhabitants. It is important that the recon remain undetected. One element of the patrol watches over the village. Meanwhile, another element returns with the recon data.

(1) The type of data that is important to a commander includes:

o Size and exact location of the village.

o Evidence of fortifications.

o Warning systems.

o Tunnel systems.

(2) The commander needs information about the number of people living in the village. He also needs to know where insurgents may be living. Are insurgents in one house, or grouping of houses, or spread out among the village? Do they stay in the village during the day?

(3) During searching operations, the people may appear hostile. You can have them assembled in a central location. This provides maximum control. It speeds up the search, prevents hiding of evidence, and allows for a more thorough search and questioning. One major disadvantage of using this method is, if any looting occurs, it will cause inhabitants to have ill feelings. These feelings may then increase their sympathy for and/or support of the insurgents.

(4) Another method of control is to restrict them to their home. This:

o Stops civilians from moving about within the search area.

o Allows them to watch over their homes.

o Discourages looting.

A disadvantage is that control and interrogation is more difficult. It also allows time to hide evidence.

(5) A third method of searching a village is to have the head of each household remain in front of his house. Others are assembled at a central location. During the search, the individual remains with the search team as they conduct the search. Looting is minimized. The head of the household can see that items are not taken. This is the best method to use to control the population.

(6) After searching the buildings in a village, the perimeter of the search area must be searched thoroughly. Check for insurgent personnel, equipment and escape tunnels. When searching a perimeter, special care must be taken to protect against booby traps. Search the perimeter and the area between the security element and the village. Two methods are normally used:

o One, if the security element is not discovered, the search element can be divided into sections. Each section searches a specific areas

within the perimeter. If insurgents are found, the security element can kill or capture them.

o Two, if the security element is discovered, it will conduct the perimeter search. Split into two major parts. One part of the element will maintain the cordon of the village. The second part will conduct the search. The search must be thorough, even though it may take a lot of time to conduct.

e. Tunnel Search. During the early stages of insurgency, the enemy will begin to build supplies. They store these supplies in hidden areas. They build tunnels, caves, and underground storage areas. From the surface, it is hard to find these concealed areas. Entrances and exits are well concealed in gardens, animal pens or piles of refuse. A tunnel configuration is shown in Figure 4-2. Look at how one entrance (item A) is below the waterline. The other is under the hut (item B).

(1) Tunnels usually are built in a zigzag pattern with a number of different levels. They have ventilation holes at varying locations (item C in Figure 4-2). This construction protects its occupants from grenades and flame weapons.



Figure 4-2. A Tunnel Configuration.

(2) When evidence of a tunnel is found, it is critical that a searching unit have a tunnel recon team. This is comprised of volunteers trained in searching tunnels. The team uses special equipment including:

o Flashlights or lighted helmets.

o Protective masks.

o Small caliber pistols.

(3) Tunnel recon teams must maintain wire communication with surface units. They should make sketches of the tunnel system. They should recover all items that could be of interest to intelligence.

(4) Searching and clearing of tunnels is a slow process. It is dangerous work. During tunnel searches, the area surrounding the tunnel should be secured and defended. To keep deaths and injuries down, the search unit should use riot control agents (tear gas is one example). Use flame weapons and explosives to flush out or destroy tunnel occupants. Before entering a tunnel, it should be flushed. This requires forcing smoke into it. The smoke will rise through ventilation shafts (item C, Figure 4-2) and provide estimates as to its length, direction, air vent locations and exits.

(5) A tunnel's size and depth is determined by a number of factors. These include:

- o Tunnel purpose.
- o Number of occupants to be housed.
- o Types of equipment being stored.
- o Types of material and equipment used to construct the tunnel.
- o Terrain and soil textures.

(6) After the tunnel has been completely searched and important contents removed, the tunnel can be destroyed. This can be done by cratering charges, using high explosives. Other methods will also cause the tunnel's roof to collapse.

4. Search Operations Conducted by Air

a. Search units mounted in armed helicopters is an effective method of conducting a search operation. It can fully utilize its mobility and firepower during the mission.

b. Airmobile teams can conduct an aerial search. They can reconnoiter an assigned area and control population movement. In ground search operations, helicopters can land search teams in areas suspected to have insurgents. With helicopters watching from the air, the teams can conduct the operations.

c. They are picked up at the end of the search. They are then rapidly taken to another search area. When using helicopters, you must plan for evacuation of prisoners, casualties, and material.

5. Terminating a Cordon/Search Mission

When ending a cordon/search operation, the area requires MP support of area damage control (ADC) operations. Also, action must be taken with suspect persons who have been detained.

a. Area Damage Control. MP units take ADC measures before and after search operations. ADC measures help reduce the level of damage or lessen its effects. This helps restore combat operations and support. ADC is mainly an engineering function. However, MP help seal off affected areas. They provide circulation control and prevent criminal activity. They watch for instances of looting and theft.

b. MP patrols will travel throughout the area. They gather intelligence information. MP watch activities of suspicious persons and question them. They collect sensitive information which may be of specific tactical interest and monitor for NBC hazards.

c. Handling Detained Persons. Suspects and sympathizers who have been detained must be evacuated and/or questioned by military intelligence experts. To protect informants, people are normally questioned in groups. After questioning, innocent people are returned to their homes. The remaining detainees are evacuated from the battle area.

This concludes Lesson 4. This lesson has presented information on how to plan and conduct cordon and search missions. It explained how to conduct an urban terrain analysis. Lesson 4 described five different types of urbanization which are found in Europe. It described offensive tactics. Finally, this lesson discussed various methods and techniques commonly used when conducting searches of houses, villages, cities, and tunnels.

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LESSON 4

PRACTICE EXERCISE

INSTRUCTIONS

You have just finished reading the instructional material for Lesson 4. This lesson covered the requirements for directing a cordon and search mission. It is now time to check your comprehension of the material. This is done by completing the practical exercise below. All of the questions are multiple choice with one correct answer or best choice. Try to complete the examination without referring to the lesson material.

When you have answered all questions, turn the page and check your answers against the answer key. Check each section of the lesson. Review any questions you have missed or do not understand. When you have completed your review, continue to the posttests.

Use the following situation to answer questions 1 through 12.

GENERAL

You are a MP platoon leader assigned to a main command post in a tactical area. TCP military police have gathered information about insurgents from stragglers and have reported this information to you. Further investigation has revealed the insurgents are using a local village as a home base. The village has less than 2,500 residents and is partially surrounded by dense foliage.

1. In planning the search mission, which of the following functions is done in the initial planning phase?

   A. Conduct undercover operations in the area.
   B. Conduct an aerial recon of the area.
   C. Conduct a terrain analysis.
   D. Conduct a physical recon of the area.

2. During the recon patrol just before beginning the search, which of the following information is NOT important to the commander?

   A. Warning system.
   B. Number of women and children in the village.
   C. Location of the village.
   D. Evidence of fortifications.

3. The village has been identified as Type A. What type of building and street patterns can be expected?

A. Multistoried apartments and wide streets.
B. Curved streets bordered by rowhouses.
C. Wide streets with buildings built in a continuous front along a block.
D. Older buildings with streets radiating from a central area.

4. Initially, how will you assess insurgent activity in the village?

A. Interview the citizens.
B. Conduct an area sweep.
C. Conduct a house-to-house search.
D. Rely on straggler's information.

5. How will you direct search teams to conduct the house searches?

A. From the inside to out.
B. From bottom to top.
C. From outside to inside.
D. From top to bottom.

6. If village citizens are hostile, which method of control is best?

A. Inhabitants are dispersed out of the area.
B. Have them assembled in a central location.
C. Restrict them to their homes.
D. Head of house remains at home, all others assembled at a central location.

7. After searching the buildings in the village, you conduct a perimeter search. Which element of the search unit will conduct this search if all units are discovered?

A. Reserve element.
B. Security element.
C. Search element.
D. Primary element.

8. If evidence of a tunnel is discovered, what action, if any, should be done first?

A. Begin a tunnel recon.
B. Secure the area around the tunnel.
C. Set up explosives around the entrance.
D. No action is taken until dog teams arrive.

9. How will you task MP to support end of mission activities?

A. Prepare an after-action report.
B. Secure the area for ADC actions.
C. Interrogate insurgents.
D. Perform ADC activities.

10. How will you task MP participating in ADC activities?

A. Assign circulation control.
B. Assign tunnel recon.
C. Assign interviewing of citizens.
D. Assign guard post security.

11. How will you protect informers from being identified?

A. Interview citizens individually.
B. Interview informants after the mission.
C. Remove groups of people at a time.
D. Isolate informants.

LESSON 4

PRACTICE EXERCISE

ANSWER KEY AND FEEDBACK

Item		Correct Answer and Feedback
1.	C.	Conduct a terrain analysis When planning a search mission... (page 4-2, para 1).
2.	B.	Number of women and children in the village The type of data that is... (page 4-12, para 3d(1)).
3.	D.	Older buildings with streets radiating... Dense, random construction... (page 4-3, para 1g(2)).
4.	B.	Conduct an area sweep A sweep of the objective... (page 4-11, para 3a(2)).
5.	D.	From top to bottom Houses are best searched from... (page 4-11, para 3c(2)).
6.	D.	Head of house remains at home... A third method of searching... (page 4-12, para 3d(5)).
7.	B.	Security element Two, if the security element... (page 4-13, para 3d(6)).
8.	B.	Secure the area around the tunnel During tunnel searches... (page 4-14, para 3e(4)).
9.	B.	Secure the area for ADC actions When ending a cordon/search operation... (page 4-14, para 5).
10.	A.	Assign circulation control They provide circulation control... (page 4-15, para 5a).
11.	C.	Remove groups of people at a time To protect informants... (page 4-15, para 5c).

APPENDIX A

Acronyms

ACP - Access Control Point.
ADA - Air Defense Artillery.
ASAC - All Source Analysis Center.
AO - Area of Operation.
ASPS - All Source Production Section.
BCC - Battlefield Circulation Control.
CCTV - Closed Circuit Television.
CEWI/GP/BW - Communications-Electronic Warfare Intelligence Group/Battalion.
CG - Commanding General.
CO - Commanding Officer.
CP - Command Post.
CP-OP - Command Post Observation Post.
CSS - Combat Service Support.
DP - Dismount Point.
DTOC - Division Tactical Operations Center.
FEBA - Forward Edge of Battle Area.
FIST - Fire Support Team.
FSE - Fire Support Element.
HTD - Highway Traffic Division.
ID - Identification.
LOC - Lines of Communication.
LOTS - Logistics Over the Short.
MSR - Main Supply Route.
NBC - Nuclear Biological, and Chemical.
PM - Provost Marshal.
POL - Petroleum Oil and Lubricants.
OP - Observation Post.
OPCON - Operational Control.
OPORD - Operation Order.
OPSEC - Operations Security.
RAP - Rear Area Protection.
RATTS - Radio Teletypes.
R & S - Recon and Security.
RWI - Radio Wire Integration.
SOI - Signal Operating Instructions.
SPOT REP - Spot Report.
TAC CP - Tactical Command Post.
TACP - Tactical Air Control Party.
TCP - Traffic Control Point.
TCMD - Transportation Control and Movement Document.
TOC - Tactical Operations Center.
TRS - Transportation Railway Service.

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
TASK ORGANIZATION	**Task Organization:** Explain how the unit is organized for the operation. If there is no change to previous task organization, indicate "no change."	"Task organization is 1st Squad with two of the platoon's machine guns, 2d Squad, 3d Squad.	"Task organization is 1st Squad, 2d Squad with one machine gun team, 3d Squad with one machine gun team.
1. SITUATION	**1. SITUATION:** Provide information essential to the subordinate leader's understanding of the situation.	"Situation:	"Situation:
a. Enemy Forces.	a. Enemy Forces. Refer to the overlay or sketch. Include pertinent intelligence provided by higher HQ and other facts and assumptions about the enemy. This analysis is stated as conclusions and addressed— (1) Disposition, composition, and strength. (2) Capabilities. A listing of what the enemy is able to do and how well. (3) Most probable course of action.	"Enemy forces: The scouts have confirmed a full strength motorized rifle squad on our portion of the company objective. They are dug in and expected to fight hard to retain this terrain. Their approximate positions and orientation are as reflected on the terrain model.	"Enemy forces: An enemy light battalion about 85% strength is expected to be traveling SSW paralleling the east side of Comanche Road on the night of 12 June as the supporting effort of a regiment attack. We anticipate their scouts to reconnoiter any time after 1200, 12 June.

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
b. Friendly Forces.	b. Friendly Forces. Provide information that subordinates need to accomplish their tasks. (1) Higher unit. A verbatime statement of the higher unit commander's mission statement from paragraph 2 and concept of the operation statement from paragraph 3a.	"Friendly forces: Company C seizes OBJ FOX, vicinity of GL162827 to prevent enemy from concentrating combat power against the battalion main effort, Company A on OBJ COW. The CO's intent is to isolate the northern portion of the objective preventing the MRP main effort from concentrating against our breach in the south. He wants to execute the breach and pass through the main attack as quickly as possible. This will prevent enemy from affecting the battalion attack.	"Friendly forces: Company A defends NLT 121000Jun91 to destroy the enemy, vicinity of GL123456 (EA FOX) and GL127439 (EA PUP) to prevent the envelopment of Company B, the battalion main effort. The CO's intent is to occupy the BP with one platoon forward destroying any reconnaissance elements. Two platoons will concentrate fires in EA FOX. The main effort destroys vehicles in forward half of EA FOX. One platoon will disrupt enemy forces preventing envelopment of our main effort. Once reconnaissance elements are destroyed, that platoon will suppress enemy forces in EA PUP. Battalion obstacles will force enemy into EA PUP and FOX.
	(2) Left unit's mission.	"On our left, 1st Platoon fix enemy on OBJ FOX to allow 2d Platoon to establish a breach.	"On our left, Company B defends the high ground to the west, vicinity of GL111461.

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
	(3) Right unit's mission.	"On our right, 2d Platoon establish a breach, vicinity of GL163826 to allow main attack to clear OBJ FOX.	"On our right, 2d Platoon, company main effort, defends BP 1 to destroy enemy in EA FOX.
	(4) Forward unit's mission.		"Scout Plt screens forward of our company BP. They will withdraw through 2d Platoon.
	(5) Mission of the unit in reserve or following. (6) Units in support or reinforcing the higher unit.	"To our rear, Company mortars suppress enemy on OBJ FOX to screen breaching effort.	
c. Attachments and Detachments.	c. Attachments and Detachments. When not shown under Task Organization, list here or in an annex, units attached or detached from the platoon, together with the effective times.	"Attachments and detachments: The platoon has three Dragons attached, which will remain under platoon control until seizure of objective.	"Attachments and detachments: none.
2. MISSION	**2. MISSION:** Provide a clear, concise statement of the task to be accomplished and the purpose for doing it (WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, AND WHY). The leader derives the mission from his mission analysis.	"Mission: 3d Platoon attacks 140200Jun91 to seize western edge of Hill 652 (OBJ CAT), vicinity of GL170834 preventing disruption of battalion main attack.	"Mission: 1st Platoon defends Hill 202 (BP 2) NLT 121000Jun91 to destroy enemy in EA FOX vicinity of GL123456 to prevent the envelopment of 2d Platoon.

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
3. EXECUTION	**3. EXECUTION:** Intent. Give the stated vision that defines the purpose of the operation and the relationship among the force, the enemy, and the terrain.	"Execution: "Concept of the operation: My intent is to penetrate OBJ CAT from the northeast. Then, we will move through the breach site. One squad will suppress the trench line allowing main attack to maneuver and enter the trench. Once the foothold is established, we will clear the trench line from east to west. Key to this mission is speed in establishing the foothold (decisive point) and providing suppressive fires allowing main attack access to trench line. This should keep them busy and keep them from disrupting the battalion main attack.	"Execution: "Concept of operation: My intent is to occupy BP 2 with two squads forward and one in depth. We will destroy forces in EA FOX and prevent envelopment of main effort. One squad destroys lead element forces, vicinity of minefield forcing them to move into EA FOX. We will then destroy him as he enters this area (decisive point). We cannot envelop 2d Platoon.
a. Concept of the operation.	a. Concept of the Operation. Refer to the operation overlay and concept sketch. Explain, in general terms, how the platoon, as a whole, will accomplish the mission. Identify the most important task for the platoon (mission-essential task) and any other essential tasks. If applicable, designate the decisive point, form of maneuver or defensive techniques, and any other significant factors or principles. Limit this paragraph to six sentences.		

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
(1) Maneuver.	(1) Maneuver. Address all squads and attachments by name, giving each of them an essential task. Designate the platoon's main effort; that is, who will accomplish the most important task. All other tasks must relate to the main effort. Give mission statements for each subordinate element.	"Maneuver: 1st Squad suppress trench line to allow 2d Squad to enter the trench line. 2d Squad, the main effort, clears trench line preventing disruption of battalion atttack. 3d Squad establishes foothold in trench line allowing 2d Squad to enter trench line.	"Maneuver: 1st Squad destroy lead element to cause the enemy to deploy. 2d Squad, main effort, destroy the enemy in EA FOX to prevent the envelopment of 2d Platoon. 3d Squad blocks enemy forces attempting to envelop 2d Squad. Once the enemy crosses Comanche Road, all elements should be firing.
(2) Fires.	(2) Fires. Refer to the fire support overlay and target list. Describe the concept of fire support to synchronize and complement the scheme of maneuver. If applicable, address priority of fires (include changes), priority targets (who controls fires on them), and any restrictive control measures on the use of fires.	"Fires: Purpose of fires is to screen observation of breaching operation. 1st Squad has priority of 60-mm mortar fire. During consolidation, 3d Squad will have priority of fires. Battalion will fire a three-minute preparatory fire on OBJ COW to disrupt enemy command and control.	"Fires: Priority of fires is to 3d Squad initially, priority shifts to 2d Squad during the enemy's assault.

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
	(3) Additional combat support assets (engineer, ADA). State the concept of employment of any combat support attachments or who gets priority of their use, how they are to be used (priority of effort), and how they will be controlled and by whom. (Do not include information that belongs in the Coordinating Instructions subparagraph.)		
b. Tasks to Maneuver Units.	b. Tasks to Maneuver Units. Specify tasks, other than those listed in paragraph 3a(1), and the purpose of each, for squads and attachments. List each in separate numbered subparagraphs. Address the reserve last. State any priority or sequence.	"Tasks to maneuver units: 1st Squad, shift fires to contact point 1, allowing 2d Platoon a clear approach into the trench line. "2d Squad, prepare satchel charges for bunkers. "3d Squad, be prepared to assist main attack.	"Tasks to maneuver units: 1st Squad occupy and prepare BP 2A, prepare your supplementary position here (point out on terrain model), to prevent flank attack. Prepare OP1 and construct obstacle 1. "2d Squad occupy and prepare BP 2B, construct obstacle 2, and provide one man to company to assist in establishing this minefield. Have that man report to the 1SG at the company CP GL119445, at 1400 today. "3d Squad occupy and prepare BP 2C, prepare OP 2, and construct obstacle 3.

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
c. Tasks to Combat Support Units.	c. Tasks to Combat Support Units. A platoon may receive an attachment of CS units; for example, an engineer squad. List tasks to CS units in subparagraphs in the order they appear in the task organization. List only those specific tasks that must be accomplished by these units not specified elsewhere.	"Tasks to combat support units: Mortars will occupy firing position, vicinity of GL167828 NLT 150425R Jun91.	
d. Coordinating Instructions.	d. Coordinating Instructions. List the details of coordination and control applicable to two or more units in the platoon. Items that may be addressed include— Priority intelligence requirements, intelligence requirements, and reporting tasks. Mission-oriented protective posture level (see Section XI). Troop safety and operational exposure guidance (see Section XI).	"Coordinating Instructions: Order of march for Company C is 1st Platoon, CP, 2d Platoon, Mortars, 3d Platoon. "Order of march for the platoon is 1st Squad, HQ, 2d Squad, 3d Squad. Movement formation is platoon file, traveling. "LD time 142300RJun91. Depart the AA at 142130 Jun91. "MOPP1 in effect. "Platoon rehearsal for key leaders, 1300. Company rehearsal, 1400. "Consolidation is IAW terrain model.	"Coordinating Instructions: All squads responsible for constructing protective and tactical (FPL) wire obstacles directly to their front. The PSG will coordinate that effort. "ADA weapons status: TIGHT. "Priority of work per platoon TACSOP. "Security: 20% until 112000Jun91 50% until defend time

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
	Engagement and disengagement criteria and instructions. Fire distribution and control measures. Consolidation and reorganization instructions (other than SOP items). Reporting requirements; for example, crossing PLs or check points. Terrorism and counterterrorism instructions. Specified tasks that pertain to more than one squad or element. Rules of engagement. Order of march and other movement instructions (consider an annex).	"Timing: 1300 Pit rehearsal 1400 Co rehearsal 1700 Inspection 1730 Chow 1830 Rest 2100 Night rehearsal 0045 Stand-to 0115 Final inspection 0200 LD time 0515 Assault time	"Timing: 10 Jun 1700 Chow 11 Jun 0515 Stand-to 0700 Chow 1000 Inspection 1700 Chow 12 Jun 0515 Stand-to 0700 Chow 0900 Final inspection of positions 1000 defend time continue to improve positions as required.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT	**4. SERVICE SUPPORT.** Include CSS instructions and arrangements supporting the operation that are of primary interest to the platoon. Include changes to established SOPs or a previously issued order. Paragraph 4 is often prepared and issued by the PSG.	"Service support:	"Service support:

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
a. General.	a. General. Reference the SOPs that govern the sustainment operations of the unit. Provide current and proposed company trains locations, casualty and damaged equipment collection points, and routes to and from them.	"Company trains will be located at trail intersection, vicinity of GL161823 after seizure of OBJ FOX.	"Company trains located just west of the road intersection, vicinity of GL118440.
b. Material and Services.	b. Material and Services:		
(1) Supply.	(1) Supply. Include information on all classes of supply of interest to the platoon. When applicable,		"Class I, T-MRE-T until defend time, then MRE-MRE-MRE.
(2) Transportation.	list constraints and limitations, specific operating hours, distribution methods or schedules and other information which alters the standard manner in which supplies are managed, controlled, handled, or distributed.		"Class IV, preconfigured loads will arrive at our position 1000 this morning. PSG, have a six-man detail ready to assist in off-loading.
(3) Services.	(3) Services. Include information or instructions that prescribe the type of service available, designation, and location of the facility and schedule for service.		

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
(4) Maintenance.	(4) Maintenance. Include any information that differs from the established SOP on maintenance of weapons and equipment.		
(5) Medical Evacuation.	(5) Medical evacuation. Identify procedures for evacuation of wounded if they differ from the SOP.	"Company casualty collection points are located along the infiltration lane. Platoon CCP after seizure of OBJ CAT will be directly behind the BTR position.	"The platoon CCP will be located here. The company has been allocated one ambulance. PSG, find a route from the company trains to our location for that ambulance to get to us, as well as a litter evacuation route.
d. Personnel.	d. Personnel. Identify the EPW collection point and any additional instructions on EPW handling not covered in the SOP.	"Company expects to receive some replacements late 15 Jun. We should receive two 11B10s. "EPW collection point wil be behind 1st Squad on the objective.	"The Chaplain will hold a nondenominational service at the company CP at 2000 today. Squad leaders report the number of men wishing to attend to the PSG by 1400. PSG, get that information to the 1SG.
e. Miscellaneous.	e. Miscellaneous. Include instructions for the destruction of supplies and any other information not covered elsewhere.		

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.	**5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.**		
a. Command.	a. Command. (1) Location of the higher unit commander and CP. (2) Location of the platoon leader or CP. (3) Location of the PSG or alternate CP. (4) Succession of command (if different from the SOP).	"Command: Commander will follow us. He will set up CP in the vicinity of the trench line. "I will follow 1st Squad during movement and will assault with 2d Squad. PSG will follow 2d Squad, then move to the support-by-fire position with 1st Squad.	"Command: Commander will be located with main effort. "The platoon CP and the alternate are located here and here (point out on terrain model).
b. Signal.	b. Signal. (1) SOI index in effect. (2) Listening silence, if applicable. (3) Methods of communication in priority. (4) Emergency signals, visual signals. (5) Code words.	"Signal: The number combination password is seven. "The time is now 1007. What are your questions?"	"Signal: Company cease fire signal is two green star clusters followed by one red. "Code word for execution EA FOX with machine gun fire is GOLDSTRIKE and for all weapons firing is BLACKSMITH. "Running password for returning patrols and OPs is MOOSEBREATH followed by the number of soldiers returning. "The time is now 0912. What are your questions?"

EXTRACT OF FM 19-30

(Classification)

Map Reference

Copy No.
Issuing Headquarters
Place of issue
Date of issue

PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN

1. Purpose. State purpose of the plan.

2. Area Security. Define the areas, buildings, and other structures considered critical and establish priorities for their protection.

3. Control Measures. Define and establish restrictions on access and movement into critical areas. These restrictions can be categorized as to personnel, vehicles, and materials.

a. Personnel Access:

(1) Establish controls pertinent to each area or structure.

(a) Authority for access.

(b) Access criteria for:

1. Unit personnel.

2. Visitors.

3. Maintenance personnel.

4. Contractor personnel.

5 National Guard.

(2) Identification and control.

(a) Describe the system to be used in each area. If a badge system is used, a complete description covering all aspects should be used in disseminating requirements for identification and control of personnel conducting business on the installation.

(b) Application of the system.

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(Classification)

(Classification)

1. Unit personnel.

2. Visitors to restricted areas.

3. Visitors to administrative areas.

4. Vendors, tradesmen, etc.

5. Contractor personnel.

6. Maintenance or support personnel.

b. Material Control.

(1) Incoming.

(a) Requirements for admission of material and supplies.

(b) Search and inspection of material for possible sabotage hazards.

(c) Special controls on delivery of supplies and/or personnel shipments in restricted areas.

(2) Outgoing.

(a) Documentation required.

(b) Controls, as outlined in (1)(a), (b), and (c) above.

(c) Classified shipments NOT involving nuclear/chemical material.

(3) Nuclear/chemical material.

(a) Controls on movement of warheads/chemicals on the installation.

(b) Controls on shipments or movement of training warheads/chemicals.

(c) Controls on pickup or delivery of warheads/chemicals outside the installation.

PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN

(Classification)

c. Vehicle Control.

(1) Policy on search of military and privately owned vehicles.

(2) Parking regulations.

(3) Controls for entrance into restricted and administrative areas.

(a) Privately owned vehicles.

(b) Military vehicles.

(c) Emergency vehicles.

d. Vehicle Registration.

4. Aids to Security. Indicate the manner in which the following listed aids to security will be implemented on the installation.

a. Protective barriers.

(1) Definition.

(2) Clear zones.

(a) Criteria.

(b) Maintenance.

(3) Signs.

(a) Types.

(b) Posting.

(4) Gates.

(a) Hours of operation.

(b) Security requirements.

(c) Lock security.

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(Classification)

b. Protective Lighting System.

(1) Use and control.

(2) Inspection.

(3) Action to be taken in the event of commercial power failure.

(4) Action to be taken in the event of a failure of alternate source of power.

(5) Emergency lighting systems.

(a) Stationary.

(b) Portable.

c. Intrusion Detection Systems.

(1) Security classification.

(2) Inspection.

(3) Use and monitoring.

(4) Action to be taken in event of "Alarm" conditions.

(5) Maintenance.

(6) Alarm logs or registers.

(7) Sensitivity settings.

(8) Fail-safe and tamper-proof provisions.

(9) Monitor panel location.

d. Communications.

(1) Locations.

(Classification)

(Classification)

(2) Use.

(3) Tests.

(4) Authentication.

5. Security Forces. Include general instructions that would apply to all security force personnel (fixed and mobile). Detailed instructions such as Special Orders and SOP should be attached as annexes.

a. Composition.

b. Tour of duty.

c. Essential posts and routes.

d. Weapons and equipment.

e. Training.

f. Use of sentry/patrol dogs.

g. Method of challenging with sign and countersign.

h. Alert force.

(1) Composition.

(2) Mission.

(3) Weapons and equipment.

(4) Location.

(5) Deployment concept.

6. Contingency Plans. Indication required actions in response to various emergency situations. Detailed plans such as counterterrorism, bomb threats, hostage negotiation, disaster, fire, etc., should be attached as annexes.

a. Individual actions.

PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN

(Classification)

b. Alert force actions.

c. Security force actions.

7. Use of Air Surveillance.

8. Coordinating Instructions. Indicate matters which require coordination with other military and civil agencies.

a. Integration with plans of host or nearby military installation.

b. Liaison and coordinate.

(1) Local civil authorities.

(2) Federal agencies.

(3) Military organizations.

/s/_____
Commander

Annexes:

A - Intelligence

B - Installation Security Status Map

C - Contingency Plans

D - Special Instructions to Security Officers/Managers and Officers of the Day

E - Commander of Relief Instructions.

F - Sergeant of the Guard Instructions.

G - Special Orders for Guard Posts.

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(Classification)

EXTRACT OF FM 90-10

APPENDIX A

URBAN TERRAIN ANALYSIS

This appendix supplements chapter 1 by providing a detailed analysis of the tactical characteristics of built-up areas. It is of specific interest to commanders at levels from platoon through brigade.

Terrain analysis is fundamental to offensive and defensive planning on any battlefield. It provides a basis for organizing forces and for determining how the area of operations impacts on the capabilities of available units and weapons. Chapter 1 provided a general description of the urban battlefield in terms of the size of built-up areas, major type lines of communication, and the urban patterns formed by a complex of built-up areas. The ground maneuver commander requires additional details pertaining to the physical layout of a built-up area and the structural characteristics of its buildings.

PHYSICAL LAYOUT

The physical layout of a village, town, or city generally represents a historical composite of the area's urban development. Within western Europe and other regions colonialized by European nations, five basic building and street patterns recur. While small rural villages are fairly homogeneous in nature, most urban areas contain a mix of these basic patterns. Each pattern impacts on maneuver and fire support schemes. For ease in presentation and subsequent reference, they have been identified by form and assigned a letter designation.

Each pattern is evaluated in terms of the following combat characteristics for offensive and defensive operations:

Mobility. The ability to move vehicles and infantry in relation to structures, open spaces, streets, and rubble.

FORM	LETTER DESIGNATION
Dense, Random Construction	A
Closed-Orderly Block	B
Dispersed Residential Area	C
High-Rise Area	D
Industrial/Transportation	E

Fields of Fire/Observation. Restriction of fields of fire and observation along streets, across spaces between buildings, and from upper floors of buildings.

Obstacles. Obstacle construction potential in relation to the following:

- Time to construct.
- Labor requirements.
- Materiel requirements.
- Obstacle value.

Cover/Concealment. Protection from direct and indirect fires is determined by the composition and strength of each area's structural materials. Concealment depends

on the proximity of structures, the potential amount of rubble, and the density of battle haze that can be developed.

Fire Hazard. The potential for fire is determined by type construction and proximity of one building to another. Each area is evaluated for the following fire hazards:

- Isolated fires—restricted to a single building or a part of a building.
- Area fires—consume from one building up to an entire block. Generally this type of fire is contained by streets.
- Fire storms—the most violent and dangerous fire, capable of consuming large areas rapidly, creating wind storms and intense heat. Fire storms are generally uncontrollable.
- Explosion hazard—present in areas containing fuel and chemicals.

Command and Control. The built-up area's effect upon:

- Coordination of fire and maneuver.
- Means of communication.

DENSE, RANDOM CONSTRUCTION (TYPE A)

This type of construction is found in the center of villages, towns, and large cities. Generally, it is the only type construction in small villages of 3,000 or less inhabitants. However, in the larger built-up areas, it is not uncommon to find a number of these areas connected by newer construction.

Dense, random construction is the oldest of the five basic patterns. As shown in chapter 1 (page 1—4), its buildings are located close together along the edges of narrow winding streets.

Tactical Evaluation

The following evaluation applies to both offense and defense:

Mobility. Movement of infantry, although difficult, is not considered to be a significant disadvantage. Infantry can move along streets, through holes in walls, and over roofs. Extensive underground sewers and utility tunnels are frequently found in these areas and are normally large enough to permit transit by individual soldiers. Movement of trucks, APCs, SP artillery, and tanks is considerably restricted by narrow, twisting streets. After rubbling, the streets will require extensive clearing to permit vehicular movement.

Fields of Fire/Observation. This is the most restrictive area for fields of fire and observation. Weapon ranges and observation distances seldom extend more than 100 meters along streets that average 7 meters in width. These narrow streets limit tank turret traverse and do not allow for minimum ATGM ranges. Deployment of heavy direct-fire weapons may also be limited by buildings and narrow streets. These short fields of fire and observation distances necessitate assigning small defensive sectors to defending units, thus requiring large numbers of troops to establish a position defense. The principal weapons employed in this area are small arms, grenades, LAWs, Claymores, and mortars.

Obstacles. Narrow streets with buildings constructed directly off the street edge facilitate construction of all types of obstacles. Even a few overturned cars or trucks in a narrow street can create an effective obstacle to armor or other vehicular passage. Demolition of structures

will also provide rubble for instant obstacles as shown above.

Type A construction is the most readily adaptable obstacle area of all. With little troop effort, time, and material requirements, these areas can be turned into one large obstacle.

Cover/Concealment. Buildings provide numerous concealed positions for infantry. Armored vehicles can find isolated positions under archways or inside small industrial or commercial structures. Thick masonry, stone, or brick walls offer excellent protection from direct fires.

Overhead protection from indirect fires and plunging small arms fire is poor. Most roofs are constructed of wood or tile materials and most ceilings and floors are wood or plaster—offering little protection. Adequate overhead protection is normally found in the basements of most of these buildings. Underground systems provide excellent protection and frequently allow movement between battle positions and sections within the built-up area.

Fire Hazard. There is considerable danger from fires in a fixed defensive system. The roofs of these closely spaced buildings normally are constructed of wooden rafters supported by light shingles. Fire extinguishers, sand, or water must be immediately available to put out even the smallest fire before the entire built-up area is destroyed by a fire storm.

Command/Control. The restrictive arrangement of buildings and streets will normally limit combat actions to a series of squad and platoon battles from one building to another. Coordination between units is difficult because of reduced visibility and the masking of radio communications.

Because of the restrictive terrain, tanks and other direct-fire weapons are difficult to control while in support of infantry forces.

CLOSED-ORDERLY BLOCK (TYPE B)

Closed-orderly block areas are normally found in the central areas of medium-size towns and large cities. These areas consist of residential and commercial type buildings. Buildings often form continuous fronts for as much as a city block, and each block normally contains an inner court. Streets in this area are normally wider than Type A areas, averaging 26 meters in width and are normally laid out in a rectangular pattern (see chapter 1, page 1—4).

Tactical Evaluation for Defense

Mobility. Infantry attacking this area must move:

- Along streets.
- Through breached building walls or underground systems.
- Over roofs.

Vehicular movement is limited to streets by the substantial buildings. These wide streets, however, may allow high-speed movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles. Large quantities of demolitions are required to create impassable rubble in the streets. These areas, unlike Type A areas, provide sufficient maneuver space for the employment of heavy direct-fire weapons in support of the defense.

Fields of Fire/Observation. Fields of fire and observation ranges extend to approximately 350 meters and are sufficient for heavy direct-fire weapons to support infantry. ATGM minimum ranges are not a disadvantage in most areas. Streets and open areas generally permit mutually supporting fires to be established. Observation of indirect fires will be limited by numerous tall buildings.

Obstacles. Unlike Type A areas, significant labor, time, and material will be required to construct obstacles in streets and around defensive positions (buildings). The well-ordered, usually right-angled street patterns permit the control of obstacles by fires.

Cover/Concealment. The heavy construction found in most walls and ceilings provides excellent protection against direct and high-angle fires. A considerable amount of time, demolitions, and labor will be required to breach walls for firing ports and

Mutually Supporting Fires



to construct infantry passageways through walls. Cellars selected for shelters must be evaluated for their ability to withstand the weight of a collapsing building. In some cases, cellar ceilings will have to be reinforced, requiring additional resources and time. Cellars also provide personnel excellent protection against the initial effects of radiation.

Underground systems are normally extensive in these areas and can provide storage areas, protection, and passageways for infantry. The defender must locate all underground systems and evaluate their contribution to the defensive concept. Those underground systems not used must be blocked or troops must be committed to control them.

As in Type A areas, armored vehicles will have few covered/concealed positions.

Fire Hazard. As in Type A areas, there are great fire hazards. If this type area must be defended, considerable resources must be expended to lessen the dangers of fire and provide firefighting equipment and materials.

Command/Control. Functions of command and control are improved over Type A areas. The orderly system of buildings and street patterns normally provides extended weapon ranges. Throughout these areas, mutually supporting fires are usually possible.

Tactical Evaluation for Offense

Mobility. For attacking infantry, the interiors of buildings provide excellent covered and concealed movement routes. However, tremendous amounts of labor and explosives are required to breach a succession of walls and ceilings. Infantry advancing through unfamiliar underground systems require time for careful reconnaissance and planning.

Armored vehicles are restricted to streets. If streets are barricaded or blocked by rubble, mobility is severely restricted until they are cleared.

Fields of Fire/Observation. As in the defense, structures permit mutual support between attacking infantry units. Heavy direct-fire weapons support is restricted to existing streets. In most cases, heavy weapons will have to be positioned well behind advancing infantry units. Flanking fires can normally be accomplished along straight street sections, in parks, and other open spaces.

Observation of indirect fires will be limited by structures and smoke. Excessive use of artillery in this type area will create rubble—further limiting vehicular mobility and reducing heavy direct-fire support. The limitations on fields of fire and visual observation necessitate the assignment of small, narrow attack zones and a high density of troops in each zone.

Obstacles. Street barricades require significant resources and time to reduce. Usually these obstacles will be covered by defensive fires. Bypassing these obstructions is difficult because of the unbroken rows of buildings. Infantry units must clear well beyond the obstacles to neutralize defensive fires, permitting the obstacles to be reduced with earthmoving equipment and/or explosives.

Cover/Concealment. Advancing along streets is an open invitation to disaster and must be avoided whenever possible. Effective cover and concealment are offered by the interiors of buildings.

Armored vehicles, however, are restricted to streets and are exposed targets in most cases. Limited protection can be achieved by using buildings as a mask.

Fire Hazard. Since the attacker is not fixed in position (as in the defense), he can avoid burning structures. The attacker may avoid attacking some areas by starting area fires and forcing the defender to leave his position.

Command/Control. Block-long, multistoried buildings require successive and mutually supporting attacks by squads and platoons, complicating the command and control of supporting direct fires. Command and control of maneuvering infantry is further complicated by reduction of radio ranges. Observation and control of indirect fires is degraded by buildings, smoke, and reduced radio ranges.

DISPERSED RESIDENTIAL AREA (TYPE C)

These areas are normally contiguous to Type B areas and are found on the outer edges of villages or in the suburbs of larger urban areas.

These areas consist of rowhouses or single dwellings with yards, trees, gardens, and fences. The street pattern is normally rectangular or gently curving. Street widths average 14 meters. However, buildings are normally set back 6—8 meters from the roadway, providing an effective street width approximating 30 meters (see chapter 1, page 1—5).

Tactical Evaluation for Defense

Mobility. Infantry is generally unrestricted. Underground utility systems are normally too small to be used. Subways, when present, will offer protected and concealed routes between areas and positions. Numerous routes are available for vehicular movement between buildings and on numerous streets. Rubble will be the principal hindrance to mobility.

Fields of Fire/Observation. Weapon ranges are often reduced to less than 250 meters by winding streets, but rectangular street patterns will, in many cases, provide extended weapon ranges. Throughout these areas mutually supported fires are usually possible. Forward observers can direct fires accurately from forward ground-level positions or from tall buildings.

Obstacles. Gaps between houses can be closed with overturned vehicles, wire, mines, cratering charges, or fallen trees. Obstacles in the streets will be of little value since, in most cases, they can be easily bypassed. To establish effective obstacles in this area, considerable time, labor, and materials will be required.

Cover/Concealment. Crew-served weapon positions can be concealed behind hedges, fences, walls, and in houses. Frequently, walls will have to be reinforced for adequate protection against heavy direct-fire weapons. When using houses, overhead protection will vary. Positions on the first and second floors will generally require

reinforcement with additional overhead protection. Positions in basements usually provide excellent protection from indirect fires and the initial radiation effects from nuclear weapons. There is little danger of being buried by rubble while occupying one- or two-story structures. These areas provide frequent opportunities to conceal and protect tanks and APCs inside of or behind buildings. Numerous alternate firing positions may be selected/prepared throughout the area.

Fire Hazard. There is no danger of area fires or fire storms. Isolated fires in a single structure can be contained with fire extinguishers, or forces can shift to an alternate position.

Command/Control. The well-ordered arrangement of this type of development facilitates command at all levels. Despite visibility restrictions, the coordination of all fires is not significantly impeded. Radio transmissions in this area are only slightly degraded.

Tactical Evaluation for Offense

Mobility. Armor and infantry approaches are numerous throughout these areas. Deployment of forces is restricted only where structures are surrounded by high thick walls. Tanks and infantry will have to use fire and maneuver in house-to-house combat. Frequently, smoke and suppressive fires will be required to cross open areas or streets. Rubble will have little effect on mobility.

Fields of Fire/Observation. The defender can prepare fields of fire, the attacker *can not.* Buildings, hedges, bushes, walls, and other obstructions limit the effectiveness of small arms, ATGMs, and heavy direct support weapons. Observation of indirect fire is limited until tall structures can be secured. Frequently, tanks and ATGMs will be limited until tall structures can be secured. Also, tanks and ATGMs will be limited to short-range engagements down streets and between houses.

Obstacles. Although bypass is possible, obstacles of all types in streets and between buildings reduce an attacker's mobility. Mines hidden between obstacles present a particular hazard for armored vehicles.

Cover/Concealment. Attacking infantry can find cover once they have penetrated a building. Between buildings infantry must use the cover afforded by walls and fences and the concealment of hedges. Normally, infantry cannot advance until defensive fires have been suppressed with fires or obscured by smoke.

Armored vehicles gain cover by moving from one building to the next while protected by overwatching fires from other vehicles.

Fire Hazard. The dangers of fire are of little consequence to the attacker; burning structures are simply bypassed.

Command/Control. The building density and resultant terrain restrictions will not seriously affect command and control. Radio coordination of fires is not degraded, but observation is limited until tall structures are secured. Close air and attack helicopter support is possible in areas where observation posts have been established.

HIGH-RISE AREA (TYPE D)

As depicted on page 1—5, Type D areas generally consist of multistoried apartment buildings, separated by large open areas such as parking lots, recreation areas, parks, and individual one-story buildings. Rarely are there unbroken rows of houses facing the street in this type area. This modern trend is most frequently found in medium-size and large city residential developments.

Tactical Evaluation for Defense

Mobility. Covered routes of movement for infantry are found only within building complexes. Underground systems are generally too small for use or are inaccessible. Establishing covered routes requires digging communication trenches between buildings. Rubble will not hamper vehicular or foot mobility because of the wide spaces between buildings. Tanks, APCs, and other vehicles have few restrictions on mobility and can move over wide streets or through numerous open areas.

Fields of Fire/Observation. Small arms and machinegun grazing fire can be employed effectively throughout the area. Mutually supporting fires can be established between buildings. Maximum weapon ranges can be achieved by positioning weapons in upper stories. ATGMs can fire out to significant ranges. Forward observers can effectively control indirect fires.

Obstacles. Construction of obstacles between buildings requires exorbitant amounts of material, time, and labor. However, obstacles can be constructed in the proximity of buildings and throughout the first floor to slow infantry attacks. Mines are effective obstacles in the open areas between buildings.

Cover/Concealment. Within taller buildings, protection is provided from indirect fires, except on the top floors. Positions on these floors must be improved by reinforcing the walls and ceilings. Protection from small arms fire is afforded by building walls. However, these walls will have to be reinforced with sandbags to provide protection against heavy direct-fire weapons.

Armored vehicles will find cover and/or concealment behind buildings or in entranceways to underground garages.

Basements provide excellent protection from all fires, including nuclear.

Fire Hazard. Area fires are precluded by the distance between buildings. Escape routes for rapid withdrawal from buildings must be established and marked.

Command/Control. Excellent observation and radio communications facilitate command and control of forces and fires throughout this area.

Tactical Evaluation for Offense

Mobility. The open spaces between buildings expose an attacker as he attempts to close on objectives (buildings). However, these open spaces do facilitate the forward movement of heavy weapons such as tanks and artillery to support infantry assaults. Defensive fires must be suppressed by all available means prior to movement of infantry or armored vehicles. Infantry and armored vehicles must *rapidly* cross open areas after defensive gunners have been suppressed by fire or their vision obscured with smoke. The principle of *no movement without covering fires must be observed in this area.* For movement inside of buildings, it may be necessary to breach walls and ceilings with explosives.

Fields of Fire/Observation. Fields of fire and observation are excellent. Mutual support between infantry and heavy direct-fire weapons is often possible.

Obstacles. In this area, mines are a particular hazard to the attacker. They will normally be covered by grazing fires and will require skilled coordinated efforts by infantry, tanks, and engineers to advance successfully. The techniques for breaching minefields in this area are the same as those for natural terrain. Great quantities of explosives will be required to breach physical obstacles on lower floors, walls, and ceilings within each building.

Cover/Concealment. Cover and concealment are not available to the attacker until he secures adjacent buildings. Therefore, attacking forces rely on relentless heavy covering fire, continuous smoke, and rapid movement from one objective (building) to the next. If the situation permits, night attacks provide a greater degree of concealment for operations in this area and should be considered to improve chances for success and to reduce casualties.

Fire Hazard. Fires are of no appreciable hindrance to attacking forces.

Command/Control. Command and control functions outside of buildings are not reduced by terrain. Communication with fire support units and maneuver units is not restricted outside of buildings. Company-size attacks are possible in these areas.

INDUSTRIAL/TRANSPORTATION (TYPE E)

The older industrial/transportation areas, located in proximity of the center of medium-size towns and larger cities, retain essentially the same characteristics as Type A and B areas. The newer industrial/transportation areas are generally located on or near the edge of towns and cities. These areas principally consist of low, flat-roofed factory buildings, warehouses, railroads, and supply depots (see chapter 1, page 1—5).

Tactical Evaluation for Defense

Mobility. Infantry routes are available through and between buildings. Frequently, underground routes are available and each must be evaluated for its utility. Armored routes exist over the road network and through large factory buildings. Spacing of buildings reduces rubble restrictions to all movement.

Fields of Fire/Observation. Numerous positions are available inside and outside of buildings. Fields of fire are available to the front and flanks, permitting mutual support between buildings. Quite often, these areas are situated on the city's outskirts, permitting excellent fields of fire over approaches to the built-up area.

Obstacles. Open areas and spaces between buildings will require tremendous resources and time to construct effective infantry obstacles. These gaps can be more effectively closed with mines and covered by fires.

Armored obstacles can be constructed with local materials (e.g., in a railyard, railroad cars can be pushed together and overturned to delay tanks and APCs).

Cover/Concealment. Infantry and armor can gain a degree of protection from direct fires by occupying positions within buildings. Little protection from indirect fire is offered by building roofs. Concealment can be gained by positioning crew-served weapons, tanks, and APCs inside of buildings. Open, shed-type transportation facilities offer little protection from enemy observation and fires—*avoid them.*

Fire Hazard. Stockpiling of fuel and combustible chemicals is common to industrial/transportation areas—*avoid them.* Isolated fires will be common in this area.

Command/Control. The usually good line-of-sight and predominantly low and widely spaced arrangement of buildings facilitate command/control of fires. Radio communications may be slightly degraded by the masking effect of buildings in these areas.

Tactical Evaluation for Offense

Mobility. The variety of building types provides numerous infantry approaches. In industrial areas, movement will be from building to building. In open transportation facilities, advancing infantry are largely dependent on supporting fire or smoke to cover movement. Streets and vacant areas allow ample maneuver space for armored vehicles.

Fields of Fire/Observation. Excellent fields of fire prevail throughout the entire area for all weapons. Observation over the entire area facilitates the employment of indirect fires and close air support. Smoke obscuration may be significant in fuel storage areas and a detriment to directing accurate fire.

Obstacles. Mines and concealed demolition charges in buildings are serious obstacles encountered in this area. Wide spacing of buildings and other open areas normally permits the attacker to bypass any rubble.

Cover/Concealment. An attacker will be confronted with the same conditions in this area as found in Type D areas. A form of concealment can be achieved by suppressive fires and the skillful employment of smoke as forces cross open areas.

Fire Hazard. Isolated fires can be easily bypassed.

Command/Control. Open spaces, excellent observation, lack of effective obstacles, and excellent communication facilitate command and control of combined arms.

TYPES OF BUILDINGS AND THEIR TACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

The design and construction of buildings are influenced by climate, available materials, function, and cultural development of the region. This section describes nine types of buildings that are common to central Europe. Because there are numerous hybrid construction methods and the possibility exists of different type buildings being adjacent or sharing a common wall, distinct tactical evaluations for the attack and defense of each type building are not practical. General factors to be considered by the commander in evaluating a building include:

- The protective value (cover) afforded by its walls, ceilings/floors, and roofs.
- The ease with which it may be demolished by enemy fire or intentionally rubbled to provide an obstacle or fighting position.
- The availability of internal lines of communication and the effort required to breach exterior walls.
- The time, effort, and material required to prepare defensive positions in the building.
- The potential fire hazard to its defenders.

Type 1. Wood and Timber Frame Construction

Most farm buildings and those buildings constructed prior to the late 19th century are classified as Type 1. Their wooden raftered ceilings and weak exterior walls offer little protection from indirect or direct weapons fire. Internal communication routes are excellent since their lightly constructed walls are easy to breach; however, significant reinforcement is required to provide protective cover if such buildings are to be used as defensive positions. Within larger built-up areas, Type 1 buildings present the greatest fire hazard.

Type 2. Masonry Construction



Buildings with strong walls of brick or natural stone constructed in the 19th and early 20th century are classified as Type 2. These buildings, typified by the old town hall, are commonly found in the central areas of towns and cities. They generally contain from two to four stories with wooden raftered ceilings and lightly constructed tile roofs. Presenting less of a fire hazard than wood and timber frame structures, Type 2 buildings are frequently suitable as defensive positions. While internal communication routes are excellent, external walls are difficult to breach without heavy weapons or demolitions.

Type 3. One- or Two-Family Dwellings

Family dwellings constructed of solid or insulating bricks or of cinder blocks with ceilings of reinforced concrete are classified as Type 3. Such buildings frequently contain strongly constructed basements. Type 3 buildings offer significant protection and require little reinforcement if used as defensive positions. Because of their construction, fire hazards are minimal. If demolished, significant rubble offering protection to the defender or creating an obstacle to the attacker is generated.

Type 4. Prefabricated One-Family Dwellings

Prefabricated family dwellings assembled with pre-cast and light building materials are classified as Type 4. In most cases, only the cellars or basements are strongly constructed. Unlike Type 3 dwellings, these buildings require significant reinforcement if they are to be used as defensive positions. They also constitute a fire hazard in a fixed defense. Rubble produced by their destruction creates an effective obstacle and additional cover for ground-level defensive positions.



Type 5. Office Building

Building Types 5 through 8 are comprised of multistory office and apartment buildings. For the purpose of classification and subsequent evaluation, each category is divided into those buildings of six stories or less and high-rise structures in excess of six stories. Multistoried office buildings, with their steel frame and reinforced concrete construction, are normally characterized by large expanses of plate glass which offer little protection.

Apartment buildings, while similar in size, generally have smaller glass areas and load-bearing reinforced concrete exterior walls which provide greater protection.



Type 6. High-Rise Office Building

Type 7. Apartment Building

Type 8. High-Rise Apartment Building

Type 9. Industrial/Warehouse Buildings



Buildings common to newer industrial and warehouse complexes are classified as Type 9. While the type construction may vary considerably, steel framing and the use of lightweight materials for exterior walls and roofs are normal practices. Reinforced concrete floors/ceilings are frequently used in multistory buildings.

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APPENDIX B - PUBLICATIONS EXTRACTS

FM 7-8, APRIL 1992
FM 19-30, MARCH 1979
FM 90-10, AUGUST 1979

Use the above publication extracts to take this subcourse. At the time we wrote this subcourse, these were the current publications. In your own work situation, always refer to the latest official publications.

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
TASK ORGANIZATION	**Task Organization:** Explain how the unit is organized for the operation. If there is no change to previous task organization, indicate "no change."	"Task organization is 1st Squad with two of the platoon's machine guns, 2d Squad, 3d Squad.	"Task organization is 1st Squad, 2d Squad with one machine gun team, 3d Squad with one machine gun team.
1. SITUATION	**1. SITUATION:** Provide information essential to the subordinate leader's understanding of the situation.	"Situation:	"Situation:
a. Enemy Forces.	a. Enemy Forces. Refer to the overlay or sketch. Include pertinent intelligence provided by higher HQ and other facts and assumptions about the enemy. This analysis is stated as conclusions and addressed— (1) Disposition, composition, and strength. (2) Capabilities. A listing of what the enemy is able to do and how well. (3) Most probable course of action.	"Enemy forces: The scouts have confirmed a full strength motorized rifle squad on our portion of the company objective. They are dug in and expected to fight hard to retain this terrain. Their approximate positions and orientation are as reflected on the terrain model.	"Enemy forces: An enemy light battalion about 85% strength is expected to be traveling SSW paralleling the east side of Comanche Road on the night of 12 June as the supporting effort of a regiment attack. We anticipate their scouts to reconnoiter any time after 1200, 12 June.

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
b. Friendly Forces.	b. Friendly Forces. Provide information that subordinates need to accomplish their tasks. (1) Higher unit. A verbatime statement of the higher unit commander's mission statement from paragraph 2 and concept of the operation statement from paragraph 3a.	"Friendly forces: Company C seizes OBJ FOX, vicinity of GL162827 to prevent enemy from concentrating combat power against the battalion main effort, Company A on OBJ COW. The CO's intent is to isolate the northern portion of the objective preventing the MRP main effort from concentrating against our breach in the south. He wants to execute the breach and pass through the main attack as quickly as possible. This will prevent enemy from affecting the battalion attack.	"Friendly forces: Company A defends NLT 121000Jun91 to destroy the enemy, vicinity of GL123456 (EA FOX) and GL127439 (EA PUP) to prevent the envelopment of Company B, the battalion main effort. The CO's intent is to occupy the BP with one platoon forward destroying any reconnaissance elements. Two platoons will concentrate fires in EA FOX. The main effort destroys vehicles in forward half of EA FOX. One platoon will disrupt enemy forces preventing envelopment of our main effort. Once reconnaissance elements are destroyed, that platoon will suppress enemy forces in EA PUP. Battalion obstacles will force enemy into EA PUP and FOX.
	(2) Left unit's mission.	"On our left, 1st Platoon fix enemy on OBJ FOX to allow 2d Platoon to establish a breach.	"On our left, Company B defends the high ground to the west, vicinity of GL111461.

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
	(3) Right unit's mission.	"On our right, 2d Platoon establish a breach, vicinity of GL163826 to allow main attack to clear OBJ FOX.	"On our right, 2d Platoon, company main effort, defends BP 1 to destroy enemy in EA FOX.
	(4) Forward unit's mission.		"Scout Plt screens forward of our company BP. They will withdraw through 2d Platoon.
	(5) Mission of the unit in reserve or following. (6) Units in support or reinforcing the higher unit.	"To our rear, Company mortars suppress enemy on OBJ FOX to screen breaching effort.	
c. Attachments and Detachments.	c. Attachments and Detachments. When not shown under Task Organization, list here or in an annex, units attached or detached from the platoon, together with the effective times.	"Attachments and detachments: The platoon has three Dragons attached, which will remain under platoon control until seizure of objective.	"Attachments and detachments: none.
2. MISSION	**2. MISSION:** Provide a clear, concise statement of the task to be accomplished and the purpose for doing it (WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, AND WHY). The leader derives the mission from his mission analysis.	"Mission: 3d Platoon attacks 140200Jun91 to seize western edge of Hill 652 (OBJ CAT), vicinity of GL170834 preventing disruption of battalion main attack.	"Mission: 1st Platoon defends Hill 202 (BP 2) NLT 121000Jun91 to destroy enemy in EA FOX vicinity of GL123456 to prevent the envelopment of 2d Platoon.

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
3. EXECUTION	**3. EXECUTION:** Intent. Give the stated vision that defines the purpose of the operation and the relationship among the force, the enemy, and the terrain.	"Execution: "Concept of the operation: My intent is to penetrate OBJ CAT from the northeast. Then, we will move through the breach site. One squad will suppress the trench line allowing main attack to maneuver and enter the trench. Once the foothold is established, we will clear the trench line from east to west. Key to this mission is speed in establishing the foothold (decisive point) and providing suppressive fires allowing main attack access to trench line. This should keep them busy and keep them from disrupting the battalion main attack.	"Execution: "Concept of operation: My intent is to occupy BP 2 with two squads forward and one in depth. We will destroy forces in EA FOX and prevent envelopment of main effort. One squad destroys lead element forces, vicinity of minefield forcing them to move into EA FOX. We will then destroy him as he enters this area (decisive point). We cannot envelop 2d Platoon.
a. Concept of the operation.	a. Concept of the Operation. Refer to the operation overlay and concept sketch. Explain, in general terms, how the platoon, as a whole, will accomplish the mission. Identify the most important task for the platoon (mission-essential task) and any other essential tasks. If applicable, designate the decisive point, form of maneuver or defensive techniques, and any other significant factors or principles. Limit this paragraph to six sentences.		

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
(1) Maneuver.	(1) Maneuver. Address all squads and attachments by name, giving each of them an essential task. Designate the platoon's main effort; that is, who will accomplish the most important task. All other tasks must relate to the main effort. Give mission statements for each subordinate element.	"Maneuver: 1st Squad suppress trench line to allow 2d Squad to enter the trench line. 2d Squad, the main effort, clears trench line preventing disruption of battalion atttack. 3d Squad establishes foothold in trench line allowing 2d Squad to enter trench line.	"Maneuver: 1st Squad destroy lead element to cause the enemy to deploy. 2d Squad, main effort, destroy the enemy in EA FOX to prevent the envelopment of 2d Platoon. 3d Squad blocks enemy forces attempting to envelop 2d Squad. Once the enemy crosses Comanche Road, all elements should be firing.
(2) Fires.	(2) Fires. Refer to the fire support overlay and target list. Describe the concept of fire support to synchronize and complement the scheme of maneuver. If applicable, address priority of fires (include changes), priority targets (who controls fires on them), and any restrictive control measures on the use of fires.	"Fires: Purpose of fires is to screen observation of breaching operation. 1st Squad has priority of 60-mm mortar fire. During consolidation, 3d Squad will have priority of fires. Battalion will fire a three-minute preparatory fire on OBJ COW to disrupt enemy command and control.	"Fires: Priority of fires is to 3d Squad initially, priority shifts to 2d Squad during the enemy's assault.

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
	(3) Additional combat support assets (engineer, ADA). State the concept of employment of any combat support attachments or who gets priority of their use, how they are to be used (priority of effort), and how they will be controlled and by whom. (Do not include information that belongs in the Coordinating Instructions subparagraph.)		
b. Tasks to Maneuver Units.	b. Tasks to Maneuver Units. Specify tasks, other than those listed in paragraph 3a(1), and the purpose of each, for squads and attachments. List each in separate numbered subparagraphs. Address the reserve last. State any priority or sequence.	"Tasks to maneuver units: 1st Squad, shift fires to contact point 1, allowing 2d Platoon a clear approach into the trench line. "2d Squad, prepare satchel charges for bunkers. "3d Squad, be prepared to assist main attack.	"Tasks to maneuver units: 1st Squad occupy and prepare BP 2A, prepare your supplementary position here (point out on terrain model), to prevent flank attack. Prepare OP1 and construct obstacle 1. "2d Squad occupy and prepare BP 2B, construct obstacle 2, and provide one man to company to assist in establishing this minefield. Have that man report to the 1SG at the company CP GL119445, at 1400 today. "3d Squad occupy and prepare BP 2C, prepare OP 2, and construct obstacle 3.

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
c. Tasks to Combat Support Units.	c. Tasks to Combat Support Units. A platoon may receive an attachment of CS units; for example, an engineer squad. List tasks to CS units in subparagraphs in the order they appear in the task organization. List only those specific tasks that must be accomplished by these units not specified elsewhere.	"Tasks to combat support units: Mortars will occupy firing position, vicinity of GL167828 NLT 150425R Jun91.	
d. Coordinating Instructions.	d. Coordinating Instructions. List the details of coordination and control applicable to two or more units in the platoon. Items that may be addressed include— Priority intelligence requirements, intelligence requirements, and reporting tasks. Mission-oriented protective posture level (see Section XI). Troop safety and operational exposure guidance (see Section XI).	"Coordinating Instructions: Order of march for Company C is 1st Platoon, CP, 2d Platoon, Mortars, 3d Platoon. "Order of march for the platoon is 1st Squad, HQ, 2d Squad, 3d Squad. Movement formation is platoon file, traveling. "LD time 142300RJun91. Depart the AA at 142130 Jun91. "MOPP1 in effect. "Platoon rehearsal for key leaders, 1300. Company rehearsal, 1400. "Consolidation is IAW terrain model.	"Coordinating Instructions: All squads responsible for constructing protective and tactical (FPL) wire obstacles directly to their front. The PSG will coordinate that effort. "ADA weapons status: TIGHT. "Priority of work per platoon TACSOP. "Security: 20% until 112000Jun91 50% until defend time

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
	Engagement and disengagement criteria and instructions. Fire distribution and control measures. Consolidation and reorganization instructions (other than SOP items). Reporting requirements; for example, crossing PLs or check points. Terrorism and counterterrorism instructions. Specified tasks that pertain to more than one squad or element. Rules of engagement. Order of march and other movement instructions (consider an annex).	"Timing: 1300 Pit rehearsal 1400 Co rehearsal 1700 Inspection 1730 Chow 1830 Rest 2100 Night rehearsal 0045 Stand-to 0115 Final inspection 0200 LD time 0515 Assault time	"Timing: 10 Jun 1700 Chow 11 Jun 0515 Stand-to 0700 Chow 1000 Inspection 1700 Chow 12 Jun 0515 Stand-to 0700 Chow 0900 Final inspection of positions 1000 defend time continue to improve positions as required.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT	**4. SERVICE SUPPORT.** Include CSS instructions and arrangements supporting the operation that are of primary interest to the platoon. Include changes to established SOPs or a previously issued order. Paragraph 4 is often prepared and issued by the PSG.	"Service support:	"Service support:

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
a. General.	a. General. Reference the SOPs that govern the sustainment operations of the unit. Provide current and proposed company trains locations, casualty and damaged equipment collection points, and routes to and from them.	"Company trains will be located at trail intersection, vicinity of GL161823 after seizure of OBJ FOX.	"Company trains located just west of the road intersection, vicinity of GL118440.
b. Material and Services.	b. Material and Services:		
(1) Supply.	(1) Supply. Include information on all classes of supply of interest to the platoon. When applicable,		"Class I, T-MRE-T until defend time, then MRE-MRE-MRE.
(2) Transportation.	list constraints and limitations, specific operating hours, distribution methods or schedules and other information which alters the standard manner in which supplies are managed, controlled, handled, or distributed.		"Class IV, preconfigured loads will arrive at our position 1000 this morning. PSG, have a six-man detail ready to assist in off-loading.
(3) Services.	(3) Services. Include information or instructions that prescribe the type of service available, designation, and location of the facility and schedule for service.		

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
(4) Maintenance.	(4) Maintenance. Include any information that differs from the established SOP on maintenance of weapons and equipment.		
(5) Medical Evacuation.	(5) Medical evacuation. Identify procedures for evacuation of wounded if they differ from the SOP.	"Company casualty collection points are located along the infiltration lane. Platoon CCP after seizure of OBJ CAT will be directly behind the BTR position.	"The platoon CCP will be located here. The company has been allocated one ambulance. PSG, find a route from the company trains to our location for that ambulance to get to us, as well as a litter evacuation route.
d. Personnel.	d. Personnel. Identify the EPW collection point and any additional instructions on EPW handling not covered in the SOP.	"Company expects to receive some replacements late 15 Jun. We should receive two 11B10s. "EPW collection point wil be behind 1st Squad on the objective.	"The Chaplain will hold a nondenominational service at the company CP at 2000 today. Squad leaders report the number of men wishing to attend to the PSG by 1400. PSG, get that information to the 1SG.
e. Miscellaneous.	e. Miscellaneous. Include instructions for the destruction of supplies and any other information not covered elsewhere.		

FORMAT	ANNOTATED FORMAT	EXAMPLE, ORAL (ATTACK)	EXAMPLE, ORAL (DEFEND)
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.	**5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.**		
a. Command.	a. Command. (1) Location of the higher unit commander and CP. (2) Location of the platoon leader or CP. (3) Location of the PSG or alternate CP. (4) Succession of command (if different from the SOP).	"Command: Commander will follow us. He will set up CP in the vicinity of the trench line. "I will follow 1st Squad during movement and will assault with 2d Squad. PSG will follow 2d Squad, then move to the support-by-fire position with 1st Squad.	"Command: Commander will be located with main effort. "The platoon CP and the alternate are located here and here (point out on terrain model).
b. Signal.	b. Signal. (1) SOI index in effect. (2) Listening silence, if applicable. (3) Methods of communication in priority. (4) Emergency signals, visual signals. (5) Code words.	"Signal: The number combination password is seven. "The time is now 1007. What are your questions?"	"Signal: Company cease fire signal is two green star clusters followed by one red. "Code word for execution EA FOX with machine gun fire is GOLDSTRIKE and for all weapons firing is BLACKSMITH. "Running password for returning patrols and OPs is MOOSEBREATH followed by the number of soldiers returning. "The time is now 0912. What are your questions?"

EXTRACT OF FM 19-30

(Classification)

Map Reference

Copy No.
Issuing Headquarters
Place of issue
Date of issue

PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN

1. Purpose. State purpose of the plan.

2. Area Security. Define the areas, buildings, and other structures considered critical and establish priorities for their protection.

3. Control Measures. Define and establish restrictions on access and movement into critical areas. These restrictions can be categorized as to personnel, vehicles, and materials.

a. Personnel Access:

(1) Establish controls pertinent to each area or structure.

(a) Authority for access.

(b) Access criteria for:

1. Unit personnel.

2. Visitors.

3. Maintenance personnel.

4. Contractor personnel.

5 National Guard.

(2) Identification and control.

(a) Describe the system to be used in each area. If a badge system is used, a complete description covering all aspects should be used in disseminating requirements for identification and control of personnel conducting business on the installation.

(b) Application of the system.

Page 1 of 6 pages

(Classification)

(Classification)

1. Unit personnel.

2. Visitors to restricted areas.

3. Visitors to administrative areas.

4. Vendors, tradesmen, etc.

5. Contractor personnel.

6. Maintenance or support personnel.

b. Material Control.

(1) Incoming.

(a) Requirements for admission of material and supplies.

(b) Search and inspection of material for possible sabotage hazards.

(c) Special controls on delivery of supplies and/or personnel shipments in restricted areas.

(2) Outgoing.

(a) Documentation required.

(b) Controls, as outlined in (1)(a), (b), and (c) above.

(c) Classified shipments NOT involving nuclear/chemical material.

(3) Nuclear/chemical material.

(a) Controls on movement of warheads/chemicals on the installation.

(b) Controls on shipments or movement of training warheads/chemicals.

(c) Controls on pickup or delivery of warheads/chemicals outside the installation.

PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN

(Classification)

c. Vehicle Control.

(1) Policy on search of military and privately owned vehicles.

(2) Parking regulations.

(3) Controls for entrance into restricted and administrative areas.

(a) Privately owned vehicles.

(b) Military vehicles.

(c) Emergency vehicles.

d. Vehicle Registration.

4. Aids to Security. Indicate the manner in which the following listed aids to security will be implemented on the installation.

a. Protective barriers.

(1) Definition.

(2) Clear zones.

(a) Criteria.

(b) Maintenance.

(3) Signs.

(a) Types.

(b) Posting.

(4) Gates.

(a) Hours of operation.

(b) Security requirements.

(c) Lock security.

Page 3 of 6 pages (Classification)

(Classification)

b. Protective Lighting System.

(1) Use and control.

(2) Inspection.

(3) Action to be taken in the event of commercial power failure.

(4) Action to be taken in the event of a failure of alternate source of power.

(5) Emergency lighting systems.

(a) Stationary.

(b) Portable.

c. Intrusion Detection Systems.

(1) Security classification.

(2) Inspection.

(3) Use and monitoring.

(4) Action to be taken in event of "Alarm" conditions.

(5) Maintenance.

(6) Alarm logs or registers.

(7) Sensitivity settings.

(8) Fail-safe and tamper-proof provisions.

(9) Monitor panel location.

d. Communications.

(1) Locations.

(Classification)

(Classification)

(2) Use.

(3) Tests.

(4) Authentication.

5. Security Forces. Include general instructions that would apply to all security force personnel (fixed and mobile). Detailed instructions such as Special Orders and SOP should be attached as annexes.

a. Composition.

b. Tour of duty.

c. Essential posts and routes.

d. Weapons and equipment.

e. Training.

f. Use of sentry/patrol dogs.

g. Method of challenging with sign and countersign.

h. Alert force.

(1) Composition.

(2) Mission.

(3) Weapons and equipment.

(4) Location.

(5) Deployment concept.

6. Contingency Plans. Indication required actions in response to various emergency situations. Detailed plans such as counterterrorism, bomb threats, hostage negotiation, disaster, fire, etc., should be attached as annexes.

a. Individual actions.

PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN

(Classification)

b. Alert force actions.

c. Security force actions.

7. Use of Air Surveillance.

8. Coordinating Instructions. Indicate matters which require coordination with other military and civil agencies.

a. Integration with plans of host or nearby military installation.

b. Liaison and coordinate.

(1) Local civil authorities.

(2) Federal agencies.

(3) Military organizations.

/s/_____
Commander

Annexes:

A - Intelligence

B - Installation Security Status Map

C - Contingency Plans

D - Special Instructions to Security Officers/Managers and Officers of the Day

E - Commander of Relief Instructions.

F - Sergeant of the Guard Instructions.

G - Special Orders for Guard Posts.

Page 6 of 6 pages

(Classification)

EXTRACT OF FM 90-10

APPENDIX A

URBAN TERRAIN ANALYSIS

This appendix supplements chapter 1 by providing a detailed analysis of the tactical characteristics of built-up areas. It is of specific interest to commanders at levels from platoon through brigade.

Terrain analysis is fundamental to offensive and defensive planning on any battlefield. It provides a basis for organizing forces and for determining how the area of operations impacts on the capabilities of available units and weapons. Chapter 1 provided a general description of the urban battlefield in terms of the size of built-up areas, major type lines of communication, and the urban patterns formed by a complex of built-up areas. The ground maneuver commander requires additional details pertaining to the physical layout of a built-up area and the structural characteristics of its buildings.

PHYSICAL LAYOUT

The physical layout of a village, town, or city generally represents a historical composite of the area's urban development. Within western Europe and other regions colonialized by European nations, five basic building and street patterns recur. While small rural villages are fairly homogeneous in nature, most urban areas contain a mix of these basic patterns. Each pattern impacts on maneuver and fire support schemes. For ease in presentation and subsequent reference, they have been identified by form and assigned a letter designation.

Each pattern is evaluated in terms of the following combat characteristics for offensive and defensive operations:

Mobility. The ability to move vehicles and infantry in relation to structures, open spaces, streets, and rubble.

FORM	LETTER DESIGNATION
Dense, Random Construction	A
Closed-Orderly Block	B
Dispersed Residential Area	C
High-Rise Area	D
Industrial/Transportation	E

Fields of Fire/Observation. Restriction of fields of fire and observation along streets, across spaces between buildings, and from upper floors of buildings.

Obstacles. Obstacle construction potential in relation to the following:

- Time to construct.
- Labor requirements.
- Materiel requirements.
- Obstacle value.

Cover/Concealment. Protection from direct and indirect fires is determined by the composition and strength of each area's structural materials. Concealment depends

on the proximity of structures, the potential amount of rubble, and the density of battle haze that can be developed.

Fire Hazard. The potential for fire is determined by type construction and proximity of one building to another. Each area is evaluated for the following fire hazards:

- Isolated fires—restricted to a single building or a part of a building.
- Area fires—consume from one building up to an entire block. Generally this type of fire is contained by streets.
- Fire storms—the most violent and dangerous fire, capable of consuming large areas rapidly, creating wind storms and intense heat. Fire storms are generally uncontrollable.
- Explosion hazard—present in areas containing fuel and chemicals.

Command and Control. The built-up area's effect upon:

- Coordination of fire and maneuver.
- Means of communication.

DENSE, RANDOM CONSTRUCTION (TYPE A)

This type of construction is found in the center of villages, towns, and large cities. Generally, it is the only type construction in small villages of 3,000 or less inhabitants. However, in the larger built-up areas, it is not uncommon to find a number of these areas connected by newer construction.

Dense, random construction is the oldest of the five basic patterns. As shown in chapter 1 (page 1—4), its buildings are located close together along the edges of narrow winding streets.

Tactical Evaluation

The following evaluation applies to both offense and defense:

Mobility. Movement of infantry, although difficult, is not considered to be a significant disadvantage. Infantry can move along streets, through holes in walls, and over roofs. Extensive underground sewers and utility tunnels are frequently found in these areas and are normally large enough to permit transit by individual soldiers. Movement of trucks, APCs, SP artillery, and tanks is considerably restricted by narrow, twisting streets. After rubbling, the streets will require extensive clearing to permit vehicular movement.

Fields of Fire/Observation. This is the most restrictive area for fields of fire and observation. Weapon ranges and observation distances seldom extend more than 100 meters along streets that average 7 meters in width. These narrow streets limit tank turret traverse and do not allow for minimum ATGM ranges. Deployment of heavy direct-fire weapons may also be limited by buildings and narrow streets. These short fields of fire and observation distances necessitate assigning small defensive sectors to defending units, thus requiring large numbers of troops to establish a position defense. The principal weapons employed in this area are small arms, grenades, LAWs, Claymores, and mortars.

Obstacles. Narrow streets with buildings constructed directly off the street edge facilitate construction of all types of obstacles. Even a few overturned cars or trucks in a narrow street can create an effective obstacle to armor or other vehicular passage. Demolition of structures

will also provide rubble for instant obstacles as shown above.

Type A construction is the most readily adaptable obstacle area of all. With little troop effort, time, and material requirements, these areas can be turned into one large obstacle.

Cover/Concealment. Buildings provide numerous concealed positions for infantry. Armored vehicles can find isolated positions under archways or inside small industrial or commercial structures. Thick masonry, stone, or brick walls offer excellent protection from direct fires.

Overhead protection from indirect fires and plunging small arms fire is poor. Most roofs are constructed of wood or tile materials and most ceilings and floors are wood or plaster—offering little protection. Adequate overhead protection is normally found in the basements of most of these buildings. Underground systems provide excellent protection and frequently allow movement between battle positions and sections within the built-up area.

Fire Hazard. There is considerable danger from fires in a fixed defensive system. The roofs of these closely spaced buildings normally are constructed of wooden rafters supported by light shingles. Fire extinguishers, sand, or water must be immediately available to put out even the smallest fire before the entire built-up area is destroyed by a fire storm.

Command/Control. The restrictive arrangement of buildings and streets will normally limit combat actions to a series of squad and platoon battles from one building to another. Coordination between units is difficult because of reduced visibility and the masking of radio communications.

Because of the restrictive terrain, tanks and other direct-fire weapons are difficult to control while in support of infantry forces.

CLOSED-ORDERLY BLOCK (TYPE B)

Closed-orderly block areas are normally found in the central areas of medium-size towns and large cities. These areas consist of residential and commercial type buildings. Buildings often form continuous fronts for as much as a city block, and each block normally contains an inner court. Streets in this area are normally wider than Type A areas, averaging 26 meters in width and are normally laid out in a rectangular pattern (see chapter 1, page 1—4).

Tactical Evaluation for Defense

Mobility. Infantry attacking this area must move:

- Along streets.
- Through breached building walls or underground systems.
- Over roofs.

Vehicular movement is limited to streets by the substantial buildings. These wide streets, however, may allow high-speed movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles. Large quantities of demolitions are required to create impassable rubble in the streets. These areas, unlike Type A areas, provide sufficient maneuver space for the employment of heavy direct-fire weapons in support of the defense.

Fields of Fire/Observation. Fields of fire and observation ranges extend to approximately 350 meters and are sufficient for heavy direct-fire weapons to support infantry. ATGM minimum ranges are not a disadvantage in most areas. Streets and open areas generally permit mutually supporting fires to be established. Observation of indirect fires will be limited by numerous tall buildings.

Obstacles. Unlike Type A areas, significant labor, time, and material will be required to construct obstacles in streets and around defensive positions (buildings). The well-ordered, usually right-angled street patterns permit the control of obstacles by fires.

Cover/Concealment. The heavy construction found in most walls and ceilings provides excellent protection against direct and high-angle fires. A considerable amount of time, demolitions, and labor will be required to breach walls for firing ports and

Mutually Supporting Fires



to construct infantry passageways through walls. Cellars selected for shelters must be evaluated for their ability to withstand the weight of a collapsing building. In some cases, cellar ceilings will have to be reinforced, requiring additional resources and time. Cellars also provide personnel excellent protection against the initial effects of radiation.

Underground systems are normally extensive in these areas and can provide storage areas, protection, and passageways for infantry. The defender must locate all underground systems and evaluate their contribution to the defensive concept. Those underground systems not used must be blocked or troops must be committed to control them.

As in Type A areas, armored vehicles will have few covered/concealed positions.

Fire Hazard. As in Type A areas, there are great fire hazards. If this type area must be defended, considerable resources must be expended to lessen the dangers of fire and provide firefighting equipment and materials.

Command/Control. Functions of command and control are improved over Type A areas. The orderly system of buildings and street patterns normally provides extended weapon ranges. Throughout these areas, mutually supporting fires are usually possible.

Tactical Evaluation for Offense

Mobility. For attacking infantry, the interiors of buildings provide excellent covered and concealed movement routes. However, tremendous amounts of labor and explosives are required to breach a succession of walls and ceilings. Infantry advancing through unfamiliar underground systems require time for careful reconnaissance and planning.

Armored vehicles are restricted to streets. If streets are barricaded or blocked by rubble, mobility is severely restricted until they are cleared.

Fields of Fire/Observation. As in the defense, structures permit mutual support between attacking infantry units. Heavy direct-fire weapons support is restricted to existing streets. In most cases, heavy weapons will have to be positioned well behind advancing infantry units. Flanking fires can normally be accomplished along straight street sections, in parks, and other open spaces.

Observation of indirect fires will be limited by structures and smoke. Excessive use of artillery in this type area will create rubble—further limiting vehicular mobility and reducing heavy direct-fire support. The limitations on fields of fire and visual observation necessitate the assignment of small, narrow attack zones and a high density of troops in each zone.

Obstacles. Street barricades require significant resources and time to reduce. Usually these obstacles will be covered by defensive fires. Bypassing these obstructions is difficult because of the unbroken rows of buildings. Infantry units must clear well beyond the obstacles to neutralize defensive fires, permitting the obstacles to be reduced with earthmoving equipment and/or explosives.

Cover/Concealment. Advancing along streets is an open invitation to disaster and must be avoided whenever possible. Effective cover and concealment are offered by the interiors of buildings.

Armored vehicles, however, are restricted to streets and are exposed targets in most cases. Limited protection can be achieved by using buildings as a mask.

Fire Hazard. Since the attacker is not fixed in position (as in the defense), he can avoid burning structures. The attacker may avoid attacking some areas by starting area fires and forcing the defender to leave his position.

Command/Control. Block-long, multistoried buildings require successive and mutually supporting attacks by squads and platoons, complicating the command and control of supporting direct fires. Command and control of maneuvering infantry is further complicated by reduction of radio ranges. Observation and control of indirect fires is degraded by buildings, smoke, and reduced radio ranges.

DISPERSED RESIDENTIAL AREA (TYPE C)

These areas are normally contiguous to Type B areas and are found on the outer edges of villages or in the suburbs of larger urban areas.

These areas consist of rowhouses or single dwellings with yards, trees, gardens, and fences. The street pattern is normally rectangular or gently curving. Street widths average 14 meters. However, buildings are normally set back 6—8 meters from the roadway, providing an effective street width approximating 30 meters (see chapter 1, page 1—5).

Tactical Evaluation for Defense

Mobility. Infantry is generally unrestricted. Underground utility systems are normally too small to be used. Subways, when present, will offer protected and concealed routes between areas and positions. Numerous routes are available for vehicular movement between buildings and on numerous streets. Rubble will be the principal hindrance to mobility.

Fields of Fire/Observation. Weapon ranges are often reduced to less than 250 meters by winding streets, but rectangular street patterns will, in many cases, provide extended weapon ranges. Throughout these areas mutually supported fires are usually possible. Forward observers can direct fires accurately from forward ground-level positions or from tall buildings.

Obstacles. Gaps between houses can be closed with overturned vehicles, wire, mines, cratering charges, or fallen trees. Obstacles in the streets will be of little value since, in most cases, they can be easily bypassed. To establish effective obstacles in this area, considerable time, labor, and materials will be required.

Cover/Concealment. Crew-served weapon positions can be concealed behind hedges, fences, walls, and in houses. Frequently, walls will have to be reinforced for adequate protection against heavy direct-fire weapons. When using houses, overhead protection will vary. Positions on the first and second floors will generally require

reinforcement with additional overhead protection. Positions in basements usually provide excellent protection from indirect fires and the initial radiation effects from nuclear weapons. There is little danger of being buried by rubble while occupying one- or two-story structures. These areas provide frequent opportunities to conceal and protect tanks and APCs inside of or behind buildings. Numerous alternate firing positions may be selected/prepared throughout the area.

Fire Hazard. There is no danger of area fires or fire storms. Isolated fires in a single structure can be contained with fire extinguishers, or forces can shift to an alternate position.

Command/Control. The well-ordered arrangement of this type of development facilitates command at all levels. Despite visibility restrictions, the coordination of all fires is not significantly impeded. Radio transmissions in this area are only slightly degraded.

Tactical Evaluation for Offense

Mobility. Armor and infantry approaches are numerous throughout these areas. Deployment of forces is restricted only where structures are surrounded by high thick walls. Tanks and infantry will have to use fire and maneuver in house-to-house combat. Frequently, smoke and suppressive fires will be required to cross open areas or streets. Rubble will have little effect on mobility.

Fields of Fire/Observation. The defender can prepare fields of fire, the attacker *can not.* Buildings, hedges, bushes, walls, and other obstructions limit the effectiveness of small arms, ATGMs, and heavy direct support weapons. Observation of indirect fire is limited until tall structures can be secured. Frequently, tanks and ATGMs will be limited until tall structures can be secured. Also, tanks and ATGMs will be limited to short-range engagements down streets and between houses.

Obstacles. Although bypass is possible, obstacles of all types in streets and between buildings reduce an attacker's mobility. Mines hidden between obstacles present a particular hazard for armored vehicles.

Cover/Concealment. Attacking infantry can find cover once they have penetrated a building. Between buildings infantry must use the cover afforded by walls and fences and the concealment of hedges. Normally, infantry cannot advance until defensive fires have been suppressed with fires or obscured by smoke.

Armored vehicles gain cover by moving from one building to the next while protected by overwatching fires from other vehicles.

Fire Hazard. The dangers of fire are of little consequence to the attacker; burning structures are simply bypassed.

Command/Control. The building density and resultant terrain restrictions will not seriously affect command and control. Radio coordination of fires is not degraded, but observation is limited until tall structures are secured. Close air and attack helicopter support is possible in areas where observation posts have been established.

HIGH-RISE AREA (TYPE D)

As depicted on page 1—5, Type D areas generally consist of multistoried apartment buildings, separated by large open areas such as parking lots, recreation areas, parks, and individual one-story buildings. Rarely are there unbroken rows of houses facing the street in this type area. This modern trend is most frequently found in medium-size and large city residential developments.

Tactical Evaluation for Defense

Mobility. Covered routes of movement for infantry are found only within building complexes. Underground systems are generally too small for use or are inaccessible. Establishing covered routes requires digging communication trenches between buildings. Rubble will not hamper vehicular or foot mobility because of the wide spaces between buildings. Tanks, APCs, and other vehicles have few restrictions on mobility and can move over wide streets or through numerous open areas.

Fields of Fire/Observation. Small arms and machinegun grazing fire can be employed effectively throughout the area. Mutually supporting fires can be established between buildings. Maximum weapon ranges can be achieved by positioning weapons in upper stories. ATGMs can fire out to significant ranges. Forward observers can effectively control indirect fires.

Obstacles. Construction of obstacles between buildings requires exorbitant amounts of material, time, and labor. However, obstacles can be constructed in the proximity of buildings and throughout the first floor to slow infantry attacks. Mines are effective obstacles in the open areas between buildings.

Cover/Concealment. Within taller buildings, protection is provided from indirect fires, except on the top floors. Positions on these floors must be improved by reinforcing the walls and ceilings. Protection from small arms fire is afforded by building walls. However, these walls will have to be reinforced with sandbags to provide protection against heavy direct-fire weapons.

Armored vehicles will find cover and/or concealment behind buildings or in entranceways to underground garages.

Basements provide excellent protection from all fires, including nuclear.

Fire Hazard. Area fires are precluded by the distance between buildings. Escape routes for rapid withdrawal from buildings must be established and marked.

Command/Control. Excellent observation and radio communications facilitate command and control of forces and fires throughout this area.

Tactical Evaluation for Offense

Mobility. The open spaces between buildings expose an attacker as he attempts to close on objectives (buildings). However, these open spaces do facilitate the forward movement of heavy weapons such as tanks and artillery to support infantry assaults. Defensive fires must be suppressed by all available means prior to movement of infantry or armored vehicles. Infantry and armored vehicles must *rapidly* cross open areas after defensive gunners have been suppressed by fire or their vision obscured with smoke. The principle of *no movement without covering fires must be observed in this area.* For movement inside of buildings, it may be necessary to breach walls and ceilings with explosives.

Fields of Fire/Observation. Fields of fire and observation are excellent. Mutual support between infantry and heavy direct-fire weapons is often possible.

Obstacles. In this area, mines are a particular hazard to the attacker. They will normally be covered by grazing fires and will require skilled coordinated efforts by infantry, tanks, and engineers to advance successfully. The techniques for breaching minefields in this area are the same as those for natural terrain. Great quantities of explosives will be required to breach physical obstacles on lower floors, walls, and ceilings within each building.

Cover/Concealment. Cover and concealment are not available to the attacker until he secures adjacent buildings. Therefore, attacking forces rely on relentless heavy covering fire, continuous smoke, and rapid movement from one objective (building) to the next. If the situation permits, night attacks provide a greater degree of concealment for operations in this area and should be considered to improve chances for success and to reduce casualties.

Fire Hazard. Fires are of no appreciable hindrance to attacking forces.

Command/Control. Command and control functions outside of buildings are not reduced by terrain. Communication with fire support units and maneuver units is not restricted outside of buildings. Company-size attacks are possible in these areas.

INDUSTRIAL/TRANSPORTATION (TYPE E)

The older industrial/transportation areas, located in proximity of the center of medium-size towns and larger cities, retain essentially the same characteristics as Type A and B areas. The newer industrial/transportation areas are generally located on or near the edge of towns and cities. These areas principally consist of low, flat-roofed factory buildings, warehouses, railroads, and supply depots (see chapter 1, page 1—5).

Tactical Evaluation for Defense

Mobility. Infantry routes are available through and between buildings. Frequently, underground routes are available and each must be evaluated for its utility. Armored routes exist over the road network and through large factory buildings. Spacing of buildings reduces rubble restrictions to all movement.

Fields of Fire/Observation. Numerous positions are available inside and outside of buildings. Fields of fire are available to the front and flanks, permitting mutual support between buildings. Quite often, these areas are situated on the city's outskirts, permitting excellent fields of fire over approaches to the built-up area.

Obstacles. Open areas and spaces between buildings will require tremendous resources and time to construct effective infantry obstacles. These gaps can be more effectively closed with mines and covered by fires.

Armored obstacles can be constructed with local materials (e.g., in a railyard, railroad cars can be pushed together and overturned to delay tanks and APCs).

Cover/Concealment. Infantry and armor can gain a degree of protection from direct fires by occupying positions within buildings. Little protection from indirect fire is offered by building roofs. Concealment can be gained by positioning crew-served weapons, tanks, and APCs inside of buildings. Open, shed-type transportation facilities offer little protection from enemy observation and fires—*avoid them.*

Fire Hazard. Stockpiling of fuel and combustible chemicals is common to industrial/transportation areas—*avoid them.* Isolated fires will be common in this area.

Command/Control. The usually good line-of-sight and predominantly low and widely spaced arrangement of buildings facilitate command/control of fires. Radio communications may be slightly degraded by the masking effect of buildings in these areas.

Tactical Evaluation for Offense

Mobility. The variety of building types provides numerous infantry approaches. In industrial areas, movement will be from building to building. In open transportation facilities, advancing infantry are largely dependent on supporting fire or smoke to cover movement. Streets and vacant areas allow ample maneuver space for armored vehicles.

Fields of Fire/Observation. Excellent fields of fire prevail throughout the entire area for all weapons. Observation over the entire area facilitates the employment of indirect fires and close air support. Smoke obscuration may be significant in fuel storage areas and a detriment to directing accurate fire.

Obstacles. Mines and concealed demolition charges in buildings are serious obstacles encountered in this area. Wide spacing of buildings and other open areas normally permits the attacker to bypass any rubble.

Cover/Concealment. An attacker will be confronted with the same conditions in this area as found in Type D areas. A form of concealment can be achieved by suppressive fires and the skillful employment of smoke as forces cross open areas.

Fire Hazard. Isolated fires can be easily bypassed.

Command/Control. Open spaces, excellent observation, lack of effective obstacles, and excellent communication facilitate command and control of combined arms.

TYPES OF BUILDINGS AND THEIR TACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

The design and construction of buildings are influenced by climate, available materials, function, and cultural development of the region. This section describes nine types of buildings that are common to central Europe. Because there are numerous hybrid construction methods and the possibility exists of different type buildings being adjacent or sharing a common wall, distinct tactical evaluations for the attack and defense of each type building are not practical. General factors to be considered by the commander in evaluating a building include:

- The protective value (cover) afforded by its walls, ceilings/floors, and roofs.
- The ease with which it may be demolished by enemy fire or intentionally rubbled to provide an obstacle or fighting position.
- The availability of internal lines of communication and the effort required to breach exterior walls.
- The time, effort, and material required to prepare defensive positions in the building.
- The potential fire hazard to its defenders.

Type 1. Wood and Timber Frame Construction

Most farm buildings and those buildings constructed prior to the late 19th century are classified as Type 1. Their wooden raftered ceilings and weak exterior walls offer little protection from indirect or direct weapons fire. Internal communication routes are excellent since their lightly constructed walls are easy to breach; however, significant reinforcement is required to provide protective cover if such buildings are to be used as defensive positions. Within larger built-up areas, Type 1 buildings present the greatest fire hazard.

Type 2. Masonry Construction



Buildings with strong walls of brick or natural stone constructed in the 19th and early 20th century are classified as Type 2. These buildings, typified by the old town hall, are commonly found in the central areas of towns and cities. They generally contain from two to four stories with wooden raftered ceilings and lightly constructed tile roofs. Presenting less of a fire hazard than wood and timber frame structures, Type 2 buildings are frequently suitable as defensive positions. While internal communication routes are excellent, external walls are difficult to breach without heavy weapons or demolitions.

Type 3. One- or Two-Family Dwellings

Family dwellings constructed of solid or insulating bricks or of cinder blocks with ceilings of reinforced concrete are classified as Type 3. Such buildings frequently contain strongly constructed basements. Type 3 buildings offer significant protection and require little reinforcement if used as defensive positions. Because of their construction, fire hazards are minimal. If demolished, significant rubble offering protection to the defender or creating an obstacle to the attacker is generated.

Type 4. Prefabricated One-Family Dwellings

Prefabricated family dwellings assembled with pre-cast and light building materials are classified as Type 4. In most cases, only the cellars or basements are strongly constructed. Unlike Type 3 dwellings, these buildings require significant reinforcement if they are to be used as defensive positions. They also constitute a fire hazard in a fixed defense. Rubble produced by their destruction creates an effective obstacle and additional cover for ground-level defensive positions.



Type 5. Office Building

Building Types 5 through 8 are comprised of multistory office and apartment buildings. For the purpose of classification and subsequent evaluation, each category is divided into those buildings of six stories or less and high-rise structures in excess of six stories. Multistoried office buildings, with their steel frame and reinforced concrete construction, are normally characterized by large expanses of plate glass which offer little protection.

Apartment buildings, while similar in size, generally have smaller glass areas and load-bearing reinforced concrete exterior walls which provide greater protection.



Type 6. High-Rise Office Building

Type 7. Apartment Building

Type 8. High-Rise Apartment Building

Type 9. Industrial/Warehouse Buildings



Buildings common to newer industrial and warehouse complexes are classified as Type 9. While the type construction may vary considerably, steel framing and the use of lightweight materials for exterior walls and roofs are normal practices. Reinforced concrete floors/ceilings are frequently used in multistory buildings.

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